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Abstract 
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, leftist thought in Cuba 
favoured anarcho-syndicalism more than any other ideology. Moreover, its 
practicality made it a popular choice among workers, who, attracted by the prospect 
of immediate and obtainable benefits, such as higher pay and fewer working hours, 
could help to prepare for the more distant revolution. This blend appealed to factory 
workers in Havana, in particular, and it is on that group that this thesis concentrates. 
A substantial growth in manufacturing industry in Cuba's capital during the 1910s 
facilitated in the creation, and then in the expansion, of a union to support the 
growing factory workforce. This thesis traces the lifespan of the Sindicato General 
Obrero de la Industria Fabril (Manufacturing Union Workers' General Union - 
SGOIF) and of its periodical El Progreso (Progress). Precursors to the SGOIF are 
studied and, for the first time, the union and its mouthpiece are analysed in detail. To 
achieve an in-depth knowledge of the SGOIF, it has been necessary to explore the 
structure of the union, who belonged to it, what tactics it used and what its ideology 
was. In this respect, both the philosophy behind the SGOIF and how this was 
employed in the real world have been examined. 
In order to fill the void left by Cuban social historiography, periodicals and 
government records are among the primary sources that have been inspected, an 
undertaking that has provided a wealth of information about the need for industrial 
unionism in Cuba and the perceived importance of direct action tactics among 
workers during the 1910s and 1920s. Through such examination, it has become 
clear that workers of the period possessed class-consciousness prior to the 
foundation of a communist party in Cuba. This thesis shows why anarcho- 
syndicalism in Cuba collapsed (detailing the part that the SGOIF played in its 
downfall), paving the way for communism, an ideology still so important in the 
political and social fabric of Cuba in the twenty first century. 
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Although the history of the Cuban labour movement has been well documented by 
Cuban and non-Cuban historians alike and the role of anarchism in that movement 
has been the subject of various studies, the part that anarcho-syndicalism played 
during the 1910s and the 1920s has mostly been glossed over, some writers barely 
dignifying it with one or two sentences in an otherwise comprehensive historiography 
of the Cuban working class. The wealth of available information surrounding both 
union organisation and the everyday lives of many workers employed in 
manufacturing industry in Havana, in particular, has been largely ignored, historians 
preferring instead to focus on the larger industries of sugar and tobacco or else to 
disregard the appeal of anarchist-related ideas and to concentrate, instead, on the 
growth of communism in a country that still educates its youth on the relevance of 
Marxism-Leninism, both of the ideology's past and its (more uncertain) present. 
Cuban labour historiography hardly admits the importance of that one-time leftist rival 
to communism, anarcho-syndicalism. The revolutionary socialist government of 
present-day Cuba seemingly attempts to validate the system still in place there, so, 
the bulk of the historiography emanating from Cuba during the last five decades has 
afforded little attention to anything that does not have a direct link with the nationalist 
attitudes prevalent today and, as regards the period studied in this thesis (1917- 
1925), major events such as the October Revolution in Russia, the birth of the Cuban 
Communist Party in 1925 (PCC), North American imperialism and the rise of the first 
regional (1920) and national (1925) labour federations have taken scholarly 
precedence over an ideology that had never agreed with communist means. 
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Anarchism entered Cuban worker consciousness during the 1880s. Spanish 
immigrant workers and the circulation of European anarchist periodicals 
communicated to Cubans an avenue for class struggle that, it was hoped, would 
combat inequalities present on the island. Prior to this, reformism had been the tool 
by which skilled tobacco workers, the first group to organise on any level in Cuba, 
aimed to improve conditions through mediation and education. Reformist leaders 
had negotiated with factory owners on behalf of the employees; the demands of the 
latter often being compromised. Anarchism, on the other hand, rejected bourgeois 
politics, and anarchists refused to use tactics that surrendered to employer 
concessions, while its promised cocktail of instant material benefits for workers and 
the image of complete future emancipation meant that anarchist unions attracted 
some new members. 
Anarchism's negative response to bourgeois politics may well account for its initial 
rise in popularity in a Spanish colony where residents without wealth and/or literacy 
skills had been excluded from the political arena. During the late nineteenth century, 
between 1.28% and 3% of all Cubans were eligible to vote. Anarchism promised 
social revolution for and by the workers themselves and Proudhonist logic assured 
them of the counter-revolutionary futility of any government. ' Even in the event of 
independence and the comparative leniency of new suffrage laws, anarchist-related 
doctrine continued to gain force in Cuba, resisting such competing leftist ideologies 
as socialism. 
Thwarted attempts to form socialist parties in early twentieth century Cuba have been 
seen by modem Cuban historians to be the result of the lack of political sophistication 
1 Joll summarises Proudhonism as follow: The abolition of the financier and the rentier, the securing to 
the worker of the full value of the goods he produced, the development of small, mutually supporting 
groups in place of the dehumanised factories, the constant reminder of the virtues of the peasant's life, 
all these had an obvious and positive appeal. And Proudhon's negative message was even more telling 
and contains the essence of anarchism" (Doll, 1979: 611. 
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among the populace [Aguirre, 1965; Ibarra, 1992; Grobart, 1966]. This thesis asserts 
that political immaturity and anarchism are not inter-related and that the 
organisational efforts of Cuban anarchists should not merely be seen as the 
forerunner to the inevitable success of communism. The failure of socialism to 
secure any plausible base of support during the first two decades of the last century 
should be attributed not to miseducation but to the refusal by Cuban socialist 
organisations to back the majority of strikes during this period. However, while such 
support could have improved the credibility of socialism, worker emancipation 
through the ballot box was not considered a serious option by many of the workforce: 
gross political corruption and the neo-colonialist policies of the United States of 
America towards Cuba deterred potential voters from wishing to cast any vote, 
regardless of party rhetoric. 
Although popular support was limited, Cuban socialist parties of the early twentieth 
century have been well documented [Rivero Muniz, 1962; Ibarra, 1992]. Likewise, 
the few strikes that possessed either nationalist undertones or that very rare socialist 
backing have been focussed upon, while anarchist-led strikes and organisations 
have often been, at worst, eliminated from Cuban labour historiography or, at best, 
under-estimated. The importance of all things socialist, such as the Russian 
Revolution and the importance of Marxist-Leninist literature on the thoughts and 
actions of workers in Cuba, in particular, appears to have been over-played. 
A major and indispensable work on the history of the Cuban labour movement is not 
attributed to any one writer or even to a collective: charting the movement from 1865 
to 1958 over four volumes (including two that reproduce important documents and 
articles from the period), Historia del Movimiento Obrero Cubano is dedicated to the 
third congress of the PCC and its author is named as the Instituto de Historia del 
Movimiento Comunista y de la Revoluciön Socialista de Cuba anexo al Comite 
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Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba (Institute of History of the Cuban Communist 
and Revolutionary Socialist Movement, annexed to the Central Committee of the 
Cuban Communist Party). 2 In the period that concerns us here, part of Volume 1 
details the "triumph of the great Socialist October Revolution" in Russia and analyses 
the impact of that remarkable event in other parts of Latin America and, in particular, 
Cuba. The October Revolution is an essential topic of study if one is to comprehend 
much of the politics of the twentieth century and especially the emergence of 
Marxism-Leninism and the Cuban Revolution, and many Cuban authors have 
understandably underlined the significance of the event. According to the official 
Cuban version: 
Desde 1917-1918, como resultado de la influencia de la victoriosa Revoluciön 
de Octubre de Rusia ... el movimiento obrero cubano entra en una 
fase 
nueva, superior. Se produce un notable ascenso en la conciencia de clase y 
en la combatividad de los trabajadores, en la lucha por su unidad y 
organizaciön (From 1917 to 1918, as a result of the influence of the victorious 
October Revolution in Russia ... the Cuban labour movement entered 
into a 
new, superior phase. There was a notable increase in class consciousness 
and in the fighting spirit of the workers, in the struggle for unity and 
organisation) [IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 196]. 
What this statement does not take into account is that, only two years before, the 
movement had been subject to particularly harsh treatment by the authorities, from 
which, in 1917, it was only just recovering. The organisational drive, furthermore, 
came not from the weak socialist element in Cuba but from the anarcho-syndicalists. 
"La violenta ruptura de hostilidades entre anarquistas y comunistas" (The violent 
outbreak of hostilities between anarchists and communists) [Aguirre, 1965: 81] that 
changed course as a result of events in Russia (and the Cuban government's 
interpretation and fear of the Revolution) had never been as pronounced in Cuba as 
it was elsewhere, due to the scant attraction of socialism there. 
2 These works are referenced from now on as IHMCRSC. 
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Serviat has rightly pointed out that the ideological current within the Cuban labour 
movement that was most affected by the Russian Revolution was anarcho- 
syndicalism [Serviat, 1967: 12], unsurprisingly, as it was the most popular leftist view 
at that time and so its adherents were the workers most likely to be informed of 
events through meetings and publications. Cabrera has contended that the 
influence on those workers was colossal: 
La büsqueda y utilizaciön de los textos marxistaleninistas se hizo cotidiana 
entre los grupos mfis avanzados de la clase obrera. Se citaba a Lenin a 
cada paso, las obras didäcticas proletarias segulan los lineamientos 
marcados por la Revoluciön Rusa (The search for and use of Marxist-Leninist 
texts increased daily among the more advanced of the working class. Lenin 
was quoted at every opportunity, didactic proletarian works followed the 
outlines marked out by the Russian Revolution) [Cabrera, 1985: 203]. 
As Cordova has noted, initial reports of the socialist revolution were not to be found 
in those publications dedicated to workers, but among the pages of the Havana 
bourgeois press [Cordova, 1997: 128], by those who wished to prevent copycat 
uprisings that might affect personal wealth and business. It is true that, after October 
1917, Lenin's writings and speeches were more widely used and discussed (none 
had reached the masses outside Russia anywhere before that date), although, if 
some workers agreed with his ideas, others did not and those who questioned the 
ideals of Lenin increased in number as information regarding Bolshevik persecution 
of workers (and others) reached foreign shores. In Cuba, condemnation of atrocities 
being committed in the new Republic was published in the worker press, a muted 
point in post-1959 Cuban analysis. 
The common assertion that the era of Marxism-Leninism was a period of heightened 
class-consciousness is misleading, and somewhat unfair, as such comments imply 
that any effort at organisation and education prior to that era was weak and that 
workers had been ill-informed. In fact, some opinions are more than mere 
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insinuations: Cabrera - "hasta 1917 el movimiento obrero, se caracterizb por 
esfuerzos islados e incoordinados" (until 1917, the worker movement was 
characterised by isolated and uncoordinated efforts) [Cabrera, 1969: 45] or (referring 
to 1914) Telleria Toca - "Nada positiva era la situaciön obrera por esa epoca de 
mucha miseria y poca organizaciön, de mucha politiqueria en el pals y poca 
conciencia clasista en sus trabajadores (there was nothing positive about the worker 
situation during that period of much poverty and little organisation, of much party 
politics in the country and little class consciousness among the workers) [Tellerfa 
Toca, 1972: 2]. 
Workers in Cuba had been organising along class lines for decades, especially in the 
tobacco industry, where artisans attempted to protect their own interests by forming 
unions, publishing worker periodicals and even calling anarchist conferences during 
the 1880s. The organisation of tobacco workers has been well documented and 
Jean Stubbs' detailed account of it stretches over both the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries [Stubbs, 1985]. Other members of the urban worker community had 
successfully attempted organisation, including printers, construction workers and 
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service industry workers, some forming unions that experienced a lull only during the 
War of Independence (1895-1898), renewing struggle as soon as it had reached a 
conclusion. In rural areas, the late abolition of slavery and its legacy stalled unionism 
in that industry. 3 
Traditions of slavery, colonialism, the War of Independence, continuing immigration, 
particularly from Spain (which survived well into the twentieth century) and 
neighbouring Caribbean islands (from around 1913), and the reliance on foreign 
economies meant that the early decades of the twentieth century was a period in 
which Cubans were still forging, or re-evaluating, a national identity (as in the USA or 
3 This is discussed more fully in Chapter 1. 
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Argentina, the notion of Cubanidad, or Cuban-ness, was not restricted to those who 
had been born in the country, history made it far more complex [Kapcia, 2000]). 
Shaffer has noted: 
... in Cuba the 
international anarchist movement arose in an exceptionally 
fluid moment of the island's history when no recognised notion of national 
identity had yet been solidified [Shaffer, 1998: viii]. 
Shaffer has recognised that even though Marxism was not popular in Cuba until the 
late 1920s, that had not precluded among the workers a sense of belonging to a 
particular class; many knew what was, or should be, involved in class struggle. 
Anarchism prospered among a working class that found no comfort in party politics 
(besides many workers were disenfranchised) but who did not yet enjoy a sense of 
nationhood or patria, a concept detested by anarchists, who instead viewed the world 
in an international context. 
The 1920s are commonly perceived to be a watershed in Cuban history, ushering in 
a period of the awakening of a national consciousness [Grobart, 1966; Silva Leon, 
1997]. The romantic and nationalist theories of the Cuban patriot Jose Marti were 
resurrected almost in conjunction with the formation of the first Cuban communist 
party. That decade has been described as a time of the arrival of a political maturity 
in Cuba when communist organisers, apostles of Marti, finally realised the need for a 
national and social liberation for Cuba and, until the challenge of communism, it is 
argued, there had been no serious nationalist debate. Anarchists, in their efforts to 
rid society of the entire capitalist system, had not drawn any distinction between the 
(increasingly US owned) tobacco trusts and sugar plantations and other employers, 
so hampering nationalist sentiment among the workers. Only during the upsurge of 
nationalism in the 1920s, it has been maintained, did labour imagine that the USA 
was an all-powerful exploiter and dominator of Cubans [Silva Leon, 1997: 45]. 
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According to the bulk of historiography, this fusion of communism and nationalism in 
the 1920s, with all its animosity towards the United States of America (a feeling still 
harboured in present-day Cuba), is where the modern day history of the country truly 
begins. The downfall of anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba is often attributed to the 
foundation of the PCC. While it is certainly a fact that the popularity of anarchist- 
related thought was eclipsed by communism, it should not be assumed that one had 
passed its shelf life and was simply replaced by the other. Other, equally importantly 
factors, not least the limitations of unionism, internal quarrels and repression, which, 
until now, have not been analysed in detail, contributed to the demise of anarcho- 
syndicalism in Cuba, 
The desire by Cuban historians to demonstrate that communism is, if not a Cuban 
phenomenon, a cubanised one, has led to the assumption that, conversely, 
anarchism was a doctrine transplanted to, and cultivated in, Cuba by Spanish 
immigrants. This argument has been upheld by Aguirre, del Toro and Silva Leon 
who have asserted that since anarchism was Spanish it was also unpatriotic and thus 
hindered the real independence of Cuba. Aguirre contends that at the dawn of 
independence from Spain, the majority of those tobacco workers who were anarchist 
were also mainly Spanish and possessed "el patriotismo desorientado y el 
internacionalism desorientado" (misplaced patriotism and misplaced internationalism) 
[Aguirre, 1965: 80]. However, Aguirre has offered no analysis of anarchist ideology 
and no attempt has been made to assess the attitude of anarchists to nationhood. 
That anarchist-related doctrine does not pledge allegiance to any particular country 
(anarchist "patriotism" is instead expressed in its loyalty to the working class as a 
whole) has led to the assumption that anarchism in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was unpatriotic. 
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The part that anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism played in educating and preparing 
the masses for the class struggle has also been downgraded and, instead, the study 
of Marxist-Leninist thought taken precedence. As Hennessy has suggested: 
As losers, anarchists have not had a good press. Praised for their militancy in 
the pre-1917 period, once there was the model for a vanguard Marxist 
Leninist party to be emulated, any refusal to do so was condemned as back- 
sliding or worse [Hennessy, 1988: 252]. 
Ferndndez, a Cuban anarchist who now lives in political exile in Miami, has charted 
much of the anarchist movement on the island, particularly through the publication 
(now ceased) of a magazine dedicated to the anarchist cause, Gudngara Libertaria, 
and in his book El Anarquismo en Cuba. The former includes essays in which 
Fernandez has detailed the events and personalities of late nineteenth-century 
anarchism in Cuba, while the latter charts the history of anarchism from its genesis in 
the 1860s to those anarchists who fled to the USA after the success of Castro's 
Revolution., While a refreshing account from an anarchist's perspective, Fernändez's 
book fails to credit the Sindicato General Obrero de la Industria Fabril (Manufacturing 
Industry Workers' General Union - SGOIF), although he, like other Cuban historians 
studying the period, does acknowledge the undeniable presence of anarcho- 
syndicalists in two of the most important and cohesive worker unions of the 1920s, 
the Federacidn Obrera de la Habana (FOH) and the Confederaciön Nacional de 
Obreros Cubanos (CNOC). Unlike many writing on the subject, Femändez has 
realised that, from 1921: 
... se inicia la etapa mfis constructiva 
del anarquismo en Cuba. La semilla 
plantada por los äcratas a finales de la decada de 1880 se habia convertido 
en aquel <Arbol de la Llbertad> que mencionara Roig San Martin, 4 y 
empezaba a dar frutos (the most constructive stage of anarchism in Cuba 
began. The seed planted by the rebels at the end of the 1880s had become 
that "Tree of Liberty" referred to by Roig San Martin, and began to bear fruit 
[Fernandez, 2000: 59]. 
For more information on Roig San Martin, see Chapter 1. 
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The general consensus by post-revolutionary Cuban historians is that by 1920, 
anarchism in Cuba had all but begun to fade. Some, but not all, non-Cuban 
historians, however, have been less dismissive, such as Benjamin, who has pointed 
out that the CNOC was "founded and until 1928 dominated by anarchist leadership" 
(the CNOC ceased to exist in that yearl) [Benjamin, 1975: 70]. Liss has conceded 
that anarchists did help found that national worker Confederation "which by the late 
1920s contained thirty-five trade unions and was affiliated with the Profintern, 
Moscow's 'Red Union' movement" [Liss, 1987: 64], thus, once again disregarding the 
strength and importance of anarchists at that time. 
More frustratingly, the role of the SGOIF within the Cuban labour movement has 
been almost entirely overlooked. Ferndndez does not even list the union's long 
running and popular mouthpiece, El Progreso [Progress], among those worker 
periodicals consulted in his bibliography and, less surprisingly, nor does that official 
Cuban publication, IHMCRSC. The occasional sentence has been dedicated to the 
union itself: Paldez Groba agreed that the SGOIF was the most combative force 
during the, first half of the twentieth century [Palaez Groba, 1991: 35]; Dimas 
mentioned, the extremely long, hard-fought boycott of La Polar beer, that was 
declared by SGOIF members and backed by countless unions and workers 
throughout the country [Dimas, 1975: 210]. That boycott was a drawn out, violent 
affair which can hardly be omitted from any labour study that concerns 1920s 
Havana but, by many, has been entirely ignored. 
Page dedicated a paragraph to the boycott, stating that terrorists were responsible 
for placing poison in bottles of La Polar, resulting in the death of "several persons" 
[Page, 1952: 59], although primary sources show that one worker died through 
drinking contaminated beer and the premise that "terrorists" carried out the act was 
not proven, the authorities ultimately failing to charge anyone with the deed. 
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According to Cabrera, the authorities themselves were the perpetrators of the crime, 
which was a near-successful attempt by them to frame leading members of the union 
[Cabrera, 1985: 256]. It is, maybe, a more realistic explanation, and one certainly 
held by the SGOIF, but one that is also without evidence. I have dedicated Chapter 
5 to analysing direct action declared by members of the SGOIF, and the boycott of 
La Polar, and the poisoning of it, deserves its own case study, being an important 
event that highlights the strength of feeling among urban workers and the measures 
they were prepared to take in order to fight employers, while simultaneously 
illustrating the solidarity shown by other workers in other trades and, as importantly, 
in other parts of the island. 
Cabrera has maintained that some in the SGOIF caused friction in the labour 
movement: 
Algunos, muy sujetos a la doctrina anarquista, sostuvieron polemicas inütiles 
o criticas daninas a la unidad obrera cuyos resultados fueron perjudiciales al 
movimiento revolucionario en general (some, very given to the anarchist 
doctrine, maintained useless or critical polemics that damaged worker unity, 
the results of which were generally harmful to the revolutionary movement) 
(Cabrera, 1985: 255]. 
She is, no doubt, referring to the differences of opinion between some in the SGOIF 
and the FOH at the time of the sugar strikes of 1924, detailed here in Chapter 4. 
However, Cabrera has not taken into account the fact that, ordinarily, a mutual 
respect existed between the two unions, nor has she substantiated accusations that 
anarchism was the root cause of any discrepancies and, like many of her generation, 
she has simply assumed that any anarchist-related doctrine was an inferior product 
that the radical proletariat had embraced merely as a precursor to something more 
advanced. The fact that that the SGOIF set up an adult education centre and a 
rationalist school for children has been overlooked by everyone, except Shaffer, and 
the union has mainly attracted negative attention, if any. While not aiming to uphold 
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the SGOIF as a beacon in the history of the Cuban labour movement, this thesis 
does at least attempt to fill the large void left by others debating the subject. 
Anarchism as an Ideology 
If no sense of nationalism and little class consciousness existed before the advent of 
communism, what was the point of anarchism both before and during this period? 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, where I have underlined the hopes and tactics of the SGOIF 
specifically and anarcho-syndicalists generally, is concerned with the ideology of the 
union. But can anarchism be labelled an ideology? How is it defined? , 
Those attempting to analyse the philosophy of anarchism have observed that its 
flexible nature makes it difficult to define [Miller, 1984: 2; Vincent, 1989: 114]. 
Perhaps, then, any attempt to compartmentalise it should be avoided. Anarchists 
understand their system of beliefs and values to be evolutionary and not static: there 
exists no collective or central anarchist manifesto and its amorphous character does 
not facilitate the creation of one. To identify anarchism as an ideology is 
troublesome: it is tempting to define any "ism" as an ideology, but the absence of any 
generic anarchist philosophy appears to negate such definition. The perceived need 
to find a one-suits-all label for anarchism (and all "ideologies") has, in fact, meant that 
a vast array of thought, ideas and understandings has often been streamlined. For, 
example, Ridley observed that theorists have tried to rationalise revolutionary 
syndicalism, in an attempt to arrange it into a logical sequence. To do this is "to treat. 
it as something unified, whereas its ideas covered a whole range of divergent shades 
of opinion. Over-simplification is the result. - And the result of that is distortion" 
[Ridley, 1973: 3]. The same could be said of anarchism and its offshoots. 
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Examining the history of anarchism in Argentine trade unions, Thompson complains 
that historians have tried "to identify ideological consistency in the (labour) 
movement, and force the various currents into a series of conventional theoretical 
moulds" [Thompson, 1984: 99]. However, anarchism is not consistent, she argues, it 
allows room for change and, as the anarcho-syndicalist Rudolf Rocker pointed out, 
"one cannot assign (to anarchism) any definite terminus nor any fixed goal" [Rocker, 
1951: 14], so, the question as to whether it is an ideology or not remains nebulous. 
Eagleton has questioned . why owners of any ideology deny that their system of 
beliefs is actually an ideology at all. To admit that one possesses an ideology, he 
argues, is to confess that one adheres to a fixed set of ideas that would be difficult to 
alter and, in this pejorative sense, ideology is seen as restrictive, allowing no room 
for manoeuvre [Eagleton, 1991: 3]. Rigidity is particularly anathema to anarchism as 
the whole premise of anarchism relies on its flexible nature and, so, to classify it in 
this way would be alien to any anarchist. In his attempt to condense the meaning of 
the term anarchism, Berkman declared that it "teaches that we can live in a society 
where there is no compulsion of any kind" [Berkman, 1929: 9], so to restrict 
anarchism would be interpreted (by the anarchist) as a kind of compulsion or lack of 
liberty to think and to act freely. 
"For the American political theorist Edward Shils, " Eagleton observed, "ideologies are 
explicit, closed, resistant to innovation, promulgated with a great deal of affectivity 
and require total adherence from their devotees" [Eagleton, 1991: 4]. If this 
interpretation were true, an ideology cannot be altered and is inorganic, "But, " 
observed the Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta, "we do not want to harden our 
anarchism into dogma, nor impose it by force; it will be what it can be, and will 
develop...... " [Malatesta, Pensiero e Volantä, 15/05/1924]. According to anarchists, 
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then, anarchism is amorphous, organic and spontaneous, possessing neither leaders 
nor anyone to impose his or her own will onto others. 
In order to understand one's own position, Lukäcs maintained, it is first necessary to 
understand other ideologies so that one can competently fight against this other [see 
Eagleton, 1991: 80]. Only then can a "true" class-consciousness be born. 
Anarchists have traditionally fought against authoritarian socialism as a viable option 
in replacing the existing social order, maintaining that it amounts to the oppression of 
the masses by the few. The debate as to whether a transitory state is needed after 
the revolution has been constantly thrashed out between Marxists and anarchists 
since Marx and Bakunin waged that ideological battle in the First International. 
Although both channels of thought agreed on the same ends, society without state, 
the means to achieving them differed. The important point here is that each group 
knows and understands the other's point of view and, being in opposition to it, forms 
its alternative ideology. 
Anarchists have also compared and contrasted their model to liberalism: Malatesta 
affirmed: 
... liberalism is in theory a kind of anarchy without socialism, and therefore is 
simply a lie, for freedom is not possible without equality, and real anarchy 
cannot exist without solidarity, without socialism [Malatesta, I'Anarchia, 
August 1896] 
Writing some 40 years later, Rocker also likened the two: 
In common with Liberalism, Anarchism represents the idea that the happiness 
and prosperity of the individual must be the standard in all social matters. 
And, in common with the great representatives of liberal thought, it has also 
the idea of limiting the functions of government to a minimum... [Rocker, 
1951: 10] 
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Liberalism, Rocker went on to say, is the concept: that government is best which 
governs least'", while anarchism maintains: `that government is best which governs 
not at all" [Rocker, 1951: 10]. Anarchism here is a method that criticises other 
ideologies and, in effect, forms its own ideology as a reaction against them. 
Anarchism thus can be observed as a negative ideology, that is, it challenges rather 
than creates. This is especially true if one takes the anarchist position vis-ä-vis 
capitalism into consideration. 
Eagleton discussed the opinion that capitalism nurtures revolution and that it is the 
oppressive nature of capitalist society that forces the downtrodden to question their 
own existence, or, capitalism creates revolutionaries [Eagleton, 1991: 103]. 
Anarchism can be defined as the antithesis to capitalism: it is combative, in short, the 
ideology of anarchism is a form of defence against capitalism. In the words of 
Malatesta: "(Anarchism) is not necessarily linked to any philosophical system. (It) 
was born of a moral revolt against social injustice" [Malatesta, Pensiero e Vo/antä, 
16/05/1925]. 
Anarchism negates the existing socio-political order anarchism is dual-edged, being 
an amalgam of the awareness of other ideologies and systems, such as socialism, 
liberalism and capitalism, and a response to these, but it is also based on day-to-day 
experiences. Like any set of ideas, anarchism may be passed onto the masses by 
the theorists, through education and propaganda, and may be interpreted by anyone 
outside of the ruling class. Theory and practice come together here and anarchism 
becomes a synthesis of that which is made clear to the oppressed through teachings 
and that which is experienced first hand. Eagleton explained: 
A successful ideology must work both practically and theoretically, and 
discover some way of linking these levels. It must extend from an elaborated 
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system of thought to the minutiae of everyday life, from a scholarly treatise to 
a shout in the street [Eagleton, 1991: 48]. 
Anarchism satisfies both these chief ingredients. From Bakunin to present-day 
anarchists, it has been widely accepted that anarchism must be fought on two fronts, 
through education and direct action. Anarcho-syndicalism may be seen as a further 
development of this double attack; it promises the final emancipation of the working 
class and it strives for immediate financial and social gains. Through direct action 
(strikes, sabotage and boycotts, in particular), anarcho-syndicalism aims eventually 
to overthrow the state, ridding society of government, religion and capitalism, in order 
that the workers, through unionisation, take control of the means of production. Any 
gains secured in preparation for the Revolution, whether shorter working days, the 
right to associate or a raise in wages, can only benefit the masses and strengthen 
the anarcho-syndicalist cause. 
Although anarchists, like many revolutionaries, may not consider their way of thinking. 
to be ideological - as Eagleton pointed out: "Ideology, like halitosis, is ... what the 
other person has" [Eagleton, 1991: 2] - anarchism certainly possesses some of the 
criteria to be termed an ideology. In the negative sense of the word, it is an ideology 
because in is in opposition to other ways of living, that is, it is a revolt against the 
state. More positively, anarchism is an ideology because it is partly formed through 
class-consciousness, being at once experiential and able to analyse and assess 
other ideologies in order to design a response to them. 
If so many workers in Cuba adhered to anarchist-related doctrine years before the 
foundation of a communist party there, then, they possessed class-consciousness. 
They were aware of their position in society and joined the class war in an attempt to 
change that, a claim that is supported throughout this thesis by the documentation 
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and analysis of union statutes, worker action and quotes from the Cuban worker 
press. 
Methodology 
This thesis is not a comparative study of manufacturing industry workers with those 
from any other industry either within Cuba or outside the country. I could have, for 
example, compared and contrasted urban brewery workers with rural sugar industry 
workers, the former belonging to a nascent and still small industry and the latter 
employed in an industry so large and financially viable that it had been deemed 
necessary to import thousand upon thousands of slaves until the late nineteenth 
century. The sugar industry had experienced huge growth during the early years of 
US hegemony, when mills (and thus workers) were subjected to rationalisation, 
something that urban factories, being relatively new, did not experience, most of the 
workers being employed as unskilled hands from the start and who were not, 
therefore, victims of deskilling, but who still managed to form a large, all- 
encompassing union long before those in the more geographically dispersed sugar 
areas. 
A study of tobacco workers, who had the oldest tradition of unionism in the country 
and who were the first to embrace anarchism, would have sat comfortably next to an 
analysis of the SGOIF, which was not founded until 1917, by which time the tobacco 
unions were exclusively reformist (I use the term reformist to refer to those unions 
that worked with employers and the state, rather than against them, to achieve 
benefits for their members). It would also have been interesting to have weighed the 
longevity of El Progreso against any number of the short-lived, left-wing worker 
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periodicals of 1920s Cuba, such as Acciön Consciente, Accidn Libertaria, Anda, 
Tiempos Nuevos, Nueva Luz, Justicia or ! Tierra!. 5 
Alternatively, I could have compared the rise and fall of the SGOIF and El Progreso 
with the United Brewery Workers of the USA, which, like the SGOIF in Cuba, was 
one. of the very first unions to embrace industrial unionism in that country and whose 
president, William E. Trautmann, was a founding member of the Industrial Workers of 
the World (IWW) and editor of Brauer Zeitung, a union mouthpiece written by and 
dedicated to the rank-and-file of the US brewing industry. 
I chose to do none of this as, I believe, the SGOIF merits its own study. That the 
union grouped together never before unionised workers (as a group of workers in 
that industry), that it was the first union in Cuba to organise along industrial lines and 
that it successfully printed its own periodical for five years are reasons enough. In 
addition, the union condoned the use of direct action (and many union members 
were arrested, deported or murdered for their - sometimes only alleged - roles in the 
use of that action). Furthermore, it was extremely influential-in the _ 
FOH and the 
CNOC, while the downfall of anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba has been attributed to the 
collapse of the SGOIF. Taking these factors into account, it becomes clear that the 
union makes for an engaging investigation. 
The near-omission of anarcho-syndicalism from the history of Cuba has been 
outlined above. Having consulted many secondary sources in Britain, mostly books 
and newspaper articles, it became apparent that the oversight was general and, 
deciding to investigate the real force of the ideology in Cuba, I travelled to the 
International Institute of Social History (IISG) in Holland in order to consult sources 
there. I had already familiarised myself with the broader history of Cuba through the 
5 Although ITierral survived from 1902 until 1914, its second phase was only for one year (1924-1925) 
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study of some of the Foreign Office records in London (at the Public Records Office 
In Kew), in addition to general history books on Cuba, the USA and Latin America. 
Likewise, it was important to examine the archives at the IISG and to formulate. a 
further research plan before making the longer trip to Havana. In Amsterdam, I 
uncovered editions of EI Progreso from 1924 and 1925, the study of which 
highlighted the importance of the SGOIF in the history of the Cuban labour 
movement, a union that, until then, I had barely heard of. The conceptual framework 
of this thesis rests heavily on the textual analysis and interpretation of EI Progreso 
(almost every edition ever printed from 1920 to 1925 is available for consultation at 
the Institute of History in Havana) and the archival analysis of sources uncovered at 
the Cuban National Archives, which included contemporary Cuban Government files 
on many unions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not least on the 
SGOIF, the FOH and the CNOC. 
My research was not designed to be an analysis of the SGOIF alone. While it was 
Important that I look at the "union line" as well as the reality that the workers faced 
and why they would (indeed whether they did) subscribe to a world-view that was 
much touted in the union halls and literature, it was also vital that I study periodicals 
dedicated to those working in other trades (printers, tobacco workers or chefs, for 
example) and those that offered other points of view (anarcho-naturist, reformist, 
bourgeois), in order to obtain a clearer picture and to ensure that I did not approach 
the question one-dimensionally. The thesis draws upon vast the qualitative data that 
I analysed and interpreted from many sources. 
I have separated this thesis into five chapters. Firstly The Development of the 
Cuban Labour Movement -A Historical Context" details the economic, political and 
social atmosphere in Cuba leading up to and during the period in which the SGOIF 
existed, looking at Cuba both in a domestic and an international context. This first 
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chapter also traces the rise of unionism in Cuba, looking at direct worker action (and 
important strikes, in particular) and conferences, whilst acknowledging the advent of 
communism and changing attitudes among the workers. It is hoped that this will 
allow the reader to get an impression of what was happening in Cuba around the 
time of the lifespan of the SGOIF and to understand the tradition (albeit a short 
tradition) of unionism on the island prior to its foundation. 
Chapter 2 is a short account of the anarchist unions that existed prior to the SGOIF 
and that were dedicated to those employed in the bars, cafes, hotels and restaurants 
of Cuba, in general, and Havana, in particular. The importance of these workers as 
regards this thesis is that many shared a knowledge of and supported direct action 
and industrial unionism in the years before a strong manufacturing sector, and so 
union, was formed in Cuba. "Forerunners to the SGOIF" illustrates that members of 
the SGOIF were not the first to espouse anarcho-syndicalism or to propagate it 
through their union's periodical, an event attributed to those working in Cuba's 
service industry during the early 1900s. The chapter studies what could be termed 
the evolutionary process of anarcho-syndicalism and also gives a brief introduction to 
the SGOIF, analysing why workers were propelled to found a union dedicated 
exclusively to factory workers, leading to chapter 3, in which the reader is invited to 
consider anarcho-syndicalist theory versus practice. 
"Pie in the Skyýand Pork-Chop Mentality" examines the purpose of the union, or its 
ideology, while taking time to consider the structure of the union and how it was run. 
It also concentrates on individual worker leaders, in order to determine if and how 
they differed from non-committee members. I ask what might have encouraged 
some to renounce the leftist ideas and attitudes that they once embraced for more 
conservative ones and how those seen as traitors (amarillistas) to the anarcho- 
syndicalist cause were treated by the union, through analysis of El Progreso. This 
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section looks at how anarchists became suspicious (and even paranoid) of any 
worker-leader who did, not wholly embrace anarcho-syndicalism, in particular. The 
chapter then goes on to give details of the workers themselves, an important study 
that helps the reader to get a sense of who the workers were, where they came from, 
where they worked and whether they supported the union. Unions could not exist 
without the rank-and-file and so I have attempted to give an overview of those whom 
the SGOIF represented. 
Chapter 4 illustrates how the SGOIF drew upon the reality of those workers in a bid 
to form along industrial lines, a type of unionism that had recently grown in popularity 
among workers in the neighbouring USA. "The Struggle for Industrial Unionism" 
uncovers why industrial unionism appeared to be the best form of organisation, given 
the mix of gender, provenance and race of many of those who worked in the new 
factories of Havana. It also looks at SGOIF's relationship with other unions at the 
time and especially the numerically and historically important regional FOH and the 
national CNOC, giving an insight into the popularity (or not) of the SGOIF among 
workers in other unions and other parts of the country, a theme that is continued In 
Chapter 5. 
"Anarcho-syndicalism and Direct Action as a Revolutionary Tool" shows how the 
union and its members used boycotts, sabotage and strikes as a means to achieving 
emancipation, showing how the ideas of direct action evolved into practical tools in 
the struggle for revolution. The precepts of direct action were not only condoned and 
propagated in El Progreso but were also embraced by the workers, and chapter 5 
highlights the application of these tactics by union members. I have made a case 
study of the extremely long consumer boycott of La Polar beer, concentrating on the 
motivation for such action, its evolution into something altogether more sinister, the 
reporting of the boycott among those both sympathetic and non-sympathetic to it and 
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the attention and support it drew from the rank-and-file. I also relate how the 
authorities used the boycott at La Polar and other incidents of violent worker action to 
justify the closure of the SGOIF and the clampdown on unionism in Cuba in general. 
The story ends with the rise of President Gerado Machado in 1925 and his 
determination to appease US business fears with regard to the labour question". 
In my conclusion, I have summed up the arguments of this thesis, laying out the 
reasons for the ultimate failure of the SGOIF and anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba, a left- 




The Development of the Cuban Labour Movement -A Historical Context. 
Any study of the Cuban labour movement in the 1920s must begin with an 
understanding of the state of the country at that point and with an analysis of 
conditions in the years leading up to it. The formation of a workforce influenced by 
any ideology depends on many socio-political and economic factors, both domestic 
and foreign. In Cuba, the persistence of a functioning slave trade, and then its 
abolition, the struggle to end Spanish colonialism, the growth of capitalism, the 
extensive influence of the USA (and fear of occupation or annexation by that 
country), the attitude of the government at home and working conditions all 
contributed to the mentality and actions of workers. For this reason, this chapter is 
concerned with the 70-year period leading up to the collapse of anarcho-syndicalism 
in Cuba, in an attempt to trace both the history of a working-class movement that 
vied with the system and the circumstances in which workers were placed. 
The chapter has been divided into three sections. Firstly it traces the Cuba of the 
late nineteenth century (From Slavery to Independence), commenting on national 
politics and the genesis of labour organisation. It then analyses the early days of the 
Republic from 1898 to 1917 (La Republica Mediatizada), a section that, while 
following the development of the labour movement, pays particular attention to US 
influence on the island, an examination that continues in the final part of the chapter 
(The Building of Unions, Federations and Confederations). Part 3 looks at the period 
1917 to 1925, the life-span of the subject of this thesis, the Sindicato General Obrero 
de la Industria Fabril [SGOIF] (The General Workers' Union of the Manufacturing 
Industry), detailing the workers' movement in Cuba as a whole. 
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From Slavery to Independence 
Cuba had relied on African slave labour until 1886 when, alongside Brazil, it became 
the -last country in the Western Hemisphere to completely outlaw the practice. 
Slavery was an important issue for the creole elite (criollos), that is, those white 
families of Spanish descent who had relaxed ties with the mother country and who, 
unlike the peninsulares (those born in Spain), possessed no political power. From the 
mid-nineteenth century some landed criollos sought the annexation of Cuba to the 
United States, which, they believed, would prolong slavery in Cuba, while many US 
planters in the southern United States hoped that the acquisition of Cuba would help 
to uphold slavery, strengthening their own cause. 
With the success of the northern states in the US Civil War, however, the Cuban 
oligarchy anticipated that the emancipation of slaves or even a possible slave revolt, 
would now be the result of annexation. Attitudes towards annexation by the USA 
thus changed and many criollos, conceding that the demise of slavery in Cuba was 
inevitable (it had been outlawed internationally), now supported the gradual abolition 
of slavery coupled with compensation to landowners by the Spanish state. A new 
political party, the Reformist Party, expounded these ideas. It was, however, short- 
lived and was dissolved in 1868 shortly after a rebellion by the military in Spain when, 
ousting the increasingly unpopular Isabel II, revolts flared up on the mainland. 
Threatened by the possibility of a social revolution, the oligarchy declared worker 
associations and some new political parties illegal and enforced censorship in Spain.. 
This paranoia was soon felt in Cuba by a new regime that had become suspicious of 
the new Cuban party's liberalism and, moreover, that had the power to destroy it. 
As Cuba was a Spanish colony, the two countries had become trading partners and 
the bulk of businesses in Cuba were owned by peninsular and creole businessmen 
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and oligarchic families. From the nineteenth century, however, the economic growth 
of the United States meant that a new trading partner was beginning to emerge and 
the warning bells of dependency began to sound very early on in this relationship. A 
financial crisis, offset by the end of the Crimean War in 1856, caused alarm in the. - 
USA when the decline in the demand for wheat not only affected farmers but also 
had a negative effect on the shipping industry. A panic ensued on Wall Street and a 
protective tariff on Cuban exports was imposed by the USA. Due to the differing 
nature of the two main industries in Cuba, sugar and tobacco, the economic 
difficulties arising from the tariff were not dealt with by those industries in the same 
way. Part of the tobacco industry responded by relocating to the USA, taking with it 
many experienced employees, an action made possible by the type of worker 
employed in the tobacco industry and by issues of crop transportation: whereas 
sugar was mostly still planted and cultivated by slaves, cigar factories employed 
skilled and (paid) workers, who enjoyed freedom of movement. Furthermore, it was 
more necessary for the comparatively heavy and cheap sugar to be processed close 
to the plantations while tobacco could be grown in the western provinces of Cuba, 
especially in Pinar del Rio and then transported to nearby Florida for rolling. 
Factories sprang up in areas such as Tampa and Key West, while the skilled workers 
who remained in cigar factories in and around Havana went on to form the genesis of 
organised labour in Cuba. ° 
This new worker organisation was based on mutualism 7a response to the 
precarious financial position of the workers. Mutual aid societies protected members 
from the economic hardships of unemployment or falling wages, helping families as 
well as individuals to cope with unforeseen changes in the industry, as had occurred 
as a direct result of the 1857 financial crisis, for example. The societies also assisted 
For more information on cigar workers in Cuba see Stubbs, 1985: 93. 7 Exclusively white and exclusively black mutual aid societies that offered sickness benefit were also 
formed among other workers in Havana and were linked to local parishes [see Thomas, 1998: 236/7]. 
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financially those workers suffering from ill-health, a requirement highlighted by a 
cholera epidemic in 1855 [Portuondo, 1961: 15]. The need for mutual aid was coupled 
with a realisation that social reform could also benefit the workers and, in 1865, the 
Asturian-born Saturnino Martinez began publication of La Aurora, a periodical 
dedicated to workers in Cuba's tobacco factories. ° 
As a result of the 1868 revolution in Spain, La Aurora closed, the return to Spanish 
conservatism bringing not only political but also social repression to Cuba. 9 The 
revolution in Spain provided a catalyst for the discontent already apparent among 
many pockets of the Cuban community. Spain imposed taxes on both Cuban imports 
and exports, while the USA retaliated by raising tariffs on Cuban goods, contributing 
to the overall dark mood in a country that was sinking further into recession. Eastern 
Cuba rose up against the injustices and limitations of Spanish rule, when, on 10 
October 1868, the Grito de Yara demanded social and economic reform. The 
subsequent rebellion lasted ten years. 
The Ten Years War- had halted worker solidarity. However, with the 1878 Pact- of 
Zanjön, a treaty agreed on by Spain and rebel leaders in Cuba in the wake of the 
war, reforms were introduced into Cuba. Political control was relaxed and the press 
became less restricted by censorship, while workers' unions and the Partido 
Autonomista (Autonomist Party), which bore resemblance to the Reformist Party that 
preceded it, were founded. 10 
8 Martinez emigrated to Cuba as a young man and found employment in Jaime Partagas cigar factory in 
Havana. He also worked in the library of the Sociedad Econbmica, after being educated in literature 
and politics at the Liceo de Guanabacoa (a cultural centre for working-class white workers). He was 
connected to the Reformist Party and its periodical EI Siglo, which advocated reform. He abandoned 
the labour movement during the early 1890s and was appointed secretary to the Chamber of 
Commerce. 
9A strike at the Cabanas y Carvajal factory in Havana in 1869 was repressed by the authorities, for 
example. 
10 As the name suggests, the Autonomist Party sought autonomy with Spain and the right to free trade. 
The Partido Union Constitucional, on the other hand, desired the continued total rule of Cuba by Spain. 
Both parties required a peaceful solution to the question of governance In Cuba. 
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In the workplace, artisans and tobacco workers, the aristocracy of labour, eager to 
protect their jobs from the mass of Spanish immigrants, were among the first to unite. 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, southern Europeans began 
to respond to the push-pull effects of immigration and sought new lives throughout 
the Americas. The push of poverty, persecution and repression from their native 
countries, coupled with the pull of economic betterment and the promise of 
employment in the New World persuaded millions to emigrate. Due to political, 
cultural and linguistic ties, the bulk of new arrivals into Cuba at this time were those. 
fleeing poverty from Spain. 
Some Spanish workers brought to the Americas those revolutionary ideologies that 
were growing in popularity in their homeland and anarchism had flourished in a 
country that was riddled with poverty and that boasted a corrupt political system that 
relied on caciquismo. " The seeds of anarchism were sown in Cuba. However, it is 
erroneous to suppose that many of the immigrants, the bulk of whom were peasants 
and labourers from distressed areas of Spain, in particular Galicia, travelled to Cuba 
to disseminate or practise radicalism. On the contrary, many would probably have 
had the intention of raising funds to take or send home, never aiming to spoil their 
chances by spreading revolutionary philosophy. However, the harsh reality of life in 
Cuba may have urged some to revisit radical ideas that would have been particularly 
attractive to those workers denied suffrage (the voting system in Cuba is discussed 
below). Although Spanish workers may have introduced new ways of thinking, some 
Cuban workers were quick to understand the potential benefits of these ideologies 
Carr defines caciquismo as `the system of electoral corruption and management, run by local bosses, 
which supported the tumo pacifrco (the rigged alternation in power of the Liberal and Liberal 
Conservative parties)" [Carr, 1985: xv]. 
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and, in the decade after the Ten Years War, . both reformist and anarchist 
associations were set up and periodicals launched. 12 
In 1887, the first workers' congress held in Cuba was staged jointly by the Circulo de 
Trabajadores, the Junta Central de Trabajadores and El Productor (The Producer), 
the worker periodical initially published to help publicise the Congress [Casanovas 
Codina, 1995: 26]. Anarchist in nature's, the Congress aimed to unify workers 
through a Federaciön de Trabajadores de la Region Cubana [FTRC] (Workers' 
Federation for the Region of Cuba), a national association along the lines of the 
Bakuninist Federaciön de los Trabajadores de la Region Espanola [FTRE]. Members 
of the Congress emphasised the importance of the international struggle and urged 
14 solidarity with the men who would come to be known as the Chicago Martyrs. 
In the tobacco industry, new reformist and anarchist unions were formed that courted 
those skilled workers often referred to as "aristocrats of labour", that is those who 
were better paid and more highly skilled than others in the industry. 15 Many of these 
skilled workers formed either under the banner of La Union Obrera [UO] (The 
Workers' Union), set up in 1888 by the reformist Satumino Martinez, or La Alianza 
Obrera [AO] (The Workers' ANliance), founded by the Cuban anarcho-syndicalist 
12 In 1878 El Boletfn (The Bulletin), a reformist monthly publication dedicated to printers and the Gremio 
de Obreros del Ramo de Tabaquerlas (Tobacco Workers' Union) were formed. 
Anarchist publications included El Obrero (The Worker) [Cienfuegos, founded 1884] and El Artesano 
(The Artisan) [Havana, founded 1885]. Anarchist associations around this time included La Junta 
Central de Artesanos (The Central Artisans' Assembly) [founded 1879], later reorganised as La Junta 
Central de Trabajadores (Central Workers' Assembly) and the Circulo de Trabajadores de la Habana 
(Workers' Circle of Havana) [founded 1885]. For more information, see IHMRSC (1), 1985: 45-49. 
13 Disenfranchisement spurred some to turn to anarchism 
14 On 11th November 1886, Albert Parsons, August Spies, George Engel and Adolph Fischer were 
hanged by US authorities for their alleged part in the bombing of a labour meeting, held to protest 
against police violence, in Haymarket Square Chicago in May of that year. The four men (along with 
Louis Lingg, who committed suicide before the due execution) are known as the Chicago Martyrs, the 
world-wide 1 °' May commemorations being held in their honour. 15 Stubbs [1985: 73-81] argues that the application of the term "labour aristocrats" to Cuban cigar makers 
is a misnomer. 
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Enrique Roig San Martin. 16 That Roig was born in Cuba is of interest here, given the 
traditional view that adherents to anarchism and its offshoots were almost exclusively 
Spanish. " 
Roig had always considered himself a staunch supporter of the class war above any 
other and was unwilling to accept that the working class should join any fight to free 
Cuba from Spanish rule. Since all rulers are potential tyrants, according to 
anarchism, any move to replace one government with another was seen by Roig as 
counterproductive. His views were echoed in the columns of El Productor until his 
death in 1889. The refusal of Cuban anarchists to join the growing separatist 
movement in Cuba died with Roig and, shortly after his death, pro-independence 
articles began to appear in EI Productor. 
EI obrero jamäs debe olvidar su patria, porque ese amor es innato a todo ser 
racional (The worker must never forget his native land as that love is innate to 
every rational being) [El Productor, 09/02/1890]. 
Speaking of those tobacco workers who had fled to the USA to find employment, the 
anarchist worker leader Enrique Creci's wrote : 
... dije mäs que (sic) una vez que los patriotas que estaban en Cayo Hueso y Tampa hacian falta en Cuba, porque as[ se realizaria mfis pronto la 
independencia (I have said more than once that the patriots who were in Key 
West and Tampa were needed in Cuba, as this is how independence would 
have been reached more swiftly) [quoted in Cabrera, 1979: 144]. 
16 Roig San Martin (1843-1889) was a Havana-bom anarchist and worker leader and a co-founder of 
the Centro de Instruccibn y Recreo (Centre of Instruction and Recreation) in 1882, set up to promote 
solidarity among workers. He advocated class war and, due to his refusal to support the separatist 
movement, history has recorded him as unpatriotic [see IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 58]. Founder of El 
Productor. 
17 See Introduction. 
18Creci was a Cuban typographer and anarchist. The editor of numerous worker periodicals, including 
El Obrereo, El Trabajo, La Lechuza and Archivo Social, he was active in the Circulo de Trabajadores 
and JCA and a participant in the 1887 and 1892 worker congresses (see below for information on the 
1892 congress). He died in the battle for independence in Matanzas in 1896. For more information, see 
Cabrera, 1979. 
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The dilemma of whether or not to join political or military struggles is one that has 
often been faced by anarchists. 19 During the early 1890s, the Cuban working class,, 
confronted with the realities of a repressive Spanish government and no doubt 
influenced by the growing propaganda made by highly regarded Cubans such as 
Jose Marti2° and Antonio Maceo, 21 embraced notions of a Cuba Libre. The 
imprisonment of worker leaders such as Creci, the temporary suspension of worker 
institutions such as El Circulo de Trabajadores and El Productor (1890) and strikes 
that progressed into bloody confrontations between anti-colonial factions and pro- 
Spanish forces22 fuelled anti-Spanish feeling among the workers, inspiring them to 
join the struggle for independence. 
.ý 
A Workers' Congress, held in Havana, 15-19 January 1892, had confirmed anarchist 
support on the island for the independence movement. The Congress, organised, 
like its predecessor, by the Junta Central de Trabajadores and promoted by El 
Productor, called for international worker solidarity, while adhering to the anarcho- 
syndicalist position that a general strike must be realised in Cuba in order to secure 
the eight-hour working day. The anarchist worker leader Eduardo Gonzalez Bobes23 
noted that the General Strike could be the only true path to achieving success in 
gaining worker demands, as partial strikes had, in the main, proven ineffective and so 
a general strike was set for. May Ist of that same year. As leaders of the 
independence movement acknowledged the benefit of linking the workers' movement 
to their own cause, so anarchists realised the need to create a broader, more 
popular, base if their own actions, such as the General Strike, were to prove 
19 Malatesta and Kropotkin could not agree on the anarchist position in ̀ The Great War", for example. 20 Josh Marti (1853-1895) was a Cuban independence leader. Thinker, organiser, writer and politician, 
he was co-founder of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party) [PRC]. He died 
In battle in the War of Independence. 21 Antonio Maceo (1848-1896) was a Cuban rebel. Known as the "Bronze Titan" in Cuba, he fought in 
the 1868-1878 war and he died in battle In the War of Independence. 22 See Casanovas, 1995, for more information. 23 Asturian-born Bobbs arrived in Cuba in 1885 as a fifteen-year old apprentice. Initially anarchist and 
active in the 1892 Congress, he enlisted in the Cuerpo de Voluntarios (Voluntary Corps), a Spanish 
paramilitary body set up to quash the independence movement. During the early Republic, he became 
involved in bourgeois politics. 
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successful. The two factions courted each other, giving rise to a powerful movement 
that would eventually help to overthrow the Spanish colonisers. 
La Republica Mediatizada (The Annexed Republic)24 
The Cuban War of Independence (1895-98), which should have resulted in the 
replacement of a Spanish Government by a Cuban one, has, due to the involvement, 
of US troops toward the end of the war, usually been labelled the Spanish-American 
War and even the Spanish-American-Cuban War [Ibarra, 1992: 1]. US participation in 
the war has also led to the conflict being referred to as the world's first imperialist 
intervention [Ibarra, 1964: 4]. An explosion on the US vessel "Maine" in Havana 
harbour, and with it the loss 260 US Marines [Aguilar, 1993: 33], led the US 
Government to declare war on Spain, an act which helped to secure the defeat of the 
colonisers. 5 
In December 1898, President McKinley announced to Congress that US occupation 
of Cuba was essential "until there is complete tranquillity in the island and a stable 
government inaugurated" [Thomas, 1998: 436]. This stable government was not 
considered ready until more than three years after the defeat of Spain, when the US- 
educated General Tomas Estrada Palma took presidential office in 1902 26 As US 
occupation ended, it left in place the Platt Amendment, Article Three of which stated: 
that upon transfer of the control of Cuba to the government established under 
the new Constitution, Cuba consents that the US reserve and retain the right 
of intervention of the preservation of Cuban independence and the 
24 This is a phrase often used by contemporary Cuban historians to describe the early period of the 
Republic of Cuba and refers to the influence of the United States of America over Cuba [eg. Torres 
Hernandez, 1973]. 
25 The USA has been suspected of orchestrating the attack on their own ship in order to justify 
intervention in the three-year old War of Independence and subsequent occupation of the island. 26 From 1899 to the inauguration of Estrada Palma, US Generals John Brooke and Leonard Wood were 
Military Governors in Cuba. 
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maintenance of stable government, adequately protecting life, property and 
individual liberty ... [quoted in Thomas, 1998: 451/2]. 
The first Cuban Constitution, signed in February 1901 by 29 Cuban delegates, 
endorsed the Platt Amendment or "the compromise between annexation and 
complete independence" [Langley, 1968: 118], which was to become an integral part 
of the new nation's make-up. The Amendment was concerned with stability and 
order in Cuba and although, in name, the island boasted the long-awaited and 
fought-for title of "The Republic of Cuba", any disorder in the country could be 
potentially interpreted as threatening to US interests, resulting in occupation, rather 
than the Cuba Libre that many had envisaged. 
During the War. of Independence, land had been spoiled or neglected, while it is 
estimated that some 200,000 of the island's population died due to hostilities, 
starvation or disease [Langley 1968: 116]. Furthermore, national institutions began to 
vanish in the aftermath of the defeat of Spain. Revolutionary clubs were dissolved on 
the premise that the existence of such bodies need not continue, since independence 
had been won and hence there was no longer anything to fight for or against. The 
PRC was dissolved in December 1898 and, some five months later, the revolutionary 
Ejercito Libertador [Liberation Army] suffered the same fate, an action described as 
"un serio reves para el pueblo" (a serious reverse for the nation) [Ibarra, 1964: 7]. 
Perez has pointed out that workers on the island felt betrayed by the outcome of the 
war and disillusioned with the new republic as they "had sacrificed selflessly and 
unstintingly of behalf of Cuba Libre, only to find the republic little more than a new 
political carapace of the old colonial system" [Perez, 1986: 61]. 
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80% of sugar plantations had been ruined during the war years and the tobacco 
industry was in a state of turmoil. With a national debt of $US 500 million27 [Langley,, 
1968: 116], many Cuban landowners experienced bankruptcy and much of the land 
and businesses were rejuvenated by foreign, mostly US and British, capital. Although 
investment in industry and infrastructure must have been a welcome relief to the war- 
torn country in the short-term, Cuba was placed at the financial, and so political, 
mercy of interests from outside Cuba. Even the exchange of land was undertaken in 
US dollars. In January 1899, President McKinley introduced Decree No. 123, which 
stipulated that any official business be conducted in US currency and that an 
exchange rate mechanism be established to convert Spanish and French currencies 
into US dollars. The new monetary scale undervalued European currency, although 
workers continued to receive wages in Spanish pesos or French Louis and, until the 
introduction of an indigenous currency in 1914, pay packets represented less than 
their true value. 
Adverse economic policies and the lack of political and social stability caused 
confusion among a population, who, at the turn of the twentieth century, had no 
strong institutions within which to voice discontent. This lack of representation was 
experienced on many fronts. Firstly, entry into the political system by Cubans was 
hindered by US occupation and, secondly, many unions had disappeared during the 
recent conflict. Furthermore, Cuba had, by US and Latin American standards, a 
relatively secularised society: 
The Catholic Church has never exercised a strong political influence. It had 
been discredited during the Wars of Independence through its attitude 
towards Spain. It had not seriously tried to proselytize the slaves (Hennessy, 
1970: 216]. 
27 Throughout this thesis I have distinguished between US Dollars ($US) and Cuban Pesos ($). 
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The church was not a strong institution and one might conjecture that strong 
ideological beliefs may have acted as a replacement for religious ones. 
Against such a backdrop, some new periodicals, political parties and worker 
organisations began to appear in Cuba in 1899. The anarchist Adrian Del Valle28 
founded periodicals such as Tiempos Nuevos and EI Nuevo Ideal, which reported on 
worker action and called upon readers to organise. When Malatesta arrived in Cuba 
in February 1900, he was banned from public speaking by the government and, 
instead, communicated with the workers of Cuba through EI Nuevo Ideal, urging 
them not to fall into the trap of being divided by race or nationality but to come 
together as a class in order to fight the common enemy, which he saw as the US 
government. [EI Nuevo Ideal, 22/03/1900: 1]. 
Many of those who became politically active had made up part of the emigre 
community that had formed in Tampa and Key West: tobacco workers who, in the 
light of independence from Spain, sought repatriation in Cuba. Once again on home 
ground, however, their search for employment was not always fruitful and, undercut 
by Spanish workers, the jobs offered to them did not always yield the wages. to which 
such highly skilled workers had become used. According to the 1899 'Cuban 
Census, 96% of white foreign males were engaged in general employment, as 
compared to just 61.3% of white Cuban males, and this reality of work displacement 
converted into nationalism, as Spanish workers were welcomed "at the expense of 
nationals whose access to some of the best paid jobs was severely limited" [de la 
Fuente, 1997: 31]. Organisations set up by repatriates tended to concentrate on the 
injustice of discrimination against Cuban workers in favour of Spanish tobacco 
28 Del Valle was a Catalonian anarchist writer who had worked as a journalist for E/ Productorof 
Barcelona. He was expelled shortly after arriving in Cuba in 1895, when he joined the 'Free Cuba" 
campaign in New York. After the War of Independence, he returned to Cuba where he wrote many 
novels and articles in worker periodicals, often under the pseudonym Palmirio de Lidia. I 
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workers, in particular, who had become known by the derogatory term tabaquerones 
[Ibarra, 1992: 138]. The Partido Socialista Cubano (Cuban Socialist Party) [PSC] and 
the Liga General de Trabajadores Cubanos (General League of Cuban Workers) 
[LGTC], both founded in 1899, were particularly concerned with the plight of Cuban 
tobacco workers. 
The presence of foreign capital on the island, and in particular the growth of tobacco 
and sugar trusts, awakened a sense of anti-capitalism in Cuba during the early years 
of the Republic. Returning to Cuba from the USA, the intellectual Diego Vicente 
Tejera29 urged workers to face the new horrors of capitalism. Like other Latin 
American intellectuals who had visited Europe during the late nineteenth century, 30 
Tejera wished to incorporate into Cuban politics the socialist ideologies he had 
encountered abroad and, in March 1899, he founded Cuba's first socialist party, the 
PSC. Although not a tobacco worker, Tejera was clearly concerned with the state of 
the tobacco industry in Cuba: 
El Capitalismo - ly un capitalismo extranjero! - se organizarä en esta rica y 
virgen tierra de la manera mäs incontrastable y odiosa: la del "trust" 
(Capitalism - and a foreign capitalism - will organise itself in the this rich and 
virgin territory in a most insuperable and hateful manner that of the trust) 
[PSC Manifesto in IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 145]. 
This attack on foreign business was unleashed in the PSC's dissolution manifesto, 
printed just four months after the foundation of a party that had encountered fierce 
opposition from the ruling classes. Although the PSC swiftly disappeared, 
preoccupation with the mighty tobacco trusts had become widespread in both the city 
and province of Havana, in particular, where much of the tobacco industry was 
centred. At this time, two thirds of tobacco factories were owned by foreign trusts: 
29 Diego Vicente Tejera (1848-1903) was a Cuban socialist who spent the majority of his adult life in 
Europe, where he studied politics, and the USA, where he promoted the Cuban Independence. 30 For example, the Peruvian Manuel Gonzalez Prada (1844-1918). 
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the Henry Clay Company, also known as "la compania inglesa" (the English 
company), and the Havana Commercial Company, alias "ei trust americano" (the 
American trust) controlled the bulk of the market, while the balance remained under 
independent ownership. Meanwhile, foreign capital also found its way into rural 
areas. Sugar plantations, particularly in the east of the island, were mostly bought up 
by large US corporations, such as the United Fruit Company. 
The domination of large businesses, the interference in Cuban affairs by the USA 
and the displacement of Cuban by Spanish workers fomented nationalism among 
some tobacco workers, a group with a relatively long tradition of organisation. The 
LGTC, a union that aimed to represented workers of varying trades in Cuba, was 
formed at a time when the notion of a wholly Cuban politics was still vague, has been 
described by Del Toro as possessing a "nacionalismo revolucionarion31 (revolutionary 
nationalism) [Del Toro, 1969: 65], although, in truth, the pull towards nationalism 
among LGTC members was much stronger than the use of revolutionary tactics. It 
was precisely the LGTC's reluctance to support direct action and its condemnation of 
strikes, in particular, that almost crippled it shortly after its foundation. This is best 
illustrated by its refusal to back a six-week strike declared by some 1,500 
construction workers in Havana during the summer of 1899. Represented by the 
Gremio de Albaniles y Ayudantes (Builders' Union), these workers were appalled at 
their harsh and dangerous conditions and long hours. They called for better working 
conditions and exercised the common and widespread anarcho-syndicalist demand 
for the eight-hour working day through a strike that attracted native and immigrant, 
black and white workers and that swiftly gained the support of those in other trades, 
such as bakers, tram, rail and tobacco workers [Meitin, 1975: 91]. 
31 Although the union proclaimed support of all workers it emphasised its Cubanness by its very name 
(Cuban Workers as opposed to workers of Cuba). 
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The strike, which gradually spread from the city into the province of Havana, was.; 
influenced by anarchists, individuals who were, according to William Ludlow, the--.. 
Military Governor of Havana at that time, "enemigos de la sociedad (los) que. z . 
enarbolan la bandera roja de la anarquia, violando las (eyes y los derechos ajenos"... 
(enemies of society [those] who embrace the red flag of anarchy, violating laws and 
the rights of others) [IMHCRSC 1,1985: 173]. That condemnation helped to justify 
the eventual imprisonment of strike leaders and the deployment of US Marines at. 
ports. The LGTC refused to support a strike that could be a breeding ground for 
anarchism: "jAbajo la huelga que trae grandes disturbios! IViva la independencia de,. 
-, 
Cuba! (Down with the strike that brings great disturbances! Long live independence! ) 
[Aguirre, 1965: 86]. The fact that the strike had attracted Spanish workers was, 
probably worrying to an organisation that aimed not to unify foreign and native 
workers, but to lessen Spanish worker privileges. Far from supporting the popular, 
action, the LGTC's president, Enrique Messonier, 32 was accused of conspiring in its 
collapse with Ludlow and Rafael de Cardenas, the chief of police who was ultimately 
responsible for repressing strikers. The US administration and company bosses 
welcomed any division in the labour movement that hindered worker solidarity, and 
the LGTC was accused by anarchist groups of socialism, nationalism and chauvinism 
[Telleria Toca in Granma, 12/09/1972: 2]. The LGTC denied that it had acted as a 
barrier to international worker solidarity, insisting that it aspired to unity, harmony and 
peace but that it would no longer tolerate the exciusivist nature of employment in the 
tobacco factories. 
However, failure to support the striking workers, regardless of nationality, led to the 
temporary downfall of the LGTC. In a matter of weeks, membership dwindled from 
32 Enrique Messonier, a Cuban worker leader and one-time anarchist and secretary of the tobacco 
workers' union, collaborated in the periodicals El Obrero and EI Productor. He was also co-founder and 
secretary of the Circulo de Trabajadores. He fought in the War of Independence and, after the collapse 
of the LGTC, became active in bourgeois politics. 
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10,000 to just 300 [Ayon, 1972: 97], suggesting that the workers were more 
passionate about bread-and-butter issues, achievable through solidarity, than about 
the politics of nationalism. For their part, the construction workers gained a rise in 
wages and the right to work an eight-hour day in the aftermath of the suppressed 
strike. 
The LGTC needed to recover support lost during the construction workers' strike and 
that opportunity came when the Platt Amendment was incorporated into the Cuban 
constitution, a move that many saw as a threat to national sovereignty. US 
interference in Cuban politics caused discontent as "el pals entero entrö en un 
perlodo de agitaciön extraordinaria. Las manifestaciones se sucedlan unas a otras 
en todos los pueblos en son de protesta" (the whole country entered into a period of 
extraordinary agitation. Demonstrations sprang up in all towns in a wave of protest) 
[Ibarra, 1992: 7]. The LGTC now played the anti-imperialist card, one close to the 
heart of many workers in Cuba. In March 1902, IAlerta! (Watch Out! ), the LGTC's 
mouthpiece published "Salvemos la Republica" (Let us Save the Republic., which 
condemned the relationship between bourgeois politicians and the USA: 
EI pueblo cubano, que no debe nada al dominador intruso que con sofistica 
falacia intenta uncirnos al carro de su ambiciön cesarista; el pueblo cubano 
que quiere ser libre, porque para serlo diö a la patria todo su contingente de 
carne y oro y Idgrimas y sufrimientos; el pueblo cubano no acepta Ia obra de 
esos traidores a la revoucibn que se disponen a entregar la patria a nueva 
esclavitud (The Cuban people, who owe nothing to the intrusive power that 
through fallacy tries to tie us to its Caesarist ambition; the Cuban people, who 
want to be free, because being so gives all their flesh, gold, tears and 
suffering to the native land; the Cuban people do not accept the work of those 
traitors to the revolution who are prepared to deliver the native land to a new 
slavery) [IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 184]. 
The growing political and economic influence of the USA in Cuba, coupled with the 
readiness of Cuban politicians to accept such domination, angered workers, helping 
the LGTC to regain strength and, in 1902, the organisation added its force to strikes 
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in the tobacco industry. A strike called at the Cabanas cigar factory, belonging to the 
"American trust", was not initially concerned with the discrimination experienced by 
native workers. Instead workers demanded that a higher quality raw material be 
available to cigar rollers, as a low-grade leaf resulted in low wages. As the strike, 
which became known as the "Huelga de los Aprendices" (Apprentices' Strike),,. 
spread to other factories, the LGTC, through jAlerta!, was swift to call other workers 
to the conflict and to produce a list of demands directed at the Trust. The Trust 
Strike Committee curiously failed to mention the quality of tobacco leaf but it did t 
demand that tobacco rolling apprenticeships be restricted to 5 per cent of the total . 
workforce. 33 The committee also called for seniority rights, price control, union 
recognition and workers' rights: 
IA Ia huelga, a la huelga todo el pueblo cubano, si es preciso, para que 
nuestros hijos obtengan el derecho de ganar su pan en el trabajo, que 
extranjeros perniciosos les niegan en el propio pals de su nacimiento! (Strike,. 
now! The whole population of Cuba, if it is necessary, so that our sons obtain 
the right to earn their bread through the work that pernicious foreigners deny 
them in their own native land! ) [IAlerta!, 09/11/1902, supplement]. 
The call to action reads as a double attack on foreign business and on Spanish 
workers, both seen as responsible for the displacement of Cubans. Enthusiasm on 
the part of the LGTC, financial support from Cuban workers still employed in Tampa 
and Key West, and the fact that the Strike Committee's demands were rejected by 
the Trust, all helped to promote the strike to areas outside the city while, within 
Havana itself, it was no longer confined to the tobacco industry. In the city, 
stevedores, sanitary workers and butchers, among others, all refused to work until 
demands were met. Perhaps more significantly, the strike triggered worker action at 
sugar plantations in the central province of Las Villas. 
33 It was feared that an abundance of skilled workers would result in employer exploitation. 
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Worker organisation within a sugar industry recently released from slavery was 
nascent during the early Republic but, in November 1902, workers in the town of 
Cruces in Las Villas exploded into direct action. Unlike those employed in the 
tobacco industry, sugar workers were not concerned with discriminatory tactics, as 
racial and international solidarity existed in that historically mixed-race industry. With 
no mention of nationalism, workers in Cruces called for better pay and conditions and 
a shorter working day, with some condemning the divisive approach of the LGTC in 
Havana. In a* letter published in the prominent and long-running anarchist periodical 
jTierra!, 34 Jose Garcia35 accused the organisation of being a continuation of the 
nineteenth-century reformist and strike-breaking Union Obrera, alleging that 
members of the LGTC aspired not to the needs of all workers but only their own. 
Unlike those individuals, he remarked, sugar workers pursued the dream of liberty for 
all "siendo nuestro ünico grito de guerra la emancipaciön de todos los esclavos, la 
desaparaciön de todos los privilegios" (our only war cry being the emancipation of all 
slaves, the disappearance of all privileges) [IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 200]. Sugar workers 
did, however, resent the imposition of foreign employers and it was intended that the 
strike spread to other plantations in the area. According to contemporary reports, 
workers stormed neighbouring plantations, instilling fear into other employees and 
driving them to participate: 
Numerosos obreros con banderas rojas recorren las calles paralizando el 
trabajo en el pueblo ...... 
La huelga general continua con mayor incremento y 
mäs ardor por parte de los huelguistas. Se teme fundamentalmente por la 
alteraciön del orden publico y la policia no permite reunion de grupos en las 
calles (Numerous workers with red flags roam the streets paralysing work in 
the town... the general strike continues more quickly and with more ardour on 
the part of the strikers. One fears fundamentally for a breach of the peace, 
and the police are not allowing group meetings in the streets) [La Lucha, 
27/11/02: 1]. 
34 /Tierre! was published between 1902 and 1914 and re-emerged in 1924/5 after being suppressed by 
the authorities. 
35 Garcia was a Spanish anarchist and worker leader among sugar workers in the Cruces region. 
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The reactionary press36 labelled the instigators of the strike bandits, trouble-makers 
and even agents of the Spanish government. Bowing to pressure from US sugar 
magnates, the US Ambassador to Cuba, Herbert G. Squiers, wrote to President 
Estrada Palma, demanding that US sugar interests be protected and he, in turn,: 
addressed an urgent telegram to the Governor of the Province of Las Villas, Jose 
Miguel G6mez37 "pars que reprimiera con mano dura a los trabajadores azucareros 
de Cruces" (that the sugar workers of Cruces be severely repressed) [Padrön: 
19/1111969: 2]. Fearing US intervention at a time when the Platt Amendment had 
only very recently replaced US occupation, the sugar strikes in Las Villas were 
brutally repressed by the Rural Guard, during which the workers Joaquin Casanas 
and Amado Montero were killed, an act known by workers thereafter as "el crimen de 
Cruces" (The crime of Cruces) [ jTierra! 19/09/1903: 11. 
Likewise, in Havana, the "Huelga de los Aprendices" ended in bloody repression. 
Cuban anxiety about adherence to article 3 of the Platt Amendment appears to have 
been decisive in the collapse of the strike, as Squiers informed Washington in its 
aftermath: 
This Government by its prompt action discouraged a great strike, one which, 
if allowed to reach a certain point, would have spread over the island and 
might have terminated in such a state of disorder as to bring the United 
States face to face again with the question of intervention .... Probably this fear induced the Cuban Government to act more promptly and vigorously 
than it would otherwise have done [Perez, 1986: 53]. 
Thus, the strike was extinguished and, though an agreement was reached that 
should have admitted Cuban apprentices into all sectors of the tobacco industry, the 
recommendation was completely disregarded by tobacco trusts and such 
concessions were not realised until the 1930s. 
36 Diario de /a Marina was accused of being `anti-obrero' (anti-worker), for example [Rebelibn, 
04/03/1909: 2]. 
37 Jos6 Miguel G6mez (1858-1921). President of Cuba from 1909-1913. 
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.. 
The suspicion that unrest in the country would spur the US administration to honour 
the Platt Amendment was not unfounded, although the eventual " reason for 
occupation lay not with labour troubles but political ones. In 1906, Estrada Palma 
was re-elected President, causing the newly formed Liberal Party to rise up in protest 
at fraudulent elections, provoking "a civil war between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties" [Shaffer, 1998: 19] The British Foreign Office's 1906 annual commercial 
report captured the mood: 
t" 
The wanton destruction caused to property by the insurgence (of the August 
1906 uprising) and the petty thievery committed by them have created a 
feeling of insecurity throughout the country ...... There 
is great stagnation in 
business, accounts are hard to collect and a want of confidence is the 
prevailing feature in all branches of trade [FO/98] . 
The political unrest forced Estrada Palma to resign and the USA to install a 
provisional Governor, Charles E Magoon, in his place, and it was during this second 
US occupation38 that the second major labour strike of the new Republic occurred. 
The Huelga de la Moneda (Currency Strike) was initiated by tobacco workers who 
demanded that, as no national currency yet existed, wages be paid in US dollars, a 
change that would be equivalent to a 10% wage increase39. Those employed in 
tobacco factories belonging to the trusts declared strike action in February 1907, 
while, according to Foreign Office reports, workers in independent tobacco factories 
contributed up to 40% of their own wages to those on strike. As worker forged 
solidarity with worker, so did the employers support each other, independent factory 
bosses declaring a lock-out at the end of April. The tobacco industry was at a 
standstill. 
38 The occupation lasted until 1909. 
39 Workers were still paid in Spanish currency, or more puzzlingly, French Louis. 
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Governor Magoon, aware that workers were also consumers and that payment in US 
dollars could only benefit US business, appeared to favour the strikers' motives: 
The workmen desire to be paid in American money; not because that 
currency is American, but because it is stable...... Any country afflicted by an 
unstable currency ought to take steps to secure a stable currency [FO 
2771147: 551 40 
The strikers celebrated success in July 1907, an event that sparked similar action in 
Havana among those employed in other sectors, notably those in the building trade 
and rail workers. "' Construction workers, supported by jTierra!, which favoured the 
anti-government attitude displayed by strikers in clashes with the authorities, were 
successful in their demands for higher wages and, although their working day was 
not lowered to eight hours, as hoped, they did manage to secure a nine-hour day, as 
opposed to the ten that many had been working [jTierra!, 21/12/07: 3]. Meanwhile, 
rail workers were accused by managers of many counts of sabotage, including 
stoning trains, greasing rails, changing sidings and threatening non-striking drivers. 
The company owners blamed the strike committee42 for encouraging such action and 
some 200 workers were detained, soon to be freed or else fined, a penalty that other 
workers helped finance. 
The strike continued while two British train companies recruited strike-breakers from 
the USA, probably hoping to divide workers along lines of nationality. As the strike 
extended to Santa Clara, fears that a general strike was imminent began to spread: 
There have been some cases of stone throwing and it is alleged that an 
attempt was recently made to blow up an engine of a train running from the 
40 According to a British Foreign Office report, the cigar workers held a demonstration in honour of 
Magoon [F0227/147: 59] 
41 Other workers who declared strikes at this time included box makers, plumbers, carpenters and street 
cleaners. 
42 It is more likely that they were isolated acts of individual terrorism or, wishing to discredit the union, 
the work of the companies themselves. The train workers' union, the Ferrocarriles Unidos, was 
reformist and did not adhere to violent direct action. 
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Capital to Santiago de Cuba ...... There are rumours that the railway strike 
is 
only a preliminary to greater evils and that the island is on the eve of a 
general strike [FO 227/147: 85]. 
Despite attempts by workers to scupper the arrival of the strike-breakers and 
although their employment contravened General Wood's 1902 military order, which 
prohibited the importation of foreign labourers under contract [FO 277/147: 85], the 
imported labour was welcomed by authorities and that action helped to destroy the 
rail workers' strike. Maybe the British train companies and government would not 
enjoy the same benefits as the US tobacco trusts and government should their 
employees be paid in US currency. Maybe the US authorities allowed the strike- 
breakers easy access to Cuban soil because it would ease some of the labour- 
related problems at home, and at the very least it would have helped to hinder US- 
Cuban worker solidarity. In any case, the rail workers' demands were not met. What 
is certain is that the apparently successful (earlier) Huelga de la Moneda was 
unpopular among writers of jTierra!. The strike was "pacifica, ordenada y sumisa" 
(peaceful, orderly and submissive) the periodical maintained [jTierra! 23/03/1907: 2] 
and the strikers' demands were limited. The strike had been a triumph for the factory 
owners and not the strikers, it pointed out [iTierra! 27/07/1907: 3]. 
During the 1906-1909 US occupation, large labour disputes were mostly confined to 
urban areas, although anarchists in the campo continued to champion their cause. 
Abelerdo Saavedra (see below) and Juan Aller43 toured the island "en excursion de 
propaganda libertaria" (on an excursion of libertarian propaganda) [La Voz del 
Dependiente, 16/06/1908: 3]. The Cuban Government preferred to be seen to be 
making some concessions to workers and, during the period immediately following 
the occupation, President Jose Miguel Gomez, ushered in two new labour laws. The 
43 Aller had been one of those worker leaders arrested in the 1899 construction workers' strike. 
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Ley de Arteaga44banned the payment of wages in coupons, a practice that until 1909 t 
had remained especially common on sugar plantations. The coupons had then been - 
traded in exclusively for products at the company store, sold at inflated prices, 
beneficial to the companies and detrimental to the workers. Another law, the Ley del 
Cierre (Closure Law) should have obliged most commercial establishments to close 
at six o'clock in the evening, allowing service industry workers more free time 45 
One of the biggest labour upsets of G6mez's relatively progressive administration' 
was the Huelga del Alcantarrillado (Sewerage Strike) of 1911, which is remarkable 
for the rare organisational role of the newly formed Agrupaciön Socialista de la 
Habana (Socialist Association of Havana). The strike was launched after two sewer 
workers died as a result of dangerous working conditions, when some 1,500 workers 
demanded safer and more sanitary conditions, an eight-hour work day, a rise in 
wages and payment in US dollars. The strike once again dispels the myth, often 
upheld by Cuban labour historians, that socialists in Cuba tended to be Cuban, while 
anarchists were Spanish troublemakers. It is estimated that 75% of sewer workers in 
Havana, and so strikers, were Spanish 40 although, according to Del Toro, the Huelga 
del Alcantarrillado was also the first instance of Marxist influence among Cuban 
workers [Del Toro, 1969: 72]. The two-month strike ultimately failed due to heavy = 
repression and expulsions by the Government, the use of strike-breakers and, once 
again, divisions among the workforce along nationalist lines, (the strike-breakers 
being recruited among the Cuban unemployed), while socialist organisers of the 
strike were accused by anarchists of possessing a lack of revolutionary fibre. 7 
44 Named after Liberal Party representative Emilio Arteaga, who proposed the bill. 45 The Ley del Cierre , however, was rarely adhered to. See Chapter 2 for more details on service industry workers. 
46 Cabrera maintains that the majority of the exploited were from Galicia [Cabrera, 1985: 128]. 
47 See Chapter 2 for more information on anarchist reaction to this strike. 
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In rural Cuba, meanwhile, unrest-was centred not on the issue of nationality but on 
race. A political party set up in 1908 by a group of Afro-Cuban veterans of the War of 
Independence, the Partido Independiente de Color [PIC] (Independent Party of 
Colour), prompted the government to introduce a new bill, known as the Morüa bill. 
Named after its proponent, the Afro-Cuban Liberal leader of the Senate, Martin 
Morüa Delgado, the bill stated that any party founded on the basis of race or colour 
would be illegal. Although the PIC insisted that it represented all races and 
nationalities, 48 the name inspired suspicions of a racially separate political entity, that 
is black versus white, and white men still constituted the Cuban government. The 
party did not dissolve, however. 
By 1912, the black population of Cuba had expanded to include workers born outside 
of the country. When the United Fruit Company managed to legally contravene the 
1903 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty, which prohibited the importation of labour from 
the neighbouring Caribbean countries, it opened the floodgates for (predominantly) 
Jamaican and Haitian labourers, shipped to Cuba to narrow the alleged labour 
shortfall on the sugar plantations. In 1913, United Fruit obtained a presidential 
decree authorising the importation of 1,000 Jamaican and Haitian labourers [De la 
Fuente, 1997: 34]. Thereafter, there was an influx of sugar labourers, displacing 
thousands of Cuban workers who, unlike their Jamaican and Haitian counterparts, 
did not accept the already outlawed coupon system and, furthermore, the new 
arrivals often accepted lower wages than those demanded by native workers. It has 
been estimated that around 2,000 West Indian immigrants legally entered Cuba 
during 1912 although, as Perez pointed out, the true volume of workers arriving from 
those countries was not known, as many entered without permission and "illegal 
immigrants usually remained in Cuba permanently" [Perez, 1986: 524]. According to 
48 Among their demands were representation by blacks in the military and government, the generically 
sought eight-hour day and free immigration for all. See De la Fuente [1999: 64] for more information. 
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official figures, around 9,445 West Indians entered Cuba from 1909 to 1913,, as 
compared to 28,900 in the next quadrennial 49 most finding employment on the sugar, 
plantations in the east of Cuba. The result was, as early as 1912, the displacement 
of many Cubans from their place of work, which led to a sense of unease as the 
reality of underemployment and poverty began to set in. 
As it was concerned with political rather than social issues, the PIC did not enjoy the 
solid backing of many Afro-Cubans, neither of peasants, workers nor farmers [De la 
Fuente, 1993: 66]. However, when the leaders of the PIC instigated a violent 
protest5° in May, 1912, thousands of malcontents in Oriente joined its ranks: 51 
Political grievances ignited social protest. They were not unrelated, but they 
were separate. Afro-Cuban politicians demanded a place in the republic, änd 
mobility. Afro-Cuban peasants demanded a place on the land, and 
permanence [Perez, 1986: 531]. 
The revolt, which saw the burning of sugar plantations, in particular, was labelled 
racist by the government, and the US administration urged the Cuban government to 
repress the uprising before it spread to other parts of the country. By the end of May, 
the US had already deployed 750 Marines at its Guantanamo base and threatened to 
send more troops to protect US interests in the eastern region [FO 371/1359: 23]. In 
fact, the British Foreign Office conceded that US occupation was precisely what the 
insurgents sought: 
There was ...... really no race feeling in Cuba. The present troubles were 
probably fomented for political reasons and helped and hurried on by those 
who desire annexation to the United States, and it will take years to establish 
confidence between the two races at any rate in the Province of Santiago [FO 
371/1359: 33]. 
49 It has been estimated that around 300,000 West Indians entered Cuba in search of work between 
1917 and 1930, [De la Fuente, 1997: 34]. For fuller immigration figures, see appendix. 60 HeIg maintains that the uprising was a protest rather than a rebellion [HeIg, 2000: 262] 51 Perez puts the number of participants at 10,000 [1986: 536]. 
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The protest, it was hoped, would help to overthrow the Gomez administration, which 
was adamant that the Mona law be upheld [Perez, 1986:. 531]. However, it was 
brutally repressed by the military52. and up to six thousand were ruthlessly killed, 
according to a report by Leech of the British Consulate: 
The casualties reported are, I fear, as often as not among innocent and 
pacific Negroes who have the misfortune to reside in the area [FO 
371/1359: 29]. 
The leaders of the revolt were killed or imprisoned and many others, including 
innocent victims, perished. The Government had deterred further occupation by the 
US and had quelled racial unrest. 
Elsewhere in the campo, the Republic's first national anarchist congress was held in 
February 1912, at the Centro Obrero (Worker Centre) in the sugar-producing region 
of Cruces. A small affair, the Congress aimed to work towards setting up a 
Federaciön de Trabajadores de Cuba (Workers Federation of Cuba), an entity that 
would embrace all workers in the country, although that dream would not be realised 
until the Confederaciön Nacional Obrera de Cuba (National Federation of the 
Workers of Cuba) was set up in 1925. The 22 delegates present agreed that there 
was a need to improve hygiene and safety at work and home, to set up rationalist 
schools and, of course, to ensure that no worker exceed an eight-hour working day. 
Since the unrest of 1902, Cruces had been a hotbed of anarchist organisation. The 
two men killed by the Rural Guard in those disturbances were seen as martyrs by 
fellow workers: 
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According to Helg, white Cubans formed militias all over the country, ready to quell the PIC protest, while large numbers of peninsulares offered their services voluntarily [HeIg, 2000: 276]. 
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En el pedazo de tierra en que se exteriorizaron un dia los anhelos rebeldes 
de nuestros inolvidables companeros Casanas y Montero, no se ha agotado 
la semilla del ideal, antes por el contrario, ha fructificado con exhuberante 
lozania [In the patch of earth where, one day, our unforgettable comrades, 
Casarias and Montero, displayed their rebellious yearnings, the seed of 
idealism has not exhausted itself, but has flourished with exuberant vigour 
[Rebeliön, 16/07/1909: 1]. 
In 1911, when the well-known anarchist Abelardo Saavedra was expelled from Cuba 
for inciting violence through anarchist meetings and propaganda tours, both Rebelidn 
(from 1910, published in Cruces) and (Tierra! were vociferous in their condemnation 
of the authorities. Meetings were held all over the island to protest against the 
expulsion of the cobbler who had organised the Centro Obrero in Cruces and who 
had been editor of (Tierra! and Rebeliön. Felipe Zapata 53 honoured him as "la figura 
anarquista mäs atrayente y respetable que se conocia en Cuba" (the most attractive 
and respectable anarchist known in Cuba) [Unidad Gastronömica, a: 33]. 
Saavedra quickly and clandestinely returned to Cuba and, along with fellow deportee 
Juan Tur, once again picked up the anarchist banner in the Cuban countryside. The 
Manifiesto de Cruces [Cruces' Manifesto], initially published in Rebeliön and then 
circulated in the campo at the beginning of 1915, urged workers to fight against the 
injustices of capitalism and to demand the much-touted eight-hour day and a 25% 
rise in wages: 
Nuestra mansedumbre y el acatamiento a las decisiones de los capitalistas, 
nos ha creado una situaciön, as[ econömica como social, que nuestra 
dignidad de hombres y el indiscutible derecho que tenemos al Integro 
desenvolvimiento de la vida, nos impelen a rebelarnos contra los que no 
reconociendonos necesidades que satisfacer y consideraciön y respeto de 
que gozar, nos utilizan como a irracionales bestias y nos tratan como a viles 
esciavos, indignos de vivir (Our meekness and deference to the decisions of 
the capitalists have created for us a situation both economic and social, that 
our dignity and the indisputable right that we have to our development as 
human beings, drives us to rebel against those who, not granting us 
necessities and the consideration and respect we deserve, use us like 
R' See chapter 3 for more on Felipe Zapata. 
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unthinking beasts and treat us like low slaves, unworthy of life) [IHMCRSC, b, 
1985: 321]. 
Screaming "Ia lucha destruira, crearä y perfeccionara" (the struggle will destroy, 
create and perfect), the Manifesto provided the authorities with the perfect 
justification for a total clampdown on anarchist activity in Cuba, and particularly in the 
countryside. Prominent figures in the workers' movement were expelled, including 
Saavedra, worker centres were shut down and (Tierra! was suppressed (it did not 
reappear until 1924, when worker unrest was rekindled in rural areas). 
With the onset of war in Europe, workers in Cuba had begun to protest against the 
atrocities being committed across the Atlantic and numerous meetings were held in 
1914, from Havana to Cruces to Cienfuegos and Ciego de Avila [jTierra!, 
01/10/1914: 3]. The service industry workers' publication El Dependiente, which 
escaped the fate of jTierra!, was especially vocal in the condemnation of the war 
(see Chapter 2). 
The Government had attempted to appease worker discontent when it financed a 
well-attended national worker congress in Havana in late August 1914. Being funded 
by the state, the congress was reformist in nature, and a range of subjects were 
discussed, including housing, night work, the protection of women and child workers, 
immigration, apprenticeships, pensions, schools, hygiene and wages. The congress 
also proposed that a Partido Democrätico Social (Social Democratic Party) be 
formed, but this was never realised due to the upheaval caused by the Great War 
and the lack of interest shown by workers [Cordova, 1997: 113]. Although the three- 
day event attracted some 1,400 workers from all corners of Cuba, anarchists 
believed it to be a non-event that pandered only to employers and the state: 
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iAh! Ese Congreso Nacional Borrego es un gancho, un admirable gancho 
politco-burgües para atrapar obreros incautos .... no es econömica-social, 
sino principalmente politica (Ah! That Hoax National Congress is a hook, an 
admirable political-bourgeois hook to pull in gullible workers ... it is not socio- 
economic, but principally political [iTierra!, 6/8/1914: 1]. 
However, such journalistic outbursts were soon quelled by the state and 1915 to 
1916 was, apart from renewed but separate strikes by construction and rail workers 
for higher wages and an eight-hour day, a relatively quiet period for the Cuban labour 
movement. 
The Building of Unions, Federations and Confederations 
In April 1917, Cuba followed the lead of the United States of America in declaring the 
country's allegiance to allied forces in the First World War, an act that, according to 
Stephen Leech of the British Consulate in Havana, was merely representative of the 
political bond that existed between the neighbouring countries [FO 371/3198: 58603]. 
This was an opinion that Leech reinforced towards the end of the war, in October 
1918, when he stated that "Cuba entered the war as a result of her circumstances 
rather than by inclination and ... her heart was not in it" [FO 371/3195: 51]. In fact, 
although Cuba imposed obligatory military service in August 1918 [New York Times: 
02/08/1918] and offered home-grown troops to bolster US forces, no military cadre 
ever left Cuban shores. The US administration thanked Cuba for its support but 
regretted that Cuban troops would be impossible to transport [Havana Post, 
10/10/1918: 2]. 
At this time, the United States appears to have been more concerned with positioning 
its own Marines on Cuban soil in an attempt to uphold its blossoming political and, 
perhaps more importantly, economic relationship with Cuba. In 1917, the US Marine 
Corps deployed troops in Camaguey and Oriente provinces partly in response to a 
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Liberal uprising, which had taken place in the face of alleged election fraud, in the 
midst of strikes by workers on the sugar plantations (see below). Perez has pointed 
out that the Platt Amendment could evoke military intervention during times of both 
political and social uncertainty: 
The analogy between strikes and rebellion, particularly as they both adversely 
affected property, and thereby passing properly under the requirements of 
treaty obligations, soon became a fixed feature in the application of the Platt 
Amendment [Perez, 1986: 57]. 
In Guantanamo alone, approximately a thousand Marines helped guard the eastern 
regions, an act that "has already inspired confidence among sugar planters and mill 
owners in Oriente Province" [FO 371/2923: 59]. The US supported the bid for re- 
election sought by General Menocal, the conservative leader who had sworn 
solidarity with the allies and whose presidency had seen a surge in economic 
investment by US companies, an influx of capital that was particularly manifest at 
sugar mills in the east of Cuba. 
The international growth in the demand for sugar spurred US companies to invest 
heavily in production, a venture that had begun before the onset of war. Albert has 
pointed out that in South America, the First World War did not create new 
circumstances in the region but merely acted as a catalyst for those factors already in 
existence [Albert, 1988: 5]. This observation was true of US investment in Cuba that, 
although evident before the war, nonetheless accelerated during the conflict. Direct 
US investment in Cuba had increased more than four-fold between 1896 and 1914, 
growing from $US 50 million to $US 215 million in that time period [O'Brien, 
1996: 208]. Thus the wheels of US industry in Cuba were already set in motion 
during the first decade of the twentieth century, although as O'Brien has noted: "If the 
increase in American investment down to World War I had been impressive, its 
development in the following decades was nothing less than spectacular" [O'Brien, 
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1996: 210]. By 1924, the amount of investment had rocketed to $US 1.3 billion, 
much of - that capital entering sugar production, mining, power and 
telecommunications, in particular. In the east of Cuba, US corporations ploughed 
capital into creating immense sugar estates that, in terms of modernity, would 
outshine those smaller and mostly Cuban or Spanish mills in the west. 
The financial influx into Cuban sugar production would foment the country's reliance 
on sugar, consolidating its position as a monocultural producer. During and since 
colonialism, sugar had been the mainstay of economic growth in Cuba and the onset 
of war in Europe led to increased demand for the product world-wide, especially in 
those Allied countries that, boasting little or no domestic production, relied on sugar 
imports. Some 75% of sugar consumed in Britain had been imported from German 
and Austro-Hungarian beet crops prior to the war [Albert, 1988: 55], a source that 
could no longer be tapped from August 1914. During the war, the world production of 
sugar beet dwindled, hitting an all time low in 1919,5' while sugar cane levelled off at 
around 11 million tons during the same period [Thomas, 1998: 1577]. While the 
output of Cuban sugar cane rose steadily during and immediately after the war years, 
as a percentage of total world production its growth was impressive indeed, rising 
from 10.5% in 1913, to 18.1% in 1917 to 26.37% in 1919 [Thomas, 1998: 1577]. 
Wealth accumulated by the owners of sugar plantations and mills was formidable, the 
total value of production reaching almost $US I billion in 1920 but falling to nearly a 
quarter of that amount in the following year. 55 
Thus the market for Cuban sugar grew during the international conflict. Whereas 
only 10% had been exported to Europe in 1913, by June 1916 that figured had 
54 In 1913, beet production was at 9,054,000 tons, gradually falling to 3,350,000 tons in 1919 [Thomas, 
1998: 1577]. Production recovered during the 1920s. 55 The total value of Cuba's sugar production in 1920 was $999,897,458 and just £273,197,276 in 1921 
[Ibarra, 1998: 442]. 
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increased to 39% [Dumoulin, 1980: 22]. This growth in business benefited mill 
owners but little of the rewards were passed onto the workforce, US companies even 
preferring to ship cane across the Florida Strait to be refined in their, own mills 
[Dumoulin, 1980: 22], thus denying employment to the workforce in Cuba. 
Regardless of this, unemployment does not appear to have been a problem in 
wartime Cuba. On the contrary, the British Consul in Havana reported in July 1917 
that labour was "scarce" and that it was becoming essential to import workers from 
other countries, preferably China, as was happening in parts of the West Indies [FO, 
371/2923: 36]. In fact, according to Cuban statistics, only 10,378 Chinese entered 
Cuba from 1919 to 1923,56 compared with 136,987 workers from the Jamaica and 
Haiti during the same period [lbarra, 1992: 452]. It was also reported that "wages are 
enormous" [FO 371/2923: 39], although it appears that, if wages were high, the cost 
of living was much higher. Pitting the salary of a cane-cutter against the cost of basic 
foodstuffs, Ibarra found that between 1917 and 1919 many families could barely 
afford to eat, real wages having decreased in the year 1917-1918 to 66% of their 
1912 value and to 80% in 1918-1919 [Ibarra, 1992: 455]. Although the situation was 
not as drastic in urban areas, where average nominal wages never appeared to have 
gone below the cost of feeding a family of four, those workers nevertheless 
experienced a hefty fall in the value of real wages after 191457 [Ibarra, 1992: 457]. 
For its part, the government attempted to curb the ever-increasing prices: 
In order to meet the serious situation arising from the highly increased cost of 
living, especially of the necessaries of life, a decree was issued on 24" April 
(1917) fixing maximum prices of bread, jerked beef, alcohol, olive oil, meat, 
fish, rice, beans, charcoal, with the power to extend or modify the list when 
considered desirable [FO 371/2923: 31]. 
If the decree were breached, the penalty would be imprisonment or the imposition of 
a fine. The high cost of living was due to the lack of domestic production and the 
56 No similar figures for Chinese immigration are available for 1917. 
57 For more information on urban wages, see Chapter 3. 
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reliance on imports available at inflated prices due to scarcity, as elsewhere in Latin 
America [Albert, 1988: 59]. Certainly Cuba had not built a successful import 
substitution industry and, by 1917, the prices of imports were abnormally high: 
In considering prices here it is necessary to remember that Cuba produces 
practically nothing herself and that nearly everything is imported from the US 
and has to pay customs duty on entry (in some cases of 40% ad valorem),... 
a further artificial increase is imposed by retailers of all kinds [FO 371/2923: 
63]. 
The situation in Cuba was serious indeed, as even staple foods, such as wheat flour - 
for bread, were imported from the USA, whose Food Administration and War Trade 
Board stipulated that, unless a maximum price for Cuban sugar was levied, the 
supply of coal and wheat to Cuba would be halted, an ultimatum to which the Cuban 
government eventually surrendered [Thomas, 1998: 531/2]. A Cuban Food 
Administration Board (FAB), based on the US model, was established in an attempt 
to control supply and to appease growing discontent in Cuba. In September 1918, 
the head of the Cuban FAB wrote to the then head of the US Board and future 
President of the United States of America, Herbert Hoover, asking him "to hasten the 
shipment of wheat flour for fear of bread riots" [The Havana Post, 21/09/1918: 6]. The 
FAB did not prove popular and its directors were accused (by many periodicals 
except ultra-conservative ones) of "amassing fabulous fortunes for themselves at the 
expense of the people", while providing "a very fertile soil for the sowing of all kinds 
of revolutionary propaganda, and anti-government politicians and Spanish anarchists 
of whom there are believed to be many in Cuba, (who) have not failed to use the 
opportunity offered" [FO 371/3705: 2]. 
Those accused of being Spanish anarchists were harshly dealt with and, in July and 
August 1919 alone, one hundred Spanish worker leaders were expelled from the 
island [Palaez Groba, 1991: 8489]. This treatment was also meted out to Germans 
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living in Cuba and, in one paranoid drive, 30 of these "enemy aliens" were deported 
[New York Times, 04/09/1919: 2]. Germans and "German sympathisers" were 
accused of promoting rail strikes, while Spanish inhabitants were -seen to be 
indifferent o the war effort or else "pro-German" CFO 371/2661: 10]. 70% of Cubans, 
on the other hand, had supported the Allies (according to the British Consul in July 
1916) eight months before the Cuban government declared war alongside the United 
States of America [FO 371/2661: 10]. 
If the government was suspicious that German propaganda was being unleashed on 
Cuba's inhabitants, those inhabitants felt a more immediate threat in the increased 
attention from US economic interests, strengthened by the positioning of Marines, 
poised to intervene if necessary. The British Consul was aware of the hostility that 
was spreading among all classes of Cubans and Spanish: 
Generally speaking, there is a strong anti-American feeling in Cuba. This is 
due largely to the irritation caused by the contact of races, dissimilar mode of 
like, etc., partly to the envy of Cubans who are jealous of American 
penetration of the island and also to an inherent feeling of hostility among the 
Spaniards as a result of American intervention on behalf of Cuban liberty, all 
of which has been fostered by a strong local German element which exerts 
considerable influence [FO 371/3195: 98/80]. 
According to the above view, Spanish inhabitants in Cuba still harboured a mistrust 
of the USA, due to the defeat of Spain in the "Spanish-American War" some twenty 
years earlier. It is just as likely, however, that this mistrust had its origins in the 
usurpation of Spanish economic interests by American ones. It is also likely that the 
roots of the anti-Americanism displayed by Cubans lay not simply in envy but also in 
the creeping displacement of workers by US management policies58 and especially 
58 Rationalisation in the workplace was still in its infancy at the end of the First World War. Rationalised 
working patterns expanded throughout the 1920s, as more US capital penetrated the sugar industry, In 
particular. As noted, mills in the west of Cuba were less modernised than those in the east and 
Dumoulin has suggested that workers in the west, who were still employed by Spanish or Cuban 
bosses, worked harder in a bid to resist being taken over by huge US companies and also in 
competition to them [Dumoulin, 1980: 58]. 
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during the cycles of US occupation. Furthermore, in Oriente Province these. 
sentiments had been exacerbated by confusion surrounding the Liberal uprising in,,, 
early 1917. Although the US administration had backed Menocal (the devil they-, - 
knew), one US naval commander in Santiago had been persuaded by a Liberal 
colonel, Fernandez, to deny entry to Menocal's fleet, which was responding to the 
uprising. This single action, according to the British Consul had caused widespread 
hostility, directed against the US: 
(The) general feeling of the people of Oriente Province is now very anti- 
American and they assert that the United States have not kept their word and 
that rebels were practically recognised by the US commander at Santiago 
[FO 371/2923: 89]. 
The effects of war-time prices, the growth of US corporations and the foreign military 
presence in Cuba soon led many workers to voice their anger at increasing hardship 
and subordination. Between the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1920,220 strikes 
were declared on Cuban soil [Cordova, 1997: 122]. The largest strikes, and those 
that were capable of causing the most damage to the economy, were staged by 
sugar and transport workers (see below). 
By 1917 urban workers in many trades had already secured the eight-hour working 
day, a right that had not yet been extended to rural areas and so was not enjoyed by 
the thousands of sugar workers on the island, many of whom were still expected to 
put in twelve hours in a day [Dumoulin, 1980: 56]. Thus a reduction of working hours, 
along with a rise in wages and union recognition, was one of the demands sought by 
striking sugar workers in the region of Cienfuegos in the western area of Santa Clara, 
during October and November 1917. 
The strike took hold around Cienfuegos for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the town of 
Cruces, some 35 kilometres north east of the city boasted such a large concentration 
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of sugar mills that the workers there had become partly urbanised. Close contact 
with one another strengthened unity, allowing workers to exchange information and 
to organise more easily. Secondly, a strong union movement already existed in 
Cienfuegos. Inspired by the transport (predominantly dock workers') union, the 
Federaciön Obrera de Bahia (FOB), which became known as the Federacibn 
Terrestre (FT), was set up, attracting many skilled workers in the city, notably 
mechanics, machinists, iron workers, carpenters, builders and coppersmiths. It was 
precisely that body of workers, headed by the reformist Vicente Martinez, 59 that 
extended its influence to the surrounding areas of the campo, incorporating other 
skilled workers locally employed in sugar mills. The FT organised members 
according to the industrial branch in which they worked, in what was a partial 
embracing of industrial unionism, although reformist and not anarcho-syndicalist in 
nature. 
Discontent soon spread from Cienfuegos to other regions and, by the end of October, 
more than 50 mills struck, mostly in Santa Clara and Camaguey, while isolated 
strikes were declared in Oriente, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio [Carr, 
1966: 134]. 00 US Marines were deployed near to sugar estates in those areas where 
US economic interests were strongest (notably in Oriente) in an attempt to 
discourage insurgency, thus protecting US-owned companies. In a bid to end the 
strikes, the government met employers to discuss the rising discontent and together 
they proposed that wages be increased by ten per cent, although they would not 
agree to a shorter working day. The workers and their leaders refused to 
compromise and the strikes continued, leading to arrests and the threatened 
59 Martinez was a member of the Liberal Party and had close ties with the Partido Socialista de Cuba 
(PSC). He had been a rail mechanic and during the 1910s he opened up his own workshop. He 
remained faithful to the Liberal Party and later joined Machado's' government [Dumoulin, 1980: 62]. 60 Carr has called these strikes "geographically limiting' [Carr, 1966: 134]. The majority did take place 
within the confines of Santa Clara and Camaguey, although sugar mills existed in every province in the 
country. Strikes called in other areas would have resulted in greater disturbances and, therefore, a 
stronger bargaining position for workers. 
63 
deportation of foreign workers. Furthermore, the Centro Obrero in Cienfuegos was. 
closed down and the right to organise was suspended. These repressive measures 
and fear of US occupation helped to defeat the strike, coupled with the somewhat 
elitist nature of the action that had been staged predominantly by skilled mechanics, 
ignoring the plight of field workers, who were unskilled but employed in their 
thousands. 
The failure to recognise those workers who did not belong to the "aristocracy" of 
sugar production may have cost the strikers dear. The downing of tools by so many, 
key employees would have brought the industry to a standstill, especially taking into 
consideration that at the time there was a supposed labour shortage on the island 
and that sugar bosses had urged the government to allow the importation of 
labourers from the nearby West Indies in order to make up for the shortfall. The 
president of the Cuba Railroad Company, Mr G. H. Whigham, believed that the labour- 
shortage was a potential threat to stability on the island and, in July 1917, he 
reported to the British Consul that at least 100,000 Chinese workers should be 
recruited into Cuba if this were to be avoided [FO 371/2923: 39]. A strike declared by 
cane-cutters would have been propitious as, given the labour shortage, the 
deployment of strike-breakers would have proved extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. However, not only did the wave of protest fail to secure the support of 
field workers, but the action also took place in the midst of the tiempo muerto [dead 
season] when such workers were not even in employment. The cane-cutting season 
takes place from between January and June and delaying strike action by just two 
months might have attracted field workers, assuming they were courted, resulting in 
a deadlock in sugar production in Cuba. 
While one strike dominated labour issues in the campo, businesses in Havana were 
affected by many smaller strikes, which culminated in a general strike towards the 
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end of 1918. The period leading up to the great unrest bore witness to a forging of 
solidarity among workers in the capital, in what can be seen as a prelude to the 
foundation of the first united workers' federation, the Federacibn Obrera de la 
Habana [FOH] (Workers' Federation of Havana) in 1920.61 The Centro Obrero, 
which served as a union base and educational centre, was established at Egido 2 in 
Havana during 1917. According to Felipe Zapata, " an anarchist union leader at that 
time, the fact that the Centro housed many unions, whose members and leaders 
frequently had conflicting ideas, often led to clashes between the varying factions. It 
was a meeting point where anarchist unions such as the SGOIF and the Sindicato 
del Ramo de la Madera (Woodworkers' Union) sat alongside the reformist unions of 
the Havana Electric and Havana Central companies, for example. For this reason, 
Zapata explained "el predominate acento en Egido 2 (era) violento, atrabiliario, 
destructor y perturbador" (the prevailing tone of in Egido 2 [was] violent, ill-tempered, 
destructive and disturbing) [Zapata, August 1948: 32]. 1., 
Nonetheless, it was a step in the direction of unity, if only through the sharing of, a 
building -a place where workers could voice their discontent to their peers. It was a 
period when the labour movement was only beginning to recover from the 
government's 1915 purge on working-class centres and periodicals. Few 
publications were being circulated at this time, although the service industry workers' 
mouthpiece, El Dependiente, managed to continue production until 1918 and the 
printers' Memorandum. Tipogräfico, being reformist and so less of a threat to the 
authorities and employers, even survived the brutality of the early Machado 
presidency in 1925 (see chapter 4). As there had been so little contact between 
workers outside their place of work until the foundation of the Centro Obrero, the 
meeting point must have been a welcome addition to the working-class cause. 
61 The FOH is discussed in greater detail below. 
62 For more details on Zapata, see Chapter 3. 
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1917 also saw the foundation of what was initially a union for brewery workers, the 
SGOIF, which expanded to embrace those working in all areas of factory work, a 
type of employment that was becoming increasingly popular as more pasta, drink 
and confectionery-producing companies were set up in urban areas of western Cuba, 
in particular. Mendoza Rodriguez has pointed out that figures from the 1919 Cuban 
census show that, of a total population of just under three million inhabitants, 4.2% of 
that number were classified as being industrial workers, that is non-professionals, 
excluding those who worked on the land [Mendoza Rodriguez, 1985: 91]. There 
existed nun proletariado artesenal con una bajisima concentraciön" (a very small craft 
proletariat) where each profession (aside from tobacco and dock workers) boasted 
fewer than 500 workers at any one time [Mendoza Rodriguez, 1985: 94]. So, a 
central point for those employed in various occupations brought workers together and 
served as a base of solidarity and. exchange. Furthermore, Egido 2 was the initial 
home of the SGOIF, the subject of this thesis, whose membership, by aiming to unite 
everyone employed in the manufacturing industry, far. out-stripped the 500 limit to 
which Rodriguez referred. 63 
The most serious urban unrest of the late 1910's was instigated by the non-radical 
dock workers' union and by streetcar operators in Havana. The demand for higher 
wages by stevedores came with a threat that, unless employers raised pay, a strike 
would be declared, an undertaking that had the potential to paralyse the country as 
sugar exports would be halted, damaging the economy, while much needed food 
imports, in particular, would be confined to port. Tram employees, meanwhile, made 
a similar threat if they did not receive a pay rise, double pay after midnight, a day off 
with pay every two weeks and a modification of tram routes. The authorities 
reciprocated these threats, warning that striking workers would simply be replaced by 
63 According to the same 1919 census, 5,774 people were employed in Cuba's factories. 
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soldiers, while leaders of the action would be imprisoned [Havana Post, 
10/09/1918: 5]. 
The president of the Federaciön de Bahia, Gervasio Sierra, 64 sent a telegram to 
President Menocal that, unless demands were met within 48 hours, there would be a 
general walkout by harbour workers. This action illustrates the reformist nature of the 
strike and it was a tactic in no way typical of anarchists, who depended upon the 
spontaneous action of individuals. The demands were not met, prompting some 
8,000 dock workers to support strike action [Mendoza Rodriguez, 1985: 96]. 
This action was not violent, although that did not prevent the directorate of the 
harbour workers' union from being sentenced to 80 days in jail, charged -with 
"conspiracy to intimidate" [Havana Post, 10/11/1918: 8]. While most imports were 
prevented from entering Cuba, "workers offered to unload foodstuffs consigned to 
various asylums and hospitals" [Havana Post, 05/11/1918: 3]. The government's 
response to the non-movement of other goods was to deploy not only soldiers and 
police to act as strike-breakers and to ensure that the conflict was peaceful but to 
relocate hundreds of prisoners to the docks in order to help offload goods from the 
vessels [IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 198]. Menocal, needing to appease US interests, 
maintained that it was Cuba's duty to ship sugar supplies to the Allies. Workers in 
other sectors did not adhere to this theory and, while dock workers in far-flung areas 
of Cuba, from Guantanamo in the east to Regla in the west, joined the strike, in 
Havana those employed in jobs as diverse as carpentry, construction and tailoring 
walked out in solidarity with the port workers. The harbour strike had become a 
general strike. 
64 According to the British Consulate, the worker-leader Sierra was arrested for murder in 1910 [FO 
371/3195: 77]. He was "skillfully bought off" by Menocal during the 1918 strikes [Thomas, 1998: 534]. In 
1919, he was ejected from May I demonstrations by fellow workers [Cabrera, 1985: 330]. 
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A decision to end the strike was taken not by those workers fighting for better pay but 
by the likes of the reformist leaders Sierra and Jose Bravo65 and by the editors of 
non-worker, daily newspapers. Acting as arbiters, this group liaised with Menocal's 
government to release workers who had recently been arrested and to bring the 
strike to a close, with no apparent benefits to the strikers. Unimpressed with the 
deal, workers in Havana revolted and the same day as the agreement had been 
reached "the first serious trouble broke out in the heart of the city" [Havana Post, 
14/11/1918: 1]. In the ensuing unrest, trams, manned by strike-breakers, were 
attacked, one worker (Eusebio Campos) was dragged from his cab and beaten, 
tramlines were covered with soap and shots were fired. The authorities retaliated, 
arresting four drivers and temporarily closing the workers' centre at Egido 2, while a 
group of Spanish and Cuban workers, among them a cobbler, a barber, a builder and 
a trader, were detained for meeting on a park bench in the city [La Lucha, 
14/11/1918: 1]. 
A resolution was finally reached by which workers were assured that they would 
receive a 15% increase in their pay, a promise that bosses did not keep, encouraging 
further strikes in the coming years, but an action that nevertheless may have spurred 
rail workers to immediately follow suit and declare their own strike. 
Rail workers in Camaguey made both political and economic demands on the 
companies for which they worked: a' rise in wages, union recognition, the promise of 
non-intervention in Cuban affairs by the USA, the abolition of military service and a 
reduction - in the cost of living. Railway employees in Havana and Santa Clara 
promptly joined the strike, inspiring those in other provinces to declare support for a 
new general strike. In Havana, stokers, typesetters, construction and metal workers 
65 Bravo was, at this time, president of the executive committee for the general strike. He went on to co- 
found the FOH and was a tobacco workers' leader. For more information, see chapter 4 
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were among those to declare solidarity, forcing the government to send troops to 
coastal areas and ports and, once again, to deploy around 500 prisoners as strike- 
breakers, while small-business licences were revoked. One month after halting work, 
rail workers secured a partial success and wages were increased by 10%. 
The port companies' failure to keep their end of the bargain led dock workers to 
declare further strikes, this time demanding not only wage rises but the right of the 
union, rather than the bosses, to hire workers. Strike action continued, igniting 
discontent and sparking more general strikes throughout 1919 and 1920. Cabrera 
has pointed out that, between the end of 1919 and August 1920, port workers struck 
almost continuously, ' only returning to work for very brief periods and at one point up 
to 1,600 prisoners were deployed to do the job [Cabrera, 1969: 63]. The country 
experienced strikes in many trades and areas: in Cienfuegos, trams stopped, 
builders struck and theatres closed their doors, from December to March printers in 
Havana demanded a 44-hour week (la semana inglesa or English week), higher 
wages and that bosses recognise union delegates and, in Camaguey, sugar crops 
were destroyed by angry workers, - while train drivers refused 'to transport the 
product-a" ' 
The government and company bosses believed that the disturbances typified by 
these strikes were damaging to the country and were an attempt at civil war 
[Fernandez, 2000: 58]. The authorities came down hard on any effort at worker 
solidarity and in subsequent months constitutional guarantees were suspended, 
dozens of workers were expelled or imprisoned and the few worker publications that 
still existed were made illegal. Telleria Toca has pointed out that the last four years 
of the Menocalista bordered on dictatorship [Tellerfa Toca, 1984: 182]. By July 1919, 
104 undesirables had been deported and leading Cuban anarchists and anarcho- 
88 Private cars were hired to transport the sugar. 
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syndicalists were sentenced to death, a penalty that was duly lifted. 67 Some workers 
were killed by the authorities and the funeral of tailor Robustiano Fernandez, shot by 
guards on the steps of Egido 2, became a worker demonstration on all-important May 
1sß. A parade from Egido 2 to Colon Cemetery was followed by a meeting at the 
Teatro Payret, a venue that, although large, reportedly could not house all the 
workers who wanted to attend the event [Lehn Expösito, 1975: 331]. It was at this 
meeting that solidarity with the Russian Revolution was first pledged, by an anarchist 
SGOIF member no less, at a time when little information about the atrocities being 
committed there had filtered through. 88 
After smashing unions, the government aimed to replace them with parallel reformist 
organisations and, in December 1918, the Centro de Asuntos Sociales [Centre for 
Social Affairs], an entity that boasted strong ties with the conservative American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), was forged, which "tratö de establecer, sin exito, 
delegaciones en todo el territorio nacional" (tried to establish, without success, 
delegations throughout the national territory) [IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 203]. Skeleton 
worker parties were created that hinted at a socialist alliance, through names such as 
Partido Socialista Obrero (Workers' Socialist Party), Partido Federal Obrero (Federal 
Workers' Party) and Partido Socialista Radical (Radical Socialist Party). They were 
headed by pro-government elements, however, and in reality did little to alleviate the 
suffering of the workers [IHMRSC, a, 1985: 204]. 
For its part, the labour movement began to gain lost ground, opening another "semi- 
clandestine" Centro Obrero at Zulueta 37 [Stubbs, 1985: 54], the location that 
became home to the FOH. 
67 Among those sentenced were Marcelo Salinas, Antonio Penichet, Alfredo Lopez, Alejandro Barreiro 
and Pablo Guerra. The jailing of particular leading organisers, including Penichet and Salinas was a 
common occurrence. 
68 Worker attitudes to the October Revolution and Bolshevism are discussed in greater detail below. 
70 
The FOH was set up amidst worker unrest and troubled times for the Cuban 
economy. The sugar shortage in Europe in particular, during the war years, had 
meant that millions of dollars had been ploughed into the Cuban sugar economy. The 
so called "Dance of the Millions", named after the wealth being accumulated in Cuba 
(the price of a pound of sugar reached 20 cents in 1919), did not last and, in 1920, 
the plummeting value of the crop caused banks and sugar holdings to collapse. "" 
The country was in economic turmoil, -although, as Perez has pointed out, the crisis 
had a silver lining as it awakened the masses to the extent to which the country was 
directly and totally affected by external economic forces [Perez, 1993: 48]. 
The first national worker congress of the decade was held at Egido 2 from 14 to 16 
April, 1920. The Congress was initially called to discuss the low living standards 
being experienced by workers at a time of economic stagnation and to agree on 
sending a Cuban delegate to the third conference of the Confederacibn Obrera Pan- 
Americana (Pan-American Worker Confederation) [COPA], being held in Mexico two 
months later. Set up in 1918, the COPA was the joint brainchild of AFL President 
Samuel Gompers and the US State Department. It aimed to unite all workers in the 
American continent so that they could discuss ways to solve labour issues through 
liaison with employers and governments and, according to recent Cuban 
historiography, it had "el propösito de corromper el movimiento obrero en America 
Latina e impedir la influencia de las fuerzas patriöticas y antimperialistas en su seno" 
(the aim of corrupting the labour movement in Latin American and of preventing the 
influence of patriotic and anti-imperialist forces at its core) [IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 204). 
The April Congress in Havana was the idea of reformist tobacco worker leader, Jose 
69 It fell to 6 cents per pound in October 1920 and reached rock bottom at 3 cents in January 1921 
[Kapcia, 2000: 66]. 
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Bravo70, who had been influential in the 1918 strike action of the train drivers" and 
who has been accused of acting as Gomper's tool to promote the AFL in Cuba 
[Estrada, 1951: 25]. However, the Congress rejected the motion to send a Cuban 
delegate to Mexico and radical members such as Lopez, Salinas and Barreiro, aware 
that it was a US governmental device, labelled COPA a yellow organisation. 72 
Participants also claimed that it would be impossible for Cuba to send a delegate to 
the COPA conference as Gompers refused to admit black workers into the AFL and 
black workers were well represented within the Cuban labour movement. Any 
attempt by Gompers and Bravo to create a national reformist association in Cuba 
seriously backfired, key posts in the Congress going to the likes of the writer Marcelo 
Salinas and printer Alfredo Lopez, both Cuban anarcho-syndicalists who were 
appointed Secretaries of the Congress, while Victor Recoba of ý the Federaciön 
Anarquista . de Cuba (Anarchist Federation of Cuba) was on the, Committee. 
Congress delegates, the majority of whom were from the Havana province, instead 
sent a greeting to the USSR, an act that did not necessarily indicate that many 
present were Marxist (the word or its significance was not mentioned) but that they 
displayed solidarity with the workers of Russia. As Fernandez has pointed out, news 
of Bolshevik persecution had not yet reached many outside of Russia [Fernandez, 
2000: 59], the reality of which would later inflame most anarchists. This show of 
international solidarity was extended when delegates pledged support for the two 
Italian anarchists, Nicolfi Sacco and Bartlomeo Vanzetti, who were charged with 
killing a shoe factory paymaster and his guard in Boston, USA in 1920. 
The Congress berated the Cuban government for the economic crisis and demanded 
solutions to the high cost of living. While some (reformist) members called for 
70 For more on Bravo, see Chapter 3. 71 The Hermandad Ferrovaria de Cuba (Rail Workers' Brotherhood of Cuba) was the only union in Cuba 
to belong to the COPA and acted as promoter of the Confederation. 72 That is, it pandered to the wishes of the state and employers, rather than to the needs of the workers. 
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government arbitration in the matter, others (anarcho-syndicalists) demanded direct 
action. A Comite Conjunto (Joint Committee), composed of delegates from each 
province, was set up to resolve the discrepancy. It was the Committee's job to liaise 
with all unions and to propose a solution to the problem at a national congress, due 
to be held on 1 January 1921. The congress never took place and the foundation of 
a national organisation in Cuba was delayed until 1925, although collectives in 
Havana did hold congresses on a number of occasions, finally setting up the FOH in 
May 1922.73 
Shortly after the April Congress, Penichet and Salinas were once again arrested, 
charged with inciting factory workers in the Havana district of Cerro to strike action, 
although it is more likely that their imprisonment was the government's attempt to 
weaken the labour movement by depriving it of two of its most influential 
personalities. Again the plan backfired. The printers' unions, the Asociaci6n de 
Tip6grafos en General and the Asociaci6n de Lit6grafos, called an extraordinary 
meeting at Egido 2 and approved 72-hour strike action as a protest against the 
arrests, to begin on 1 May 1920, a motion backed by the SGOIF. A meeting was 
held at the Teatro Nacional and, when bombs exploded there, the government 
reacted by arresting five more worker leaders, among them Alfredo Lopez and the 
anarchists Nicasio Trujillo and Pablo Guerra, all charged with a breach of the Ley de 
Explosivos (Explosives' Law). The men were eventually released, Löpez spending 
90 days in jail. 
The brutal rule of Menocal was followed by the relatively moderate government of 
Alfredo Zayas in 1921, who rose to power after further contested elections, corruption 
and the fear of another Liberal uprising. Not until General Enoch Crowder, 
73 Meetings were held on 26/11/1920,09/08/1921,15/09/1921 and 04/10/1921. On each occasion 
between 15 and 18 collectives attended. It was during the October session that the FOH was founded. 
The resolutions of the FOH are discussed below. 
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representing the US government, arranged for new, fairer elections to be held, did 
the Liberals abstain from the race and Zayas entered office unchallenged. The new 
government, however, ushered in a fresh period of corruption, Zayas being "a 
cultivated, opportunistic lawyer almost totally free of moral scruples" [Perez, 1993: 
48]. However, as Fernandez has pointed out, his presidency treated the labour 
movement less harshly than that of Menocal and so, being freer to use propaganda, 
it was during this time that use inicia la etapa mfis constructiva del anarquismo en 
Cuba" (the most constructive period of anarchism began in Cuba) [Fernandez, 2000: 
59]. 
Although no national organisation had yet come into being, the workers of Havana 
had managed to group together, in what can be seen as the first organisation in 
Cuba to embrace a wide range of worker unions, attracting those from the 
manufacturing industry, cigar makers, cobblers, tailors, metal and woodworkers and 
builders, among others. After two preliminary meetings, seventeen worker 
organisations met on 15 September 1921, at the headquarters of the cigar-rollers' 
union, la Sociedad de Torcedores, in Havana, "con el propösito de constituir la 
Federaciön Obrera de la Habana [FOH]" (with the intention of building the Workers' 
Federation of Havana) [FOH, 2]. The meeting named the delegate of the printers' 
union, Jose Pena Vilaboa, as Secretary, while the tobacco union representative, 
Alejandro Barreiro, was named President. 74 The union was set up legally and a 
standing order was sent to the State Governor for legal sanction, which "conforme a 
las leyes del pals; Ilevando la firma y los sellos autenticos de catorce 
74 In a subsequent meeting on 4"' October, 1921, Barreiro's title changed to General Secretary, while 
Alfredo Lopez and the construction workers' union delegate, J. Eduardo Alpizar, were nominated 
Deputy-General Secretary and Deputy-Financial Secretary, respectively. 
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organisaciones" (conforms with the laws of the country; bearing the signatures and 
official stamps of fourteen organisations) [IHMCRSC, b, 1975: 350]. 75 
The FOH was decidedly anarcho-syndicalist in nature, apparent through analysis of 
the resolutions passed during the first Congress in 1922. A number of Committees 
were set up during the Congress, whose function it was to study contemporary 
issues: a committee for education, a committee that would be responsible for the 
setting up of the FOH's periodical (this never happened) and a committee for the 
foundation of another, nation-wide federation. The Congress discussed the need to 
introduce equal pay for women and, while they could not abolish child labour (it was 
agreed that many homes depended on a child's wage for survival), it was concluded 
that, depending on age and strength, a child should never work more than six hours 
per day. The Congress also decided that piecework was "inmoral y perjudicial a la 
clase obrera" (immoral and harmful to the working class) [IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 354]. 
Members agreed to pay five cents monthly in subscriptions, to be collected by each 
organisation and handed into the Financial Secretary, who, along with the General 
Secretary and two Deputies, would be voted for by the Committee and would hold 
post for one year. An ordinary congress would be held every six months, while 
extraordinary congresses were possible if two-thirds of member collectives so 
required in writing. The Federation gave autonomy to each union, although all had 
the right to FOH support in times of struggle. It was a united worker front of 
resistance, education and guidance with the "afinidad y cohesion, de evitar ser 
absorbido por la burguesla organizada" (affinity and cohesion to avoid being 
absorbed by the organised bourgeoisie) [IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 3571. The FOH 
75From the minutes of the 19th November 1921 meeting it is clear that neither the Intemacional de 
Concineros (Union of Chefs and Cooks) or the Sociedad de Bamizadores (Glazers' Union) attended, 
while the Union de Dependientes del Ramo del Tobaco (Tobacco Workers' Union) had expressed the 
wish not to form part of the FOR All three unions had sent delegates to the 15th September meeting, 
explaining the discrepancy between the fourteen signatures on the order and the seventeen unions 
present on that date. 
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embraced as its principles "Ia lucha de clases, accibn directa y reachacen 
colectivamente la acciön electoral" (the class war, direct action and collectively 
rejecting electoral action) [IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 357]. The FOH was at the forefront of 
many struggles during the following, years, not only within the confines of Havana 
province but spreading its influence to become involved in lengthy strikes declared in 
the campo. 'ß 
The sugar strikes of 1924, backed by the FOH, were a response to the growing 
displacement of sugar workers at a time when rationalisation continued to transform 
many workplaces, particularly in the eastern mills. US investment in the sugar 
industry persisted throughout the 1920s and O'Brien has noted that: 
By 1923 the ten largest American holding companies, including Cuban Cane 
Sugar, Cuban American, General Sugar and Punta Alegre, controlled 54 of 
the 182 mills in Cuba and accounted for over half of the island's production 
[O'Brien, 1996: 216]. 
As each company aimed to derive the maximum production possible from these 
mills, massive imports of machinery were made, in the hope that the long-term effect 
of the introduction of this new equipment would be to help replace a labour-intensive 
industry with a capital-intensive one [O'Brien, 1996: 216]. As more new electrical 
equipment, unloading systems, methods of extraction and management techniques 
were introduced, the sugar mills were rapidly converted into modern mills, company 
bosses even finding a way to drastically speed up the sugar grinding season, saving 
on labour costs. These technological advances, while improving output and 
efficiency, led to a loss of identity and place of purpose among workers who began to 
experience underemployment and the displacement of man by machine. The 
entrepreneurial tendency to value speed and volume over workers in the pursuit of 
cheaper goods led, in the sugar mills, to an angry workforce that now demanded 
76 The 1924 train and sugar strikes are dealt with in greater detail in later chapters. 
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better working conditions and union recognition, a right that would give unions, and 
so workers, more power in the workplace. As early as 1911, Lindsey had observed 
that Cuban workers at best felt undervalued by US bosses and at worst abused by 
them: 
Beneath a most unimposing exterior a Cuban laborer generally manages to 
cherish a considerable sense of personal dignity and he resents deeply, 
however unperturbed he may appear, the rough handling that has come to 
mean so little to his fellow laborer in the U. S.. Perhaps the unexpressed 
contempt with which he is tolerated by some Americans is resented still more 
deeply... Nowhere else (in the world) does the least considered member of a 
community aspire to social equality with its most exalted personage [Lindsey, 
1911: 132]. 
Such resentment triggered the sugar strikes of 1924, which disrupted the industry 
throughout much of that year (the strikes are analysed in more detail in chapters 4 
and 5) and were supported by other workers' unions. The FOH, which, -although it 
supported such worker action, did not enjoy complete popularity among the radical 
working class. The anarchist periodical Acciön Consciente (Conscious Action) found 
the federation to be too centralised, arguing that it placed too much emphasis on 
bureaucracy. It urged members to demand that their subscriptions be used not on 
committees (or on the wages of committee members) but on books, schools and 
periodicals, that is, things that would help to educate the masses. In fact, a study of 
FOH expenditure records shows that a large quantity of those subscriptions did help 
pay for the rationalist school set up by it. A FOH rationalist school was set up at 
Zulueta 37 in October, 1922 and initially registered just eleven students, including 
two of Lopez's children and two of Barreiro's [Shaffer, 1998: 266]. The school, which 
offered education to children for four hours during the daytime and classes to adults 
in the evening, soon attracted other pupils, boasting an intake of 55 children and 72 
adults in February 1923, rising to 76 children by March [Shaffer, 1998: 268]. While 
other rationalist schools were founded in Banes and Cardenas and another by the 
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SGOIF, " "the largest and most successful school was the FOH school in Havana" 
[Shaffer, 1998: 267]. The school offered the usual subjects of language, history and 
science and, while concentrating on educating its pupils in the importance of hygiene 
and physiology, it aimed to prepare children for their lives as workers. The wages 
generated by subscriptions, to which Acciön Consciente referred, may well have 
concerned the salaries paid to three teachers at the school: Jose Miguel Perez, later 
deported by Machado in his role of the Partido Comunista de Cuba's (Cuban 
Communist Party) [PCC] Secretary General; regular FOH committee member and 
founder of the PCC,,. Jose Pena Vilaboa, and Eloisa Barreira, the wife of Alejandro, 
who was the FOH Financial Secretary at that time and co-founder of PCC [FOH: 33]. 
It was during this period then that, as some Marxists were employed as educators, 
workers and their offspring were probably first exposed to the ideas of Marxism 
through learning. 
The pulling-together of workers and those involved in education became more 
pronounced when, in November 1923, the adult education institute, the Universidad 
Popular Jose Marti (Jose Marti Popular University) [UPJM], was founded. The UPJM 
was the product of collaboration between Alfredo Lopez and Julio Antonio Melia, 
Melia was a student who had set up the Federacibn Estudantil Universitaria 
(Federation of ; University Students) [FEU], founded as a reaction against the 
corruption rife in the university sector and demanding university reform through 
campus occupation. Although a Marxist who helped found the PCC, Melia looked 
upon the veteran anarcho-sydicalist Lopez as his mentor and their friendship spurred 
them to found the UPJM, which complemented the FOH school at Zulueta 37. The 
institution offered additional free evening classes to working adults, who were 
instructed by recent graduates of the University of Havana, including the poet Ruben 
Martinez Villena, who, along with the socialist Carlos Balipo (see below) and Melia, 
T7 The SGOIF rationalist school is dealt with in Chapter 3. 
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founded the Liga Antimperialista (Anti-imperialist League), and who was leader of the 
Protest of the 13; a body of intellectuals that denounced corruption in education and 
government. 78 
During the same year, the anti-corruption Veterans' and Patriots' Association was 
founded (in which Martinez Villena was also active), although it was short-lived and 
collapsed after staging an uprising in Las Villas. All of the above associations set up 
in 1923 cited common grievances: they either aimed to combat the corruption of the 
Zayas government or imperialism, or both. As Marxism was gradually becoming 
better known, some of those active in other organisations began to join socialist 
groupings, culminating in the foundation of the first communist party in Cuba, the 
PCC, in August, 1925. 
Socialism had not been any great force in Cuba during the early twentieth century. 
The voting system was not open to everyone, since recent arrivals from other 
countries were disenfranchised, as were women. 79 In 1901, suffrage was available 
to just one-third of all Cuban males and to a mere 5% of the total population 
[Schaffer, 1988: 17]. Those Cuban males eligible to vote were often mistrustful of the 
electoral process, wary of the level of corruption in Cuban politics and for these 
reasons any attempt at forming a socialist party on the island was little supported. 
Anarcho-syndicalist unions, through which workers could take matters into their own 
hands, or reformist ones, through which negotiations could be made with the state or 
employers, proved more popular. Attempts, however, were made at forming socialist 
associations particularly by the indefatigable Carlos Balipo. One of the founders of 
the Partido Revolucionario Cubano that had fought for an independent Cuba, Balipo 
founded the first socialist alliance in Cuba, the Club de Propaganda Socialista in 
78 Martinez Villena also went on to become President of the national worker confederation, the CNOC, 
in 1927 and leader of the PCC. 
79 The voting system is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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1903 and went on to form the nationwide Partido Obrero Socialista 80 (Socialist 
Workers' Party) in 1905. The party attracted little worker support, maybe due to its 
unwillingness to back many of the strikes of the period. The Partido Socialista de 
Manzanillo in Oriente, founded by the Spaniard Agustin "Martinillo" Martin in 1906, 
did support a localised strike at the Niquero sugar company in 1912 while the 
Agrupaciön Socialista de la Habana (Socialist Grouping of Havana) [ASH], had 
added weight to the sewerage workers' strike of 1911. 
With the advent of the Russian Revolution in 1917, Balinoa' went on to form the ASH 
which identified with the workers of Russia and aimed to spread Marxism to all 
workers in Cuba. Although the ASH attracted a couple of respected worker leaders, 
such as Pena Vilaboa and Barreiro, it failed in its quest to widen its influence and not 
until 1923 did the first communist body appear in the form of the Agrupaciön 
Comunista de la Habana (Communist Association of Havana) [CAH], setting a 
precedent for similar associations that same year in Guabanacoa, Manzanillo, 
Bayamo, Guantanamo, Media Luna, San Antonio de los Banos, Palma Soriano, and 
other places. 
In Havana in mid-August 1925, just nine days after the formation of the 
Confederaciön Nacional de Obreros de Cuba [CNOC] (see below for more on 
CNOC), seventeen people met in Havana in a Congress that resulted in the 
formation of the PCC. Five workers attended this Congress, all of whom had been 
union delegates to either or both the FOH and CNOC. The following worker-leaders 
had been present at the most recent CNOC Congress: Alejandro Barreiro, 
representative of the FOH and of the Union de Obreros de la Industria de Cigarreria 
80 This changed its name to Partido Socialista de Cuba (Socialist Party of Cuba) the following year. 81 Among the periodicals published by Balirio were Justicia (1920/21), Espdrtaco (1922) and Lucha de 
Clases (1924/25) which expounded Marxist theories and for which Pena Vilaboa and M. Perez, both 
leading members of the FOH, wrote. 
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en, General (General Tobacco Industry Workers' Union); Miguel Valdes, 
representative of the Federaciön de Trabajadores de Tabaco en Rama de Cuba 
(Federation of Cuban Tobacco Sowers) and of the Sociedad de Resistencia de 
Torcedores de San Antonio de los Banos (Resistance Society of Cigarmakers of San 
Antonio de los Barios); Venancio Rodriguez, representative of the Sociedad de 
Torcedores de Guanabacoa (Society of Cigarmakers of Guanabacoa) and Emilio 
Rodriguez, representative of the Gremio de Despalilladores de San Antonio de los 
Banos (Union of Tobacco Sorters of San Antonio de los Banos). Along with Jose 
Pena Vilaboa, the first Secretary of the FOH, these men were the only workers 
present at the formation of the PCC and each possessed an insight into the running 
of worker associations on the island. The Congress discussed the importance of 
infiltrating unions in order to spread the influence of communism to the workers of 
Cuba [IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 445-451]. 
Although no reference was made to the FOH or the CNOC in the first PCC meeting, 
the group discussed the need to "adoptar un programa concreto de reivindicaciones 
para los obreros y campesinos, que le permitiera entablar con ellos vinculos 
fraternales de lucha" (adopt a concrete programme of demands for workers and 
peasants, that would allow it to strike up with them a brotherly bond of struggle) 
[IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 231]. Neither was there any recorded mention of the 
predominance of anarcho-syndicalists in recent worker organisations and 
congresses, although the group must have been aware of the importance of wresting 
influence from them in a bid to construct a solid party based along Marxist-Leninist 
lines. 
For their part, anarcho-syndicalists were split on the theme of communism, and more 
particularly of Russia and Bolshevism. While some writers in worker periodicals 
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hoped that the new regime in Russia could still prove its worth, other -anarchist 
periodicals had voiced their complete mistrust of all connected with Marxism: 
... sin hacernos 
falsas ilusiones, sin equivocarnos sobre su alcance y 
significaciön; previmos su marcha lenta y penosa porque vimos todavia 
potentes esos grandes enemigos del progreso y de la emancipaciön humana: 
La ignorancia y su häbito de la obediencia, y la politica y su espiritu 
conservador de dominacibn (without false illusions, without being mistaken 
about its reach and significance; we foresee its slow and painful march 
because we still strongly see those large enemies of progress and human 
emancipation: ignorance and its custom of obedience and politics with its 
conservative spirit of domination) [Acciön Consciente, 25/12/1922: 1). 
According to jTierra!, the seeds of communism had already been sown among 
workers. In October 1924, the periodical reported that some conferences and 
cultural events held at the Centro Obrero in Havana had defended communism while 
mounting "un ataque furibundo a la Anarquia" (a furious attack on Anarchism) 
[Tierra! 09/10/1924]. The article enquired whether this position was supported by 
the FOH, a question that seems justified when taking into account that figures such 
as Barreiro and Pena Vilaboa, both communists, had played such a prominent role in 
the local organisation. 
The presence of communism became even more apparent on 22 August 1925, when, 
at the Parque de Marte, an anti-imperialist meeting was held, in which Lopez, 
Barreiro, Mella and Alfonso Bernal de Riesgo spoke. Both Mella and Bernal, 
described as "intelectuales revolucionarios" [IHMCRSC, a, 1975: 210], addressed the 
large congregation alongside "un companero chino y otro hebreo (quienes) hablaron 
en sus idiomas y fueron muy aplaudidos por sus camaradas" (a Chinese comrade 
and another Jewish comrade (who) spoke in their languages and were heavily 
applauded by their companions) (El Progreso, 1925, r: 1]. A Jewish contingent was 
also present at the August PCC Congress, and it appears likely that the speaker at 
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the anti-imperialist gathering was also one of these founding members. 82 A 1925 
manifesto released by the Anti-Imperialist League, part of a world-wide Comintern 
front activity [Thomas, 1998: 578], declared that 
Cuba debe ser para los cubanos. Esto no quiere decir odio al extranjero, 
quiere decir odio al capital extranjero, 83 que desconoce la necesidades de los 
comerciantes, de los colonos, de los obreros, de los empleados ... (Cuba 
must be for the Cubans. That doesn't mean hate for the foreigner, it means 
hate for foreign capital, which does not recognise the needs of the traders, 
the sugar planters, the workers, the clerks ... ) [Rossell, 1973: 108]. 
As little as two days had elapsed between the resolution passed by the PCC to 
spread Marxism-Leninism in Cuba and the August anti-imperialist rally. ' 
The foundation of the PCC came hot on the heels of the CNOC. Meeting in 
December 1924, delegates of the FOH had decided that the time was ripe for the first 
national worker organisation, particularly in light of the sugar strikes that had been 
sweeping the Cuban countryside that year (see chapter 3). A date for the Congress 
was set for 15 -19 February in Cienfuegos, an important sugar-producing region that 
had played a significant role in previous worker struggles, especially in Cruces. 
Sugar workers, the largest group of workers in Cuba, sent delegates from just one 
union to the February conference. 85 That they had failed to organise as an industry 
and did not yet participate in national worker discussions was not lost on organisers, 
who saw the inclusion of sugar workers as a key element if a truly national 
organisation were to be formed. Cienfuegos as a choice of venue for what was to 
become known as Segundo Congreso Obrero Nacional (Second National Worker 
Congress) [SCON] was, therefore, symbolic. 
82 Jewish founders of the PCC were Yoshka Grinberg and Yunger Semjovich (later known as Fablo 
Grobart) of the Secciön Hebrea (Jewish Section) and Felix Gurbich of the Juventud Comunista Hebrea 
(Jewish Communist Youth). Jewish immigrants from Poland had set up a communist Grouping 
ýAgnipacidn Comunista) in 1925 [Benjamin, 1975: 81]. 
3 Emphasis in original. 84 The PCC Congress closed on 20th August 1925. 85 Francisco Ans and Lucas Sain Bolivar attended from the Unibn de Trabajadores de la Industria 
Azucarera de Puerto Padre in Oriente [Tellerla Toca, 1984: 120]. 
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SCON laid the foundation for the CNOC, which was officially founded at a third 
worker congress in Camaguey in August 1925. SCON resolutions were similar to 
those of the FOH in that its 105 delegates, representing 75 unions, voted to reject 
any electoral action, condemned arbitration with the government and employers and 
condoned the use of direct action and class struggle. The new Confederation's 
"Tactics and Principles" detailed this: 
Considerando que la colaboracibn con las demäs clases sociales 
entrana en si cierto confusionismo del que siempre resultamos enganados 
los trabajadores; sabiendo por experiencia que todo {intermediario} entre el 
capital y nosotros solo viene a perturbaar nuestra marcha progresiva, 
tratando de anular nuestros esfuerzos; viendo que la politica es la fuente de 
todas las inmoralidades, la cizanadora de todas nuestras luchas intemas y la 
ratz de todos los males de la sociedad presente, el Segundo Congreso 
Obrero Nacional acuerda declarar que adopta como principio la Lucha de 
Clase, la Acciön Directa y que rechaza Colectivamente la Acciön Electoral 
(Given that collaboration with other social classes carries with it a certain 
confusion from which we, the workers, always end up being deceived; 
knowing through experience that all (intermediaries) between capital and 
ourselves only serve to hinder our way forward, trying to override our efforts; 
seeing that politics is the source of all immorality, the reason for all our 
internal struggles and the root of all evil in present society, the Second 
National Worker Congress agrees to adopt as its principle Class Struggle, 
Direct Action and to Collectively reject Electoral Action) [IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 
400]. 
The Congress also rejected motions for the creation of worker pensions, the 
introduction of an "accidents at work" law and for a minimum wage as fixed by the 
state, all of which were typical of motions put forward by reformist delegates. 
Instead, it agreed on decidedly anarcho-syndicalist resolutions, such as the eight- 
hour day (or 44-hour week), rest from toil on a Sunday, support for strike action, a 
minimum wage fixed by the union, sexual equality and the creation of more rationalist 
schools, cultural conferences and worker centres. Delegates stood against the 
foundation of parallel unions in any trade and passed a resolution not to 
bureaucratise the Confederation, leaving each locality to run its own internal affairs. 
Despite these motions, not all delegates were anarcho-syndicalists. Instead the 
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CNOC was made up of a coalition of anarcho-syndicalist, reformist and communist 
members. 
It is important that the influence of reformist unions over workers not be 
underestimated. Key workers in the transport sector, docks and trains particularly, 
and in the tobacco factories were led by reformist unions who had bargained with 
employers and the state in order to secure demands for their members (dock workers 
from 1918 to 1920, train drivers in 1920 and 1924 and tobacco workers in almost 
every strike that they had declared, for, example). Partly for that reason, those 
influenced by anarchism, as communists, understood the need to infiltrate unions 
and to win over already unionised workers, thus sympathising with the writings of 
Malatesta: 
One must (therefore) find ways of living among non-anarchists, as 
anarchistically as possible, (and) which will further our propaganda and offer 
possibilities of applying our ideas [in Richards, 1993: 152]. 
The hope by anarchists that they could exert their influence through the FOH and 
CNOC and gain more support among workers was dashed in part by the rise of 
communism in Cuba, an ideology that allowed for a more solid base of organisation 
than anarchism ever would, 86 and, in part by the rise to power of a new President of 
Cuba in May 1925, General Gerado Machado. 87 At first, Machado appeared to be 
the Cuban leader that the country had been awaiting: someone who would reform the 
US Reciprocity Treaty and dispense with the Platt Amendment (or so he alleged in 
his inauguration programme) [Dominguez, 1986: 35]. In a country where anger and 
suspicion of the US government had been at the forefront of economic and political 
issues, this move would have proved popular among many sectors of the population. 
86 Discussed in Chapter 4. 
87 The early rule of Machado is well documented in Chapter S. 
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However, Machado was not only an attractive option to the population of Cuba as: 
In the eyes of most American statesmen and business executives, Gerado 
Machado proved to be the Cuban president for whom they had been 
searching for a quarter of a century. While appealing to and partially 
appeasing Cuban nationalism, Machado respected and protected American 
investments, providing the stable political environment in which American 
companies could thrive. Most importantly, Machado proved his value to 
American corporations by meeting and mastering the challenge presented by 
resistant workers and local elites [O'Brien, 1996: 230]. 
At a business lunch at the Bankers' Club in New York in April 1925, the new 
President assured sugar magnates that their investments- would not be affected 
merely because a new government was about to take power: , 
Quiero asegurar a los hombres de negocios presentes aqui ya los que no 
estän, que tendrän todos una garantia absoluta para sus intereses bajo la 
administracibn cubana (I would like to assure all the businessmen here 
present, and those who are not, that you have an absolute guarantee about 
your interests under the Cuban administration) [in Rosell, 1973: 53]. 
He also promised US businesses that no labour strike on the island would ever last 
more than 24 hours [Rosell, 1973: 53]. Just days after the formation of the CNOC, 
Machado aimed to smash unions and halt worker revolt using a blend of 
assassination, detention, expulsion and suppression, a commitment that, as will be 
examined, in no small way contributed to the demise of anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba. 
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Chapter 2 
Forerunners to the SGOIF - Anarcho-Syndicalism among Cafe, Hotel and 
Restaurant Workers 
In 1907, the first worker periodical was published devoted to those employed in 
Cuba's cafes, hotels and restaurants, including chefs, bar staff and waiters: The 
periodical aimed to alert readers to the social injustices experienced by workers in 
that sector. For ten years one of two periodicals ran, La Voz del Dependiente (The 
Voice of the Service -Worker) being published from 1907 until 1911, when its name 
was changed to simply El Dependiente (The Service Worker), which ceased 
publication in 1917. Throughout their life spans, the periodicals were dedicated to 
libertarian ideals and through them the evolutionary process of anarchist-related 
thought can be traced. Various strands of anarchism were propagated in these 
publications and in particular the juxtaposition of the debate surrounding industrial 
unionism and the search for a moralistic society is evident. Common to all 
anarchistic thought, the need to secure immediate economic and social gains sat 
side-by-side with the hope for an egalitarian future and, in this search, distinct but not 
necessarily contradicting anarchisms were adhered to. The benefits of anarcho- 
naturism, for example, were published in El Dependiente alongside articles that 
propagated the use of direct action. 
The openness of anarchism and its offshoots encouraged a spectrum of ideas to 
reach those who might embrace it and so the apparent inconsistencies detectable in 
the periodicals should not surprise students of anarchism. Throughout Latin 
America, the 1910s was essentially an era when the boundaries of anarchist thought 
were changeable88 and a study of the long-standing libertarian publication, El 
88 That is, there was a general move from anarchism to anarcho-syndicalism. Anarchism is by its very 
nature amorphous. 
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Dependiente, gives an insight into the amorphous nature of anarchism during this 
period in Cuban history. The writers and editors, and one supposes the readers, of 
EI Dependiente were among the first to condone the use of direct action in the Cuban 
workplace and they were certainly the instigators of discussions surrounding the 
pitfalls and benefits of industrial unionism. In these respects, EI Dependiente, 
particularly, can be seen as a forerunner to EI Progreso, and, although the two 
periodicals were not aimed at those employed in the same workplace, the closeness 
of those who served food and drink and those who produced consumer goods 
becomes evident through examination of the mouthpieces written both for and by 
them, in terms of social cohesion and the ideas generated among the workers. At 
times, EI Dependiente declared boycotts of those goods made by the very factory 
workers who would later make up part of the SGOIF, and, although such action was 
not staged in direct support of the factory workers, it must have helped awaken them 
to certain forms of direct action. A study of cafe and restaurant workers, therefore, 
aids an understanding of the theoretical and practical path followed by those 
employed in the manufacturing industry from 1917 to 1925. 
Sowing the seeds of Direct Action in the Cuban Workplace88 
From its first edition [26/07/1911 ], EI Dependiente promoted the use of direct action 
tactics in order to achieve benefits in the workplace. Responding to the failed strike 
of sewerage workers in Havana, called in retaliation against poor wages and 
unacceptable working conditions, the periodical condemned the absence of solid 
worker organisation and the futility of pacific strikes. The lack of cohesion among 
workers in the Huelga del Alcantarillado (Sewerage Strike) in July 1911 has been 
es Chapter 5 studies in depth the origins of direct action and its use by the SGOIF. The most common 
forms of direct action in Cuba during the 1910s and 1920s were sabotage, the boycott and the strike, 
while the General Strike was considered, by anarcho-syndicalists world-wide, the most revolutionary of 
possible revolutionary acts. 
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blamed; by latter-day historians, partly on the Spanish anarchist character of the 
strike organisers, the Agrupaciön Socialista [Ibarra, 1992: 141], and partly on . 
the 
creation of a reactionary union, the Federaciön de Trabajadores Cubanos 
(Federation of Cuban Workers) [FTC]. Contemporary reports in worker periodicals, 
however, bemoaned the presence not of anarchist but socialist elements in the strike 
and the libertarian periodical Via Libre, denied that the expelled organisers Antonio 
Vieytes and Severino Chacön were rebellious (anarchist) agitators, contending that 
they were hard working men whose political leanings were Marxist [Via Libre, 
5/08/1911: 1 ]. EI Dependiente agreed that the strike was not anarchist in nature and 
so anarchists could not be blamed for its collapse, as most of the organisers were 
socialist, and adherents to. ideologies other, than socialism. had not played any 
significant role in the strike. Indeed, if anarchists had taken more of. a lead in the 
strike it may not have been a failure, the periodical noted, especially in light of the 
tactics of repression used by the then Secretary of State, Machado, and the strike- 
breakers employed by him through the FTC: 
... nuestro propösito es combatir ese afdn de pacifismo que en horas inoportunas suelen predicar en tribunas y periödicos los amantes de lo 
establecido, los respetadores de lo que dicen combatir, en una palabra, los 
socialistas (our aim is to combat the urge towards pacifism that the lovers of 
the established order, those who respect what they feign to combat, in a word, 
the socialists, usually preach at inopportune moments through tribunes and 
periodicals) [EI Dependiente, 26/7/1911: 1 ]. 
The strikers had lacked revolutionary spirit, noted El Dependiente and unless the 
workers were well organised, peaceful strikes did not and could not combat the 
established order: 
... las huelgas pacificas - cuando los obreros caracen de organizacibn y no 
estän solidamente unidos - son un fracaso... (... peaceful strikes - when the 
workers lack organisation and are not completely united - are a failure... ) [El Dependiente, 26/07/1911: 1] 
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The strike was neither of resistance nor attack, it concluded, and if the workers were 
to overcome repression, they needed to react with violence where necessary. Such 
references to the need to fight violence and subordination with violence were 
repeated in later issues of EI Dependiente. In December 1912, for example, the 
paper vindicated the use of sabotage, contending that it was the: 
... arma de combate que es esgrimida con un exito verdadero... ei cual sirve 
prdcticamente a los esciavos del salario en todo momento de hueiga o en 
todo momento en que haya aigo pendiente con los tiranos y explotadores 
(... combative weapon that is used with true success ... that so practically helps wage slaves when they are on strike or when they take issue with 
tyrants and exploiters) [EI Dependiente, 10/12/12: 2]. 
The periodical declared that violent sabotage, if used defensively, was warranted: "A 
todo acto violento por nuestra parte, ha precedido una violencia por la parte 
contraria, que nos justifica" (violence used by the enemy has preceded every violent 
act on our part, and so we are justified) [El Dependiente, 20/05/1912: 1]. Despite the 
real capacity to perform violent sabotage, such as the poisoning of food or the 
deliberate breaking of cooking equipment, there is no evidence to suggest that such 
acts were ever committed by these workers. As Shaffer has pointed out, the use of 
"publicity sabotage", whereby workers informed diners of the inhumane conditions 
they were forced to endure by employers, could prove as effective [Shaffer, 1998: 
163]. This "open-mouth sabotage" [Industrial Worker, 15/01/1914: 1] was a popular 
tool of the IWW, which encouraged workers in London to inform consumers of the 
squalor in which they worked and lived (at this time in Cuba, most dependientes lived 
in dirty, tiny attic rooms that doubled as storage rooms in their place of employment). 
If in-house secrets were divulged to customers, it was hoped that, seeing the effect 
on the quality of their own dining experience, they would at once side with employees 
over employers and demand more hygienic conditions: 
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... let the dishwashers, waiters and other 
hotel and restaurant workers tell of 
conditions under which dishes are "washed" and the order "prepared" and the 
employers will be forced into submission [Industrial Worker, 15/01/1914: 4]. 
The low levels of hygiene experienced by many cafe, hotel and restaurant workers in 
Cuba, coupled with extremely long working hours, was the main complaint voiced by 
them. El Dependiente reported that employees suffered up to sixteen-hour workdays 
and, unlike most anarcho-syndicalists, they did not call for this to be reduced to eight 
hours but were content to settle at a ten-hour day. In any case a sharp reduction in 
the working day would affect pay for some as tips gained often supported the meagre 
wages earned by waiters, in particular. In order to achieve fewer working hours, 
"open-mouth sabotage" was perhaps seen to be the most practical tool, although a 
study of the periodical shows that the ideas surrounding more traditional forms of 
direct action were also circulated among workers: 
Cuando el BOICOT9° esgrimamos, y hasta el SABOTAJE, contra todos los 
verdugos y explotadores, sera cuando habremos enterado, conscientes, en el 
concierto de lo que EL DEPENDIENTE divuiga incesantemente (When we 
brandish the boycott and even sabotage against the executioners, will be the 
day that we will have consciously achieved everything that El Dependiente 
has always stood for) [El Depiendiente, 14/08/1912: 3]. 
Many of the workplaces, with the exception of the larger hotels in Havana, operated 
on a small-scale and so in the event of an all-out strike at any one establishment 
employing, say, just four or five workers, the employers found the staff easily 
replaceable. The failure of strike action was further exacerbated by the lack of 
cohesion among service workers as although they all shared a common ground 
insofar as they could follow work-related news through their periodical, they had not 
managed to federate into one solid union. "' 
90 Upper case is used in the original version. 91 Industrial unionism among service industry workers is discussed below, this chapter. 
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Neither was the use of boycotts always a reliable weapon in their own sphere, 
although they were propagated by El Dependiente and used in solidarity with workers 
in other sectors. Eating establishments proved difficult to boycott as, firstly, they 
were not exclusively frequented by workers and so, to be truly effective, boycotts 
needed the support of all classes and, secondly, because those who read the 
periodical were, in the main, service industry workers, who spent the bulk of their 
lives in their own workplaces and usually lacked free time to frequent other houses, 
rendering boycotts of them useless. On the other hand, boycotts of products sold in 
the workplace, such as locally supplied soft drink or beer were commonplace. When 
the beer and ice company La Tropical refused to recognise the Union de 
Dependientes de Cafes (UDC - the Cafe Workers' Union) and the Sindicato de 
Restaurantes, Hoteles y fondas (SRHF - Hotel, Restaurant and Bar Workers' union), 
whose members regularly staffed open days hosted by the company, El Dependiente 
urged readers to boycott three beers produced by the company [El Dependiente, 
10/01/1912: 1]. 
In 1912, the Ley de Cierre (Closing Law) was introduced, a law that restricted the 
opening of cafes to ten hours per day, and thus one that should have precluded the 
sixteen-hour shifts undertaken by workers. The law was not adhered to and, headed 
by cafe owner Manuel G Arias, employers set up the "Centro de Cafes" that 
campaigned for the abolition of the law. Arias was also a distributor of mineral 
waters and so EI Dependiente declared all products linked to him boycotted [EI 
Dependiente, 24/12/1913: 4], an action that aimed to gain the support of cafe workers 
while encouraging staff to refuse to serve boycotted goods, or else they could blend 
the boycott with "open-mouth sabotage" by informing customers of all the moral (and 
legal) reasons why they should not consume them. 
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Products declared off-bounds to sympathetic consumers92 by El Dependiente 
included brands of. drink'and cigarettes produced by companies that had subjected 
workers to unfair treatment. 93 As discussed, boycotts and sabotage, in particular, fully 
entered worker vocabulary in Cuba through articles and news published in El 
Dependiente and the use of these tools of working-class struggle accelerated, 
alongside anarcho-syndicalism, throughout the 1910s, climaxing in the 1920s when 
the SGOIF executed them to the point of "abuse" [Alonso, 1928: 249]. Throughout 
the life of El Dependiente, though, anarcho-syndicalism was not the only ideology 
embraced by its readers as, striving for moral betterment and an immediate solution 
to the dire living and working conditions they were subjected to, anarchists looked 
towards naturism. Thus these schools of thought, for a time, co-existed in what can 
be seen as part of the evolutionary process of anarchism in early-twentieth century 
urban Cuba. 
The Two Faces of War-Time Anarchism. 
Among the -working class in Cuba the dependientes were not only important 
proponents of anarcho-syndicalism but also of anarcho-naturism, merging the two 
philosophies into a unique amalgam of collective direct action for social change with 
sanitary and dietary reforms for individual change [Shaffer, 1998: 1541 
This blending of collective struggle with individualism was heightened by the growing 
concern with physical and moral wellbeing in the face of the First World War. 
Although anarcho-naturism had begun to crystallise in Cuba around 1910, through 
92 That non-essential and easily recognisable goods can be effectively boycotted by consumers is 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
93 Among brands affected were the Gener Cigarette Company [El Dependiente, 18/06/1913] and 
Solares mineral waters [24/12/1913]. 
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such concepts as vegetarianism and hydrotherapy, 94 the attraction of alternative 
lifestyles grew as the apparent imperialism of the "Great War" took precedence on 
the world stage. Just as those economic factors that had begun to materialise prior 
to the war flourished during wartime, so did advancing ideas and attitudes among 
workers. In Cuba, naturism was one of those factors that attracted popularity very 
shortly after the declaration of war in Europe in August 1914, when contributors to El 
Dependiente, in particular, expressed their disgust at the conflict, maintaining that it 
contradicted nature and denied the human race the opportunity to live in natural 
harmony: 
Los anarquistas y sindicalistas protestan de ellas (guerras) por ser lo mäs 
destastroso y antihumano, y sin embargo, una parte de seres que no 
merecen el nombre de humanos por ser organicamente degenerados y 
relajados moraimente, los califican de asesinos y destructores de la 
humanidad (Anarchists and syndicalists are against (wars) as they are 
devastating and anti-human, although such beings do not deserve to be called 
human, as they are organically degenerate and morally relaxed; they qualify 
as assassins and destroyers of nature) [El Dependiente, 23/09/1914: 1]. 
The condemnation of war was fierce. Already demonstrating a marrying of the 
moralistic position of "pure" anarchism with the practicality of anarcho-syndicalism, EI 
Dependiente at once damned the instigators for their lack of moral fibre and made 
readers aware of the knock-on economic effects the war would have on them: 
No puede servos indiferente al malestar que la guerra agrave, la baja de los 
jornales; la subida de los articulos de primer necesidad; los paros fozosos y la 
perspectiva del hambre, cosas son que nos han de aguijonear muy duro; 
debemos pues tomar parte directa y activa en lo que tan de cerca atane ya 
(We cannot be indifferent to the discomfort aggravated by the war, the fall in 
wages, the price rise of basic goods, unemployment and the prospect of 
hunger, things that have to be harshly thrust upon us; we must, therefore, take 
a direct and active role in what will soon concern us ) [El Dependiente, 
12/08/1914: 1]. 
94 See, for example, La Voz del Dependiente [30/04/1910] and Page, 1952: 49 
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It was suggested that the workers of Cuba protest against the war, taking the line of 
some anarchists, such as Errico Malatesta, that war should be with the exploiters of 
the world and not with other (usually working-class) soldiers, who were separated 
only by international political boundaries. 95 As well as expressing goodwill towards 
other oppressed peoples, EI Dependiente encouraged readers to respect and care 
for one's own body, as. the perceived need for self-evaluation became part of the 
personal battle against war and imperialism. Thus the adherents of naturism 
imagined that it was an antidote to war and, while the periodical warned of the 
practical and moral disadvantages of the conflict in Europe, it simultaneously praised 
the benefits of vegetarianism, massage, sun therapy and hygiene, among other self- 
cleansing therapies, all of which could be studied and practised at the Pro-Vida 
Naturist School, 98 
Searching for a healthier and liberated society while rejecting violence and war, 
naturists of the period craved a morally cleansed society, free from artificial 
"poisons". According to the intellectual Carlos Loveira97, abstinence from alcohol, 
tobacco and gambling would allow workers to channel money ordinarily spent on 
such vices into securing a physically healthier lifestyle. In turn an improved standard 
of living "Ie hacen mäs libre, mas preparado para imponerse y rebelarse contra una 
explotaciön abusiva (... makes you freer, more readily prepared to assert yourself and 
to rebel against an abusive exploitation) [Loveira, Pro-Vida, March 1915]. And so 
naturism was fused with anarchism, and its end was to free society of the existent 
hierarchy and to enjoy a fuller and happy life. 
e5 Other anarchists, such as Kropoktin, supported the allies during the War, hoping to quash German 
militarism. 96 Pro-Vida was also the name of a monthly naturist publication that ran for the duration of the War. 97 The rail worker Carlos Loveira (1882-1928) was born in Las Villas. A socialist and novelist who wrote 
about divorce, administrative corruption and social conflict, Loveira enlisted in the Ejercito Libertador 
(Liberation Army) during the Cuban War of Independence. 
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Anarcho-naturism was also an immediate ý response to the misery in which the 
dependientes lived, such as having to camp out in restaurants or cafes, to the lack of 
ventilation and the poor washing facilities available and to the punishing long days 
that they worked. If the body were healthier, it was reasoned, it would be more able 
to cope with the present drudgery. The attractiveness of the anarcho-naturism, 
therefore, lay in its dual-edged potential; better conditions now and preparation for a 
brighter future. 
Such commitment to the pursuit of a healthy body, and so a healthy mind, veered 
towards individualistic anarchism, but workers were well aware of the need not just to 
care for oneself, but also to forge strong bonds with other workers through industrial 
unionism. The importance of forming solid working-class organisations was not a 
new concept in Cuba98 and, from 1913, industrial unionism was passionately 
debated. 
Dependientes Debate Industrial Unionism. 
As the industrial unionism of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) gained 
strength in the USA, its ideas were being exported to other parts of the world, notably 
by sailors visiting Chile, Australia and New Zealand [Van der Linden, 1998: 186]. The 
growth of huge corporations encouraged some workers to attempt to build 
organisations that would be more ready to challenge the new employers as, if the 
tyrants were ready to exploit en masse, it was reasoned, the unions must respond by 
incorporating all workers in any given industry. In Cuba, no industrial union was 
formed until the birth of the SGOIF although many in the service industry pleaded 
98 Calls for the creation of large scale unions in Cuba had been made, for example, in the following 
libertarian periodicals: El Productor [06/10/1887,11/04/1889 and 25/04/1889]; El Nuevo Ideal 
[04/03/1899,30/06/1899,07/07/1899,14/06/1900,15/10/1900] and Rebeli6n [16/04/1910]. 
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with readers of El Dependiente to help form a union that would embrace all food and 
drink workers in the country. 
Through the periodical; workers were invited to voice their opinions as to how an all- 
encompassing union could benefit them in a regular feature entitled "Encuesta. 
LDeben las sociedades de Dependientes y Concineros de Hoteles, Restaurants y 
Fondas federarse? " [Survey: Should the societies for Dependientes and Chefs of 
Hotels, Restaurants and Taverns federate? ]. Separate unions for chefs and 
dependientes had been formed late in the nineteenth century, even though they 
worked in the same environment. It is likely that chefs, being skilled, considered 
themselves to be the aristocracy of service industry workers and wished to set 
themselves apart from the lowlier dependientes, thus preserving autonomy of craft. 
What is more puzzling, however, is that dependientes who worked in restaurants, 
hotels and "fondas" (small restaurants) were detached from those employed in cafes, 
although it could have been thought that cafe workers were deemed to reside even 
further down the social scale. In any case, this lack of cohesion weakened the 
workers' cause and, in effect, led to chefs battling against dependientes and vice- 
versa, lamented Justo Velez [El Dependiente, 26/01/1916: 1], an anarcho-syndicalist 
who regularly penned articles for the periodical. If waiters walked out -of the 
workplace, for example, the chefs, not belonging to the same union, would not offer 
support and simply carried on with their working day, he pointed out. As the meals 
were still being cooked, the owner could serve customers himself. or else employ 
others to wait the tables and the waiters' strike would certainly fail.. Echoing the 
IWW, Velez maintained that "la injuria hecha a uno es la injuria hecha a todos" (insult 
to one is insult to all) [El Dependiente, 26/01/1916: 1], a phrase that would later be 
adopted by the SGOIF. 
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Calls for solidarity appeared weekly, written by various authortworkers, illustrating its 
wide appeal. It was believed that industrial unionism was a crucial step if workers 
were to keep up with the modern world at a time when huge industry was evolving. 
The Ateneo Obrero (Workers' Association) in Havana urged all workers in Cuba to 
consider building large organisations that were more able to combat the exploiters: 
Hay que organizarse, hermanos; y las organizaciones de ahora, no han de 
tener los estrechos moldes hasta aqua acostumbrados; hay que ampliarlas, 
hay que sacarlas del reducido Iimite del oficio, de la ocupaciön, del empleo 
parcial; se hace necesario porque las evoluciones comercio-industriales de la 
epoca as[ lo indican; agrandarlas todo lo mäs posible, haciendolas 
industriales; hay que crear sindicatos formidables, de horizantes 
revolucionarios, porque las necesidades de las luchas obrero-patronales, 
econömico-sociolögico del presente, as[ empiezan a exigirlo (You have to 
organise brothers; and the organisations of today should not be as narrow as 
those we have, until now, been used to, they have to widen, we must rid them 
of. the limitations of craft, trade and part work; it has become necessary 
because commercial-industrial relations of the era point that way: enlarge 
them as much as possible, making them industrial; we have to create 
formidable unions, with revolutionary horizons, because the needs of the 
socio-economic, worker-employer struggles of today, have started to demand 
it) [El Dependiente, 01/07/1914: 1]. 
Craft unionism caused divisions, it was noted, while industrial unionism fomented 
worker solidarity and was able to deal with more grievances. Francisco Diaz99 , 
lamented that workers had become mere units of capitalism and that the modern 
proletariat was nothing more than a product of industry [EI Dependiente, 
11/08/1915: 1]. For that reason, he continued, it was essential that large unions be 
formed so that workers would be better able to protect and defend themselves. He 
believed that a revolutionary period, rather than just one revolution, was needed and 
preparation would take place over years and must happen in many countries. The 
first step could now be realised through the construction of industrial unions and thus 
he urged all service workers to take the lead in Cuba and to form a unified front, a 
99 Diaz also worked under the pseudonym T. A. Tizo. A Regular contributor to EI Dependiente, he had 
been Secretary of the Union de Dependientes de Cafes and was elected as a committee member 
several times. EI Dependiente reported on his death on 10/01/1917. 
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"ramo gaströnomico" (food and drink branch). 100 The workers' unions had achieved 
nothing separately, observed Diaz, and so all existing unions should be dismantled in 
order to construct "un fuerte sindicato moderno con un reglamento sindicalista" (a 
solid modern union, with a syndicalist structure) (El Dependiente, 11/08/1915: 1]. 
Besides, workers in Cuba had little confidence in the unions already operating in the 
country, whereas the industrial unions of Europe and the US helped to educate 
workers, - teaching them to fight and to recognise and practise their rights. An 
industrial union in Cuba would bring the worker struggle to the fore and "lo que no 
pueden lograr veinte lo alcanzan diez mil sin grandes esfuerzos" (what twenty cannot 
achieve, ten thousand can without any great effort). 101 
It was believed that the evolution of big business called for a positive response by 
producers and- so -unions should move with the times and '"mundializarse" 
(internationalise) [El Dependiente, 01/07/1914]. This could be achieved through 
industrial organisation which was "mds general, mds trascendental" (more general, 
more far-reaching) and which took the new working atmosphere into consideration. 
In effect, the appeal of industrial unionism lay in the fact that it was a more modern 
approach to class struggle, an approach that must evolve in concert with the real 
changes taking place in industry. 
The need to construct a "Federaciön Gastronömica" (Food and Drink Federation) 
along anarcho-syndicalist lines had been discussed in El Dependiente as. early as 
1913 [10/09/1913] and would continue to be debated until the closure of the 
periodical four years later. However, service industry workers never federated into 
one union, maybe owing to the fact that the businesses in which they worked 
operated on a small-scale and so the employees lacked the sufficient cohesion and 
100 The belief that a `ramo gastrbnomico' in Cuba was a necessary ingredient in the first step towards a 
worker revolution was repeated by the SGOIF worker-leader Paulino Diez in 1924. See Chapter 4. 
101 The ten thousand workers referred to all workers employed in the food and drink industry. 
99 
contact with one another that was necessary for such a feat to be realised. On the 
other hand, those responsible for producing the goods sold in such establishments, 
that is, beer, ice and soft drink producers, were employed in, if not vast workplaces, 
large factories where they had regular communication with fellow workers, facilitating 
in the creation of a solid union that could collectively fight for their rights in a growing 
industry. As the production of EI Dependiente drew to a close, 102 the first industrial 
union in Cuba grew from its ashes and, in August 1917, the SGOIF was formed, a 
union that continued to propagate the ideas of direct action, industrial unionism and 
anarcho-syndicalism so favoured in the pages of EI Dependiente. 
Service industry workers were aware of ideas surrounding direct action, and although 
there appears to have been some adherence to the principles of the boycott, 
sabotage and strike, they were not regarded as practical tools in their own workaday 
lives. The real economic hardships and the perceived moral laxity during wartime, 
though, helped convince some workers of the validity of anarcho-naturism. Towards 
the end of the "Great War" and with the decline of EI Dependiente, anarcho-naturism 
was overshadowed by the desire to form a union based along industrial lines, a 
desire that was strengthened by the apparent success of the Russian Revolution, an 
event that gave confidence to workers the world over who hoped to change society 
through collective action. The SGOIF sought to build worker unity, and industrial 
unionism was a response to a growing industrial base, and with it an expanding 
industrial proletariat, on the island. 
Introduction to the Sindicato General de Obreros de la Industria Fabril (SGOIF) 
The SGOIF was founded in Puentes Grandes in the south west of Havana City on 
August 1st 1917 and its periodical, E/ Progreso, went into print three years later. 
102 The last copy of EI Dependiente held at the IISG in Amsterdam is dated 01/09/1917. 
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Both the union and its publication were remarkably influential among workers until 
1925, the year that witnessed the arrival of the Machadato and the formation of both 
the CNOC and the PCC. For eight years, the SGOIF. was at the forefront of 
revolutionary urban worker struggles, -a position that has been summed up by 
Estrada: 
El Progreso, örgano del primer Sindicato General de Obreros de la industria 
fabril (sic), que tan gran influencia tuvo en ei movimiento sindical de nuestro 
pals y de America Latina, y en suyo periödico, igual que en la serie de folletos 
que publico, fueron dadas a conocer en forma sistemätica, las teorlas del 
Sindicalismo Revolucionario (El Progreso, organ of the first . Genera! Union of 
the Workers of the manufacturing industry, which had such a great influence 
in the unionist movement in our country and in Latin America, and in whose 
periodical, as in the series of pamphletsf03 that they published, information 
was systematically given on the theories of Revolutionary. Syndicalism) 
[Estrada, 1951: 23]. 
At its foundation,.. the SGOIF stated as its aim "organizar a todos los trabajadores- 
fabriles de la Provincia" (to organise all factory workers in the Province) [AN, 
390/11684: 3], although the restriction of organising solely those workers An, the 
Province of Havana was soon lifted to include those employed in the manufacturing 
industry nationwide. However, the bulk of factories were in and around the City of 
Havana, and Puentes Grandes was a significant base for the SGOIF, being home to 
the only breweries on the island, Tropical and La Polar, and, by extension, home to 
the majority of those who manned them. Throughout its existence, the address given 
to the authorities as the union's contact base was either in Puentes Grandes or the 
neighbouring barrio (neighbourhood) of El Cerro, although it appears that general 
meetings were ordinarily held at the more spacious Centro Oberero at Egido 2 in the 
City Centre., -I 
103 Leaflets published by the editorial team of EI Progreso included EI sindicalismo en Cataluna 
(Syndicalism in Catalonia) by Angel Pestarla and Principios, Medios y Fines del Sindicalismo 




Set up legally through a series of letters to the Civil Governor of the Province of 
Havana, the union aimed to halt a system that pandered to the privileged few, over 
the masses and to put an end to "las actuales deplorables condiciones de vida" (the 
present deplorable conditions of life) [AN, 390/11694: 29] to which those workers 
were subject. According to SGOIF statutes, the only way to face this challenge, was 
"mediante ei esfuerzo constante y solidario de los desheredados" (through the 
constant and unified force of the disinherited) [AN, 390/11684: 29]. 
Factory workers had organised prior to the foundation of the union, albeit on a 
smaller and less ambitious scale than that undertaken by the SGOIF. In January 
1913, when workers at the Tropical Brewery struck for better pay and conditions, the 
recently formed but short lived, Comite Gestor de la Federacibn Nacional Obrera 
(Managing Committee of the National Worker Federation) [CGFNO] assumed the 
role of organiser of the strike and managed to secure support from other worker 
organisations around the island. Solidarity was declared by unions in Matanzas and 
Cardenas and stretched as far as Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo in the east. 
Strike-breakers were brought in to work the Tropical factory, from Tiscornia, the 
immigration detention centre across Havana bay, although when the cohort tried to 
disembark they were attacked by incensed strikers. The police retaliated by firing 
shots at the picketers and the new arrivals slept in the brewery, unwilling to face the 
angry crowd. The use of immigrants as strike-breakers, while solving the problem of 
finding labour to man the machinery, was most probably a ploy by the authorities and 
company bosses to divide the workers (strikers and immigrants) along lines of race 
and/or nationality. That the employment of strike-breakers had the desired divisive 
effect is not recorded, although workers and their families certainly were upset by the 
use of others to fill their positions and a protest demonstration, attended by men, 
women and children, roused the authorities, leading the Police and the Rural Guard 
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to forcibly enter places frequented by the strikers (restaurants and worker centres) 
and to make arrests. 
The CGFNO called a meeting to discuss the possibility of calling a general strike in 
protest at the suppression of strikers. It was well attended, attracting those from a 
wide range of occupations: bakers, builders, carpenters, dock workers, tobacco 
workers, marble workers and jewellers, among others. The majority of those present 
reportedly supported the general strike, although the cigar worker and union leader, 
Alejandro Barreiro, opposed such action, predicting that an attempt at organising on 
such a large scale so soon after the foundation of the CGFNO would be a mistake 
and would destroy the so-called federation before it could have the opportunity to be 
properly established. Nevertheless, a general strike was approved with little 
preparation, in what can be seen as an example of spontaneous worker action 
(according to Cabrera, just one day had elapsed between the declaration of the strike 
at Tropical and the agreement to extend it to a general strike [Cabrera, 1985: 148]). 
The authorities halted the planned action by making further arrests and the strike was 
always restricted to the Tropical brewery. It ultimately failed, although it continued for 
two weeks, employers conceding to none of the demands made. To add insult to 
injury, the company announced that, despite worker action, 100,000 bottles of beer 
had been produced during that fortnight [Cabrera, 1985: 149]. The workers 
subsequently declared a boycott of Tropical, Tivoli and Palatino brands of beer (all 
produced at the same factory), a tool of direct action that remained so popular among 
factory workers and the SGOIF in particular. 104 
The downfall of the CGFNO, as prophesised by Barreiro, did occur but it made one 
last effort to unify workers in Cuba when, in August 1913, in the area of Ceiba, 
Havana, a number of factories struck for an eight-hour day, higher wages and better 
104 See chapter 5 for details on SGOIF use of the boycott. 
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conditions of work. The strike rapidly spread to the neighbouring barrios of Puentes 
Grandes and Palatino, reportedly attracting up to 3,500 strikers to the cause 
[Cabrera, 1985: 146]. Tropical brewery employed strike-breakers, who had to be 
escorted to the factory by police, although, after strikers stoned the new recruits, they 
once again had to spend days in the workplace to avoid angry, and violent, strikers. 
The solidarity and enthusiasm that became so characteristic of the later SGOIF was 
demonstrated by the attitude of workers to the strike. Those who were able to do so 
began a collection to help financially fellow workers on industrial action and a soup 
kitchen was improvised at the Instructivo de la Ceiba (Educational Centre of Ceiba). 
The police, who possessed no legal warrant for such action, stormed fondas where 
strikers congregated and leaders of the Centro were detained for their part in the 
organisation of the strike. The centre was closed down by the authorities. In the 
meantime, employers at tile and brick factories, whose workers were also out on 
strike, asked that they be able to employ strike-breakers. The strikes had the 
potential to transform into a general strike but "las posibilidades de un movimiento 
general solidario se frustraron" (the possibilities of a general, unified movement were 
frustrated) [Cabrera, 1985: 146], presumably due to the failure of the organising 
committee of the CGFNO to effectively manage the situation, maybe taking heed of 
Barreiro's warning that the Federation still was not ready to take on such a heavy 
organisational role. 
What is evident from the strikes of 1913 is that there existed an awareness of the 
need to organise a growing workforce and, if the recorded figures are correct, the 
number employed in the manufacturing industry was already substantial. 105 That 
workforce had shown solidarity through initiating strike action and in the financial 
support displayed to fellow workers. The demands made on companies was similar 
to those that would be insisted upon years later by members of the SGOIF (the 
105 That is considering that 3,500 had joined the August strike. 
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common anarcho-syndicalist demand for the eight hour day and union recognition, in 
particular), and failed strikes, like those after it, led to consumer boycotts of those 
products made in factories that had witnessed such action. Furthermore, the strikers 
displayed signs of violent action, while a spontaneous general strike was favoured by 
many. However, the lack of an organised focal point was evident during those 
earlier years and, as predicted by Barreiro, the managing committee crumbled soon 
after the summer of 1913 and no nationwide federation then existed until 1925. 
The foundation of the SGOIF and, later, the FOH must then be considered essential 
steps in the creation of a country-wide union, exemplified by the CNOC. The SGOIF 
was the first union organised along industrial lines and both the FOH and CNOC 
statutes mirrored those of the manufacturers' union. As illustrated, workers in Cuba 
had begun organising years before the creation of the SGOIF, and service industry 
workers had shared with factory workers the pull towards organising by industrial 
branches. However, the latter achieved that goal (whereas the former had not) 
although this happened four years after the displays of discontent, direct action and 
solidarity of 1913. The'repressive era of the Menocalato had precipitated a lull in 
worker organisation but, as documented earlier, strike action began to recover lost 
ground during 1917 and the time was ripe for unifying those employed in factories of 
Havana. 
1917 was the year when the revenue gained from sugar profits rose and when Cuba, 
alongside the USA, declared war (if in name only, as far as Cuba was concerned). 
The importance of supplying allied countries with the Cuban crop and the scarcity of 
sugar generally, led to its inflated price until the Dance of the Millions and the 
subsequent price crash in 1920. It was also the year when sugar workers unleashed 
a wave of protest in the campo and Menocal began his second term as Cuban 
president, provoking a liberal backlash and the ensuing deployment of 1,500 US 
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troops in the east of Cuba. Abroad, it was a tumultuous year. Beside the 
international conflict that had been raging for three years, the October Revolution 
brought the ideas of Marxism-Leninism to the political stage and, if workers did not 
yet fully embrace communism as an ideology, the event certainly gave food for 
thought to millions of workers worldwide. It was inspiring in that it illustrated that 
rulers could be overthrown and that some alternative were possible. 
It is likely that those events of 1917 had some effect on the workers of Cuba. In 
addition, the US Government passed a law in December of that year that prohibited 
the sale and consumption, of alcohol in any US state. As a result, Cuba attracted 
more US tourists than it previously had, many who used the island as a "playground" 
where they were able to enjoy the freedom of alcohol consumption and gambling. 
This new tourism expanded in 1919 when "fresh areas for enrichment were opened 
up by a tourist law enabling bets of jai-alai, 106 gambling and horse racing" [Thomas, 
1998: 534]. The wealth enjoyed by these travellers was in stark contrast to the 
pittance earned by workers in Havana, where the majority of tourists holidayed, and 
those employed in the service industry witnessed first hand the poor distribution of 
that wealth. It is also likely that the production of alcohol became more important in 
Cuba, as it could no longer be imported from the USA at a time when it was in such 
high demand. This would have given those employed in the breweries a stronger 
bargaining position and so the organisation of a solid union base among those 
workers came at a propitious time. 
Manufacturing industry was experiencing a growth period during this era and new 
businesses selling beer were offered tax breaks in a bid to boost the industry in 
Cuba. As factories were being expanded or built, new technologies were introduced 
that would maximise output while saving on labour. As in the sugar mills, urban 
106 Jai-alai s a fast-moving ball game imported to Cuba from the Basque region of Spain. 
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factories turned to capital-intensive methods of production,, which while not 
necessarily displacing all workers (the majority of who were newly employed in a 
nascent industry) would -have left them with little control in the workplace. Indeed, 
one of the main complaints during strikes organised by the SGOIF was that the union 
was not recognised by employers: once it achieved such recognition, it could place 
more demands on bosses, thus gaining control. 
New technologies simplified the jobs being undertaken by individual workers, who 
duly experienced a dilution of skills. As jobs became less difficult to master, workers 
could easily be replaced by other, non-skilled hands, benefiting the employers during 
strike action and making it easier for. workers to seek employment in other areas. 
This, increased mobility, coupled with the fact that many of Havana's factories were 
centred in and around Puentes Grandes, meant that inter-worker contact grew, 
almost definitely fomenting, worker solidarity. In the factories of Havana, as 
elsewhere, changes in technology "acted as a powerful stimulus for a unionism 
designed to unite and mobilise all the workers in a particular industry" (Thorpe, Van 
der Linden, 1990: 11]. It was under such conditions that the SGOIF was formed. 
The following chapters chart the life span of the SGOIF, analysing the ideology of the 
union, while comparing and contrasting union rhetoric with the action of the workers 
themselves. The importance of organising along industrial lines and how the SGOIF 
managed this is then assessed. Finally, the use of direct action by members of the 
SGOIF is chronicled, showing how use of sabotage, strikes and boycotts spurred the 
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Chapter 3 
Pie In the Sky and Pork-Chop Mentality: The Ideology of the Union and the 
Workers 
The ultimate was more or less what the philosophic anarchists and socialists 
in (the IWW) were talking about, pie in the sky, but I wanted the pork chops 
on the table right now. I wanted the ultimate too... " [Bird et al, 1987: 50/51). 
The above admission was that of IWW member Joseph Murphy, a harvest worker in 
the United States. Although he understood the final aims of the worker organisers, 
and he had hoped that these would be eventually achieved, his personal primary 
goal was to secure higher wages. That bread-and-butter issues had to be won was 
confirmed by textile worker, Fania Steelink, also an associate of the union: "(the 
organisers) admitted it was a belly philosophy" [Bird et al, 1987: 172]. During a cold 
economic climate this "pork-chop mentality" often had to be a reality for those 
workers who needed to earn survival wages. The same held for Cuban workers. 
Comparing US and Cuban urban workers in the 1920s, Chapman observed that 
there were many similarities between the two groups, but he noted that there was an 
increased radicalism among those in urban Cuba, on the one hand, and a lower 
standard of living, on the other [Chapman, 1927: 587]. This chapter will concentrate 
on the leaders and theorists within the SGOIF, analysing the ideology that they 
adhered to, and on the workers who belonged to the SGOIF, examining the reasons 
for workers' struggles and whether they demonstrated "pork-chop mentality". Also 
some of those worker-leaders accused of - being traitors by the union and its 
periodical will be documented, in order to determine why some unionists shifted from 
espousing anarcho-syndicalism to embracing a less radical viewpoint. 
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The Dual Purpose of the SGOIF - Immediate Gains and Final Emancipation 
The task of revolutionary syndicalism is two-fold: on the one hand, it conducts 
the daily revolutionary struggle for the economic, intellectual and moral 
improvement of the workers within the present social order; on the other, its 
principal goal is to prepare the masses for the independent administration of 
production and for the division and take-over of all sections of social life 
[Thorpe, 1989: Appendix D]. 
In common with anarcho-syndicalists world wide, contributors to El Progreso 
understood the need for the union to fight for gains in the present but also the 
importance of preparing workers for the coming revolution. This preparation would 
take the form of education, both through schooling and in the workplace, while 
meetings and vigils would bolster solidarity and class-consciousness. SGOIF 
statutes also recognised the importance of this duality. The belief that the struggle 
needed to be fought on two fronts was crucial to the union's existence. Its aim was to 
create branches of industrial unionism that would foment solidarity: 
... con el fin de luchar para conseguir 
todas los mejoras inmediatas que sean 
posibles, e jr preparändonos a la obra de nuestra total emancipaciön, basada 
en la posesiön de la tierra, fäbricas, casas y todos los instrumentos de 
producciön por parte de la Humanidad toda, sin exciusiones ni privilegios 
(with the goal of righting to pursue all the immediate gains possible, and to be 
prepared for the task of our total emancipation, based on the possession of 
the land, factories, homes and all the instruments of production by all 
Humanity, without exclusions nor privileges) [AN 390/11664: 29-36]. 
Immediate gains were fought for in the workplace through direct action. During the 
first half of the 1920s, the SGOIF staged many strikes, to which boycotts of goods 
from the factory where the strike had been declared often ran parallel. Members 
were accused of more violent direct action, however, including bomb-throwing, 
poisonings and murder. 107 Through strength in numbers, the union hoped to use 
action against employers in an attempt to secure higher wages and reduce working 
hours, while maintaining the allegiance of the workers who would immediately benefit 
107 See Chapter 5. 
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from material advantages. One of the traits that ideologically distinguished the union 
from a reformist union such as the Hermandad Ferroviaria de Cuba (Railway 
Brotherhood of Cuba), say, was the rhetoric used by some SGOIF members in their 
conviction that the workforce could yield more than short-term gains and that total 
emancipation could eventually be realised: 
Es necesario, que el espfritu de lucha que anima a los militantes de nuestro 
gran ejercito proletario, no se circunsciba solamente a las mejoras inmediatas 
que en el sentido econömico vienen a atenuar una parte de los dolores que el 
presente sistema esclavizante nos produce (It is essential that the spirit of 
struggle , which encourages the militants of our large proletarian army, does 
not confine itself to the immediate gains that in the economic sense will 
alleviate some of the hardships that the current enslaving society affords us) 
[El Progreso, 1925, r 3]. 
The above text has been taken from an article called "Luchar es * Vivir - 
Decepcionismo y Perseverancia". The unnamed writer called upon readers to think 
not only of what could be secured in the short run, such as improved wages, better 
working conditions and fewer working hours, but also to attune their minds to the 
longer-term. Immediate benefits were important but if fought for alone would fail to 
free the workforce from the abuses of "el capitalismo absorbente, eficazmente 
ayudado por los privilegiados de la burocracia estatal" (Tyrannical capitalism, 
effectively helped by the privileged of the state bureaucracy) [El Progreso, 1925, r. 3]. 
The proletariat, the writer concluded, had to concentrate on building its strength and 
must be ready to crush the ever-increasing obstacles to emancipation. A 
contribution penned by one Jose Torralve asserted that in order to achieve this social 
and economic emancipation, the proletariat first had to come together as a social 
class and any ideological differences must be discarded for the sake of unity [El 
Progreso, 1924, k: 2]. 
Whether the rank and file aspired to a libertarian future or only to immediate gains is 
discussed below, although according to some writers in El Progreso, the masses 
111 
were unaware of the alternative social path to that which they had been following. 
Writing in 1924, the prominent SGOIF member Jose A. Iglesias, the brother of 
Margarito, 108 believed that the workers were ignorant of class issues and needed 
enlightening: "la mayoria de los obreros de Cuba no conciben que puede existir otro 
sistema mejor que el de ahora" (the majority of workers in Cuba do not realise that 
there could exist another system better than the one we have now) [El Progreso, 
1924, il: 1]. 
A worker in Cabaiguän, chanced upon just one page of El Progreso. Having 
previously been naive to the principles of anarcho-syndicalism and to the work of 
SGOIF and El Progreso, the worker wrote to the paper stating "... y como yo no 
entiendo de esas cosas, me puse a leerlo y me Ilene de entusiasmo" (and as I did 
not understand those things, I began to read it and I filled with enthusiasm) [El 
Progreso, 1925, q: 4]. How many other workers existed in the same state of 
ignorance, asked the editorial of El Progreso; workers "que tienen sed de 
conocimientos y no encuentran la fuente? n109 (... who are thirsty for knowledge do not 
rind the fountain) [El Progreso, 1925, q: 4]. Readers were then urged to extend this 
type of contact between workers. A carefully discarded copy of revolutionary 
literature, in a cafe or on a streetcar, which might then be devoured by another 
worker, was the best way to disseminate propaganda, it observed. It was hoped that 
such action would help to ignite workers' imaginations and to entice them to take that 
step further in joining the unions, where the battle for final emancipation could truly 
be fought. 
One Jorge Blau believed that the union house was the " Escuela de Rebeldias" 
(School of Revolt), a place where many rebels, both of ideas and action, had 
108 For more information on Margarito Iglesias, see chapter 5. 109A play on words: °fuente" can be translated as either source or fountain. 
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matured. - In his opinion, the union was "el invernadero donde se echo la semilla que 
ha de ser el arbusto frondoso de manana" (the greenhouse where one throws the 
seed that must be the leafy shrub of tomorrow) [El Progreso, 1925, q: 4]. The union 
houses could act as training grounds for future revolutionaries and, through solidarity 
and the exchange of ideas, - workers could come together to achieve freedom from 
tyranny. And so, they were called to those preparatory schools of revolution - invited 
to the bosom of the union and encouraged to attend meetings, and gatherings 'a 
deliberar nuestros asuntos, a vencer el tirano que os explota, que vive una vida 
regalada a cuenta de vuestros sudores y sufrimientos, riendose de vuestros dolores" 
(to discuss our affairs, to defeat the tyrant who exploits you, who lives a charmed life - 
thanks to your sweat and suffering, laughing at your pain) [El Progreso, 1924, w: 11. 
In an article tracking the trajectory of the IWW, Cannon noted that the IVWV leaders 
never failed to use strike meetings as an opportunity to inform the workers of its 
wider goal, which was the overthrow of capitalism [Cannon, 1971: 12]. Likewise, the 
SGOIF understood the need to educate workers wherever and whenever possible. It 
was believed to be essential that workers, once organised, take time to study that 
which was referred to as "the social question". It was not sufficient that they simply 
read El Progreso and pay their subscriptions as, if there were to be progress; they 
had to act upon their own initiative. Solidarity with other union members was an 
important factor and, true to anarchism, it was suggested that tolerance of other 
points of view be practised. Union members would not automatically be anarchistic 
in outlook and so anarchists were urged to take an active part in the organisations 
and sow ideas among them [El Progreso, 1925: m]. That anarchists infiltrate the 
unions is in keeping with Malatesta's assertion that "we anarchists should extend our 
activities into all organisations to preach unity among all workers, decentralisation, 
freedom of initiative, within the common framework of solidarity...... " [Malatesta, 
Pensiero e Volontä, 16/02/1925]. 
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If, through association, workers could achieve that level of consciousness necessary 
in the step towards emancipation, then, it was hoped, their children could acquire 
such awareness at a much earlier age, through schooling. Shaffer has observed 
that: 
While direct action may have led to worker initiatives in the workplace, it was 
anarchist educational initiatives that served to free the individual minds of 
children and adults to critique their surrounding and imagine a revolutionary 
future [Shaffer, 1998: 27]. 
In July 1923, the Sindicato Fabril established a new rationalist school in Puentes 
Grandes at the union building of La Mundial1° [El Progreso, 1923, c: 1], the third 
school set up by workers in 1920s Cuba based on Francisco Ferrer's Escuela 
Modema. "' The schools covered many of the subjects studied at public institutions, 
but they also allowed students to explore any possible artistic side to their nature and 
toý benefit from countryside walks and enjoy a break from the routine of the city. 
Science and nature were also studied and it was hoped that trips to various 
workplaces would help the students to consider their approaching lives as workers. 
Evening classes were held at the school for adults who wished to learn about 
hygiene and nutrition, among other subjects, while offering hope to those children 
who, thus far, had been neglected by public schooling [Shaffer, 1998: 266]. The 
school at Puentes Grandes, which relocated to the district of Cerro late in 1923, to 
facilitate expansion and a new library, was supported by worker dues. It is highly 
likely that the opportunity was taken during the evenings to awaken workers to the 
perceived evils of capitalism and to the need to overthrow the existing socio-political 
order, hardly surprising given that the schools were funded by the worker, were the 
brainchild of Ferrer and the initiative of the union. In short, they offered education to 
110 La Mundial was a marble company, which employed stone masons belonging to the SGOIF. 111 The other schools were at FOH headquarters in Central Havana and in Banes, Holguin. Another 
school was set up shortly afterwards in Cardenas, Matanzas. For more information on the history of 
rationalist schools in Cuba see Shaffer, 1998: 250-277. 
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the Cuban working class while attempting to bring the revolution one step closer to 
realisation. 
The Day to Day Running of the SGOIF - Structure, Meetings and Finance 
The Structure of the Union. 
The organization of Anarcho-Syndicalism is based upon the principles of 
Federalism, on free combination from below upward, putting the right of self- 
determination of every union above everything else and recognizing only the 
organic agreement of all on the basis of like interests and common 
convictions [Rocker, 1973: 33]. 
Rocker wrote of the formation of anarcho-syndicalist unions that grouped together all 
willing craft unions into a single industrial alliance, each union simultaneously being 
joined to a local union dedicated to each trade. In the case of workers employed in 
the manufacturing industry, 'therefore, all bottle cleaners from one factory, say, might 
form a union. That particular union would then combine with workers from other 
factories to construct a local union of bottle cleaners. Furthermore, all bottle cleaners 
would be affiliated to every union in the industry and so would form a working bond 
with confectioners, ice-makers and dray workers, for example. Such organisation is 
typical of the anarcho-syndicalism that had entered existing craft unions, as 
happened in early twentieth century France, where established unions were 
penetrated by anarchists [Ridley, 1970]. 
The SGOIF believed that craft unionism did not provide the best'way forward for 
workers and was convinced that the type of unionism practised in Europe could only 
divide the workers even further, benefiting employers more than employees. Instead 
they maintained that unity should be strengthened by workers forming an industrial 
alliance and the SGOIF was the first attempt by Cuban workers to group into 
industrial sections, although, as discussed in Chapter 2, the topic had been furiously 
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debated by hotel, restaurant and cafe workers in Havana throughout the 1910s. - That 
the SGOIF strove for industrial unionism as opposed to craft unionism suggests that 
these workers were influenced by the IWW in the neighbouring USA, and the tactics 
employed and the ideology espoused by the union were indeed reminiscent of those 
espoused by the "One Big Union" forged by North American workers. 
The IWW was set up as a response to the AFL, which operated along craft union 
lines and which found strength among the labour aristocracy. The AFL did not seek 
the affiliation of the vast number of transient workers found mostly in the west of the 
country nor of the immigrant workers in the east. Neither did it acknowledge the 
growing number of unskilled members of North America's workforce.. The IWW 
offered those previously unorganised workers a chance to foster, solidarity and to 
collectively fight against the oppressor, an opportunity formerly impossible. The 
national IWW created a union parallel to the AFL, surviving alongside it rather than 
attempting to place its revolutionary-minded workers into the AFL to plant fresh 
seeds and convert its membership to a more socialist viewpoint, as happened in 
France, for example [Ridley, 1970]. 
In Cuba, however, although some small collectives were operating, no large scale 
unions existed in manufacturing industry during the 1910s and so the SGOIF was not 
created in opposition to anything but what it labelled the tyrants: the state and, to a 
greater extent, the employers. The union envisaged the bosses to be the biggest 
threat to the happiness of the workers and as the drink companies were expanding 
so too did the workers need to forge closer ties in order to fight them. In its quest 
for immediate economic gains and final emancipation from employers, the SGOIF did 
not group along trade lines but depending on the product being made, that is all 
workers involved in the manufacture of the same product were grouped in to one 
industrial section, regardless of trade. By 1924, the union had attracted not solely 
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brewery workers but also those who worked in chocolate, biscuit, soap, wine, paper, 
ice and soft drink factories,, among others, to become an entity truly based on 
industrial lines, the industry being the manufacturing sector. 
From its foundation, the. SGOIF had aimed to form a large industrial union. Its 
statutes declared that to the union "podr6n pertenecer todos los individuos ... en 
cualquier de los establecimientos fabriles de toda la repüblica ... sin distincibn de 
sexos, razas o nacionalidades" (all individuals can belong ... in any of the factories in 
all the republic ... regardless of sex, race or nationality) [AN 390/11684: 29-36]. 
These statutes also laid out the structure of the union.. Each industrial section would 
nominate three delegates to the Central Committee (CC) of the SGOIF which was 
based in Havana, usually in Puentes Grandes or Cerro. If an industrial section had 
more than three factories, one delegate from each factory would be nominated to the 
CC. The CC then nominated an organisational secretary and a financial secretary, 
ratified in a general assembly of union members, to oversee the general running of 
the union. The financial secretary was responsible for general book-keeping and in 
particular for ensuring that each member paid his or her dues and, in return for duties 
undertaken, both secretaries of the CC received a monthly salary of $75, increasing 
to $90 if the number of associates should exceed 2,000. The organisational 
secretary and the financial secretary were the only members of the SGOIF to receive 
a wage from the union, although delegates who lost wages due to the responsibility 
of his or her position were duly reimbursed through SGOIF funds. 
Provincial committees were also established. along identical lines . to the CC 
in 
Havana; three delegates from each industrial section were nominated along with a 
financial secretary and -an organisational secretary, Nominations for the secretaries 
of. both the provincial, and central committees were held yearly in order to facilitate 
some kind of " rotational process, thus avoiding the control of power by a few 
117 
individuals. However, from 1921 to 1925, the Cuban-born Margarito Iglesias almost 
continually held either one of the secretarial positions in the CC, only conceding them 
while imprisoned by the authorities. The extent of Iglesias' influence over the CC is 
hard to determine, however, and he never penned articles for El Progreso under his 
own name, although he was certainly an anarcho-syndicalist and so distressed the 
government that he was finally assassinated by the Machadato in 1927 (see below). 
Finance 
Marcel Van der Linden has observed that to analyse the financial organisation of 
revolutionary syndicalist unions is often considered to be a crude approach, as such 
a study undermines the romanticism surrounding the ideology. After all, the unions 
were concerned with the struggle towards a better world, one unencumbered by 
monetary constraints. He also pointed out, however, that an analysis of the financial 
mechanics of a union enables us to better understand the day-to-day running of that 
union [Van der Linden, 1998: 185] and, in any case, an organisation will struggle to 
operate with no capital whatsoever. The SGOIF was not coy about financial matters 
and it regularly encouraged those in employment to assist struggling workers, not just 
morally but also economically. 
Collections made for striking workers were many. In 1923, the firing of workers 
attempting to organise at a paper mill led to a prolonged strike by workers at the mill 
calling for their reinstatement. On several occasions the SGOIF stressed the 
importance of solidarity with these workers through direct action (products from the 
mill were boycotted) and through collections by SGOIF members in employment, 
from which up to 230 workers received between $2-55 and $6-50 each at varying 
stages of the strike. This is just one example of financial help given to striking 
workers but such collections were numerous. Collections were also made in support 
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of imprisoned SGOIF members and their-families, the most successful collection 
being for the men accused of poisoning bottles of the boycotted La Polar beer' 12 . In 
one week alone, El Progreso reported that 1,421 workers had contributed to the 
collection, displaying tremendous and impressive solidarity [El Progreso, 1924, n1: 7] 
and that solidarity was echoed by endless demonstrations denouncing the arrests. 
Collections were also made for workers outside Cuba. Worker solidarity extended to 
Spain in 1921, for example, when 740 pesetas were sent to Barcelona to help those 
who had been persecuted and imprisoned by the authorities and, in the same week 
1,013 pesetas went to the Spanish CNT. A "Comite Pro Presos y Perseguidos de 
Espana" (Committee for Prisoners and the Persecuted of Spain) was also set up and. 
meetings were called to discuss the importance of solidarity: 
La clase trabajadora tiene que intemacionalizar sus fuerzas si quiere barrer el 
cuerpo de paräsitos que hoy lucha; cometiendo los crimenes mas horrorosos 
por sostener los privelegios de vivir a expensas del proletariat (The working- 
class has to intemationalise its forces if it wants to sweep away the body of 
parasites that it fights today; committing ever-more horrendous crimes in 
order to sustain the privileges of life at the expense of the proletariat) [El 
Progreso, 1921, g: 2]. 
That the importance of internationalism was understood by the union is evident from 
the above. However, a study of El Progreso reveals that, although the fate of 
workers outside Cuba was debated, in particular that of Spanish workers, due to the 
linguistic and cultural bond that existed through immigration, and of Russian workers, 
where the revolution had caused immense debate the world over, the periodical 
remained primarily concerned with domestic issues. News of strikes and boycotts, 
of education and meetings dominated the pages of EI Progreso and union members 
were required to support financially both the periodical and the union. 
112 See Chapter 5 for a case study of the boycott of. La Polar. 
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The SGOIF expected each associate to pay a subscription of ¢40, as laid out by the 
statutes, and any member failing to contribute this for three consecutive months, 
without good reason (specifically health grounds or unemployment), would be, 
excluded from the union. 50% of this sum found its way to the CC, where it was 
used for the general running of the union and its newspaper while the remainder 
stayed with the provincial or industrial sections to help towards their upkeep. 
Through membership of the SGOIF, subscription to EI Progreso was automatic, that 
is payment for a worker's copy of the periodical was included in these dues. The 
paper certainly struggled during the-first months of its existence, as, three months 
after its foundation in September, 1920, the editorial team felt the need to call upon 
readers for cash on more than one occasion. The first twelve issues had cost $1,270 
to print and distribute although only $304.80 had been received as payment, the 
deficit being covered by dipping into SGOIF funds [EI Progreso, 1920, e: 2]. At first 
glance, it could be deduced that union numbers were not as high as had been hoped, 
or expected, as payment for the SGOIF was included in the membership dues: few 
members means fewer subscriptions and consequently higher production costs. 
However, low membership seemed not to have been the reason for the financial 
hiccup. In February 1921, it was reported that, over twenty-two editions, a total of 
approximately 60,000 copies of EI Progreso had been transported to the interior (el 
campo) and although each copy had cost ¢3 to produce, and the cover price to non- 
SGOIF members was ¢4, overall the amount received fell well short of either figure 
[EI Progreso, 1921, b: 3]. More than half of Cuba's manufacturing sector was based 
in and around the capital: according to the Republic's 1919 Census, 3,179 workers 
were employed in Havana's manufacturing industry and 2,595 worked in other 
provinces on the island [Cuban Census, 1919: 749]. The union did not organise a 
closed shop and so it is unlikely that all copies distributed to the interior of the country 
were delivered to card-holding members, which indicates that the periodical attracted 
an audience of non-affiliated members. It is interesting to note that anarcho- 
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syndicalist ideas were being disseminated beyond the realms of urban factories, and 
its popularity elsewhere can be best explained by the effects of the rationalisation of 
some sugar mills. The restructuring of the ingenios was responsible for a loss of 
identity and control among those workers who, - looking for an outlet for their 
discontent, were probably open to some of the solutions discussed in El Progreso 
(see Chapter 1). Initially, there was a breakdown in communication between the 
workers of the interior and the SGOIF as regards payment, and, one year after going 
to print, low receipts continued to cause problems at the newspaper [El Progreso, 
1921, p: 1]. Eventually the situation was resolved and collections for the paper 
recovered the cost of production and distribution. 
Union dues, then, were used to pay for the day to day running of the union and its 
periodical. When special projects were adopted, such as the rationalist school 
established at Puentes Grandes in 1923, the union called upon workers to make 
further contributions, (in the case of the school, a further ¢20 was sought from each 
associate and the amount collected was sufficient to cover rent, teaching staff and 
materials for the school [E! Progreso, 1924, cl: 3]) Taking the wage offered to the 
secretaries of the CC as a guide ($75 monthly), it is estimated that the ¢40 
subscription did not constitute a large proportion of workers' salaries, helping to 
attract members and thus strengthen the union. ' 13 
Meetings 
A study of SGOIF statutes demonstrates that the union believed worker and 
committee communication to be tantamount to good organisation. CC delegates 
ordinarily met twice a month and failure to attend three consecutive meetings, without 
113 In fact, the average daily wage, according to El Progreso, was between $2.20 and $4 [EI Progreso, 
1924, dl: 21. If the average worker, therefore, earned $3 a day and worked 6 days per week, a four 
week pay packet was $72. 
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justification, led to delegates being "voluntarily separated" from the union. Perhaps 
due to the autonomy allowed to industrial and provincial sections of the union, the 
statutes did not specify how many meetings should be conducted outside of the CC, 
although a general assembly was held every three months and extraordinary 
sessions could be called whenever a section demanded it or else the CC was 
capable of calling an extraordinary meeting when at least fifteen union members 
requested one. Indeed, meetings were many: in February 1925,46 SGOIF 
meetings were held throughout the country, in March members attended 41 meetings 
and in April, 32 were recorded up to the 170' of the month [El Progreso, 1925, I: 4]. In 
addition to ordinary CC, industrial, provincial and general meetings, endless protest 
meetings and demonstrations were staged by SGOIF members and those 
sympathetic to their cause. 
Protest meetings that challenged the imprisonment of the SGOIF "beer poisoners" 
are too numerous to count as they were held the island over and often. In 1925, 
meetings protested the "atrocities" committed at the sugar mills of Morön14 [EI 
Progreso, 1925, I: 4] and that same year worker demonstrations condemned the 
death penalty that had been re-instated by Machado15 [El Progeso, 1925, n: 1]. 
SGOIF members were invited to attend anti-imperialist meetings and those that 
discussed government repression [EI Progreso, 1925, I, 4]. Furthermore, 
conferences, vigils and concerts were staged as fundraising events while 
simultaneously acting as educational tools aimed at directing propaganda, with a 
view to encouraging solidarity, towards women and children in particular [EI 
Progreso, 1921, f: 3 and I: 2]. 
114 For more information surrounding the sugar strikes, see chapters 1 and 5. 115 This is one of the few recorded instances of political demands being made by the SGOIF. 
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Such dedication to constant communication shows that workers responded to union 
rhetoric. A need to discuss their plight existed along with a certain understanding 
that strength could be partially achieved not just through association but by openly 
displaying solidarity with one another, via meetings and protests. Manuel Cuervo, 
writing in EI Progreso in 1925, seems to have captured this spirit: 
Los trabajadores tenemos que acostumbramos a discutir nuestros asuntos 
entre todo ... y debemos de velar porque no corran el riesgo de caer en 
manos de un aventurero cualquiera. Todo el poder para las asambleas, 
ninguno para los comites o comisiones (We workers have to get used to 
discussing our affairs amongst ourselves ... and we must take care not to run the risk of falling into the hands of some adventurer. All power to meetings, 
none to committees or commissions) [El Progreso, 1925, g: 1 ]. 
The call to meetings helped the workers to forge links with each other outside of the 
work environment while serving to promote the SGOIF and unionism in general. As 
unionism grew, workers could exchange ideas and revolutionary propaganda could 
be further disseminated. 
SGOIF's Attitude towards Communism 
Mendoza Rodriguez has argued that the period from 1917 to 1925 was the least 
homogeneous period in the forty-five years that he had examined1', [Mendoza 
Rodriguez, 1985: 182] and, in particular, he noticed that the Russian Revolution had 
caused divisions among the workers, two clear currents existing in Cuba during that 
time. While the "orthodox" anarchists denounced the Soviet revolution, the anarcho- 
syndicalists were more Marxist and pro-Soviet, he maintained. Accidn Consciente 
was one of those he referred to as an orthodox anarchist periodical and indeed, in 
1922, the publication unequivocally supported the people of Russia whilst 
condemning the Communist Party that had been installed there "jViva la Revolucibn 
1e He studied the period 1880-1925 
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Rusal, iViva la Revoluciön Mundiall ! Abajo ei gobierno bolchevique! iAbajo todos los 
gobiernosi" (Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live the World Revolution! 
Down with the bolshevik government! Down with all governments ) [Acciön 
Consciente, 25/12/1922: 1]. 
However, that all anarcho-syndicalists and their periodicals supported the Bolsheviks 
is erroneous. Undoubtedly the subject provoked arguments and divisions among 
leftists the world over, including the anarcho-syndicalists of Cuba, although it was not 
the only, and by no means the main, divisive subject on the island. In El Progreso, 
the validity of the Revolution was debated during 1921 in particular, although interest 
in it began to wane vis-ä-vis domestic issues. As it became clear that pockets of the 
Russian population, including workers, were being persecuted by the newly-installed 
government, anarchists everywhere at first questioned and then denounced the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Both negative and positive opinions appeared in EI 
Progreso during 1921: one J. Lopez Chavez, a worker at the Esmeralda sugar 
estate, argued that for the revolution to be realised, the world needed more 
educators and revolutionary sparks, in short "necesitamos un Lenine (sic) adonde 
quiera" (we need a Lenin in every corner) [EI Progreso, 1921, n: 3]. Jose H. Delgado 
believed that although the end must be anarchism, there should also exist an 
intermediary period, such as was happening in Russia and he urged anarchists to 
support all fellow workers. Eliseo Morales reasoned that, although Bolshevism had 
displayed faults, at least the people of Russia had achieved more than the workers of 
Cuba [El Progreso, 1921, m: 2]. 
Not all contributors to the periodical, however, were so tolerant of the newly 
established regime in Russia. One opinion in "Comentarios" condemned the 
authoritarianism of Bolshevik power: 
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No somos partidarios de ningün gobierno, no somos bolcheviques, porque 
todo estado no es mas que el detentador de todas las energfas y de todas las 
iniciativas. Si en Rusfa,. despues de hecha de la revolucibn, lejos de 
formarse un gobierno autoritario y centralista se hubiera hecho responsible 
de la producciön y el consumo a los grandes sindicatos, probablemente hoy 
en aquel pals no habria hambre (We are not supporters of any government, 
we are not Bolsheviks, because any state is nothing more than the holder of 
all energies and initiatives. If in Russia, after the Revolution was achieved, 
instead of forming an authoritarian and centrist government, large syndicates 
had been responsible for production and consumption, there probably would 
not be hunger in that country today) [EI Progreso, 1921, m: 1 ]. 
The revolution was perceived by some to have been betrayed by those who had 
subsequently seized the country: "... realmente, hay pocas cosas malas de que el 
Partido Comunista, y ei Gobierno que lo representa, no puedan ser acusados" 
(really, there are few bad things that the Communist Party, and the Government that 
represents it, cannot be accused ot) [El Progreso, 1922, a: 2]. A plea for 
international support by Russian anarcho-syndicalists was published in El Progreso, 
when a letter reproduced from the Parisian Le Libertaire (The Libertarian) detailed 
what it named the economic disorganisation and the absence of political life being 
enforced by the dictatorship, concluding: "no repitfiis nuestro error no introduzcais el 
comunismo del estado" (do not repeat our mistake: do not introduce state 
communism) [El Progreso, 1921, q: 1]. 
Others called for unity. Felipe Zapata' 17 observed that divisions among the Cuban left 
had not previously existed: "en Cuba se ha sido siempre anarquista o no se ha sido 
nada que tuviera relacidn con la lucha del trabajo" (in Cuba one has always been 
anarchist or one has been nothing in relation to the work struggle) [El Progreso, 
1921, k: 2]. Furthermore, whereas divisions between anarchists and socialists had 
damaged the working-class movement in Spain, Argentina, USA, France and Italy, 
he continued, "la acci6n social de los trabajadores conscientes de Cuba se 
desarrollaba al unisono con un solo frente y tendib ... a un iinico 
fin" (The social 
117 For more on Zapata, see below, Amarillismo 
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action of the aware workers of Cuba developed in unison with a single front and 
tended towards a single end) [El Progreso, 1921, k: 2]. Zapata understood that these 
divisions had begun to cause irreparable "canyons" in revolutionary thought: 
Es indiscutible. EI a! istamiento en nuestas fi! as de tanta gente nueva ha 
traido la division, tal enemistad, tal antipatia; se han relajado de tal modo los 
antiguos lazos afectivos; se ha corrompido hasta tal punto la antigua 
familiaridad revolucionaria, que da rubor, que da pena convencerse de tanta 
estOpida rea! idad iCufinto se ha perdidol... Que boichevique, que 
antibo! chevique, que anarquista, que antianarquista... jEsa ... 
basura! (It is 
without debate. The enlisting of so many new people into our ranks has 
brought divisions, such enmity, such antipathy; in this way the established 
emotional ties have become slack, and up to such a point the old 
revolutionary solidarity has been corrupted, which is appalling and which 
shamefully makes one realise the stupid truth. How much has been lost! 
Whether bolshevik or anti-bolshevik, whether anarchist or anti-anarchist ... All that ... 
is rubbish! ) [El Progreso, 1921, k: 2] 
Zapata's pleas fell on deaf ears. Although the majority of those reports on 
Bolshevism published in El Progreso after 1921 told of the evils of the Party and of its 
enmity towards the workers, there was little perception of the split that was slowly 
evolving among the Cuban left. No national communist party existed in Cuba until 
1925 and so the threat of infiltration by communists in the working-class movement 
and the eventual eclipse of anarchist related thought was not taken seriously. 
Instead, El Progreso concentrated on what was taking place at home, which was 
more tangible and recognisable: the impact of US imperialism, the formation of the 
FOH and the CNOC, governmental persecution and direct action. Undoubtedly, 
there were divisions in the Cuban labour movement, although the perceived threat 
came not from communists but from reformists, or those workers/leaders that did not 
adhere to the SGOIF, the so-called amarillistas. 
Amarillismo: Traitors and Turncoats 
Men do not make positions; positions, contrariwise, make men [Bakunin, 
L'Egalit6: 28/08/1869]. 
Bakunin believed that those in positions of leadership faced a certain challenge as 
most were inclined to alter or distort the very ideals on which the struggle to gain 
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command was originally based. He maintained that the -reality of governance 
highlighted the enticement of office and what was once a fight for and with the 
masses no longer appeared of personal relevance to the elected president or 
secretary of an organisation. Leadership could only corrupt, he observed: 
Even the best of men are rendered corruptible by the temptation of power and 
the absence of a serious, consistent opposition...... [Bakunin, L'Egalite: 
28/08/1869] 
And, he continued: 
If there is a devil in human history, that devil is the principle of command 
[Bakunin, L'Egalit6: 28/08/1869]. 
Anarchists denied the need for authority and so, for permanent leadership. They 
believed that it could only result in slavery, the corruption of the masses by a few. 
The very basis of anarchism propagated the freedom of the individual and any 
reversal of this would give way to human bondage. Anarchism, therefore, refused to 
be party to hierarchical structures and to rule was seen to be the antithesis of all that 
anarchists stood for. Writing in 1899, the Italian anarchist, Errico Malatesta, stressed 
this point: 
If we, in any way, dominate the lives of others and prevent them from doing 
what they wish to do, then for all practical purposes we cease to be 
anarchists [Malatesta, La Questione Social, 25/11/1899]. 
In his pamphlet What is Anarchy? 18, the Peruvian anarchist Manuel Gonzalez Prada 
highlighted the belief that power is not compatible with anarchism: 
Authority leads to abuse, obedience implies subjugation, for the truly 
emancipated human being does not strive to dominate anyone else,. and 
its The original Spanish text, La 'Ananqula, appeared in the anarcho-syndicalist peridiocal Los Parias 
(The Outcasts) in Lima, Peru, in 1907. 
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accepts no other authority than that of oneself over oneself [Gonzalez Prada, 
1972]. 
Therefore, in an attempt to halt this corruption of authority, leadership did not enter 
into anarchist thought. Each being was 
free to act upon his or her own will without 
the imposition of rules and regulations by a higher political or moral entity. 
Organisation should be voluntary and spontaneous and individuals should unite in 
order to pursue a specific goal, the life span of the group existing in tandem with the 
particular struggle. Once the goal had been accomplished, any hint of structure 
should dissolve, leaving no permanent organisation and certainly no hierarchy. 
Essentially, anarcho-syndicalism agreed with this philosophy. Anarcho-syndicalism 
was based upon federalism, each union possessing the liberty to act upon the free 
will of its members. Rudolf Rocker observed that anarcho-syndicalism was: 
... the right of self-determination of every union above everything else and 
recognizing only the organic agreement of all on the basis of like interests and 
common conviction [Rocker, 1973: 33]. 
Frequently, the need for communication among these many unions resulted in the 
creation of some point of collaboration: a central focus was often forged in order to 
maintain links between the various groups within the anarcho-syndicalist movement. 
A national federation usually acted as overseer to the organic organisations, 
although, at base level, the unions would preserve their autonomy. 
In keeping with anarchism, anarcho-syndicalist theory valued the importance of 
spontaneity and spontaneous direct action was at the heart of anarcho-syndicalism. 
In his Critique of Syndicalist Methods the Italian anarchist Alfredo Bonanno here 
encountered a contradiction at its very root as the unions were organisations and the 
structure of any organisation demands leadership. Leadership and spontaneity are 
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incompatible, he argued, and leadership and anarchism cannot coexist. Any form of 
organisation requires a pyramidal structure and a force must appear at its summit 
and Bonanno believed that, initially anarchist or not, the person(s) at the peak of an 
organisation would inevitably renounce anarchism, and that the gradual shift from 
anarchist militant to anarcho-syndicalist to syndicalist was often very real "without 
(the militant) either knowing or wishing it" [Bonanno, 1998: 29]. Worker leaders who 
made the transition were reviled by those remaining faithful to the anarcho-syndicalist 
cause, and they were labelled traitors to the working-class movement. 
Bakunin insisted that the masses themselves were responsible for the corruption 
meted out to them by their leaders as it was their ignorance that opened the door of 
betrayal to more intelligent, more ambitious or shrewder men and trust was often 
placed in men who would, reaching positions of power, be disloyal to the needs and 
wants of those finding themselves in the lower echelons of a given movement. The 
masses, therefore "create their own exploiters, their own despots, their own 
executioners of humanity" (Bakunin in Dolgoff, 1971: 245). 
This indifference, argued anarcho-syndicalists, had to be overcome and the solution 
was the promotion of education through meetings, the workplace and literature. 
Those worker leaders who had abandoned anarcho-syndicalism in favour of a less 
militant, purer syndicalist form of worker struggle were dubbed amarillistas19 by the 
anarcho-syndicalist press. 
Amarillismo was defined by EI Progreso as: 
...... la violencia en plena calle que emplearän los elementos gubermentales 
en nombre de una minoria, de una facciön de mercenarios, constituidos en 
agrupacibn enemiga de las verdaderas organizaciones proletarias [EI 
119 The term, literally translated into English as yellow trade unionist, was also popular in the IWW. 
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Progreso, 1923, f: 1] (...... violence, in full daylight, undertaken by 
governmental elements in the name of a minority, of a mercenary faction, built 
of the enemies of true proletarian organisations). 
Writers for El Progreso supposed that any person employing a less revolutionary 
means of class struggle (than themselves) was a defector and a traitor in short, an 
amarillista. The periodical dedicated column after column to denouncing worker 
leaders who chose to head unions other than the SGOIF. For this particular study 
have analysed the unionist lives of four men: Hilario Alonso, Felipe Zapata, Juan 
Arevalo and Jose Bravo. They have been singled out here as they were by El 
Progreso, even though only Zapata had ever been an SGOIF member: Alonso 
indulged in regular literary bickering with the periodical, while Arevalo and Bravo 
were vilified by its writers for treachery to Cuban workers in general. 
Hilario Alonso: from anarcho-syndicalist to amarillista. 
Hilario Alonso was a cafe worker who, in the space of fifteen years journeyed from 
workplace agitator to admirer of President Machado, a true fall from grace in the eyes 
of 1920's anarcho-syndicalists. 
Alonso's first appearance in the sphere of worker struggle seems to have been as 
Secretary for the radical Union de Dependientes de Cafes de la Habana in 1912 [El 
Dependiente, 17/01/1912: 3]. Hilario Alonso often contributed to the pages of the 
weekly El Dependiente, urging the workers to throw off their shackles and to 
organise. From his position of Secretary of the Ateneo Obrero (Workers' Cultural 
Centre), he noted that "La emancipacibn de los trabajadores ha de ser obra de los 
mismos trabajadores" (The emancipation of the workers must be the work of the 
workers themselves). [El Dependiente, 01/07/1914,1] Alongside this plea, the 
editorial team, to which Alonso contributed in no small way, urged readers to 
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organise on a scale large enough to combat, or at least match, the might of the huge 
industries employers were creating on the island, and a cry for industrial unionism 
was issued as, in order to fight the evolution of big business, worker organisations 
also had to expand. 
That the young Alonso was one of the most dedicated disseminators of industrial 
unionism is of interest here. With fellow unionist and El Dependiente contributor, 
Aquilino Lopez, Alonso was a champion of the cause of revolutionary syndicalism in 
Cuba. According to other writers in El Dependiente, Alonso and Lopez were 
inspirational, attempting to pull the Cuban proletariat out of its slumber of 
unconsciousness. It had been their mission to awaken that worker consciousness 
and writings in the periodical suggested that these two men alone, through El 
Dependiente, had actively propagated syndicalism in Cuba [EI Dependiente, 
13/10/1915: 4 and 17/12/1915: 1]. In his semi-hagiographical dedication, 'Para mis 
queridos amigos Aquilino Lopez e Hilario Alonso', Justo Velez wrote: 
Vosotros, como todos los grandes pensadores, habeis Ilegado a la 
conclusiön de que la causa de todos los males sociales radica en el hecho de 
existir la explotaciön del hombre por el hombre (You, like all the great 
thinkers, have reached the conclusion that the cause of all social ills is 
wrapped up in the fact that the exploitation of man by man exists). 
And, he continued: 
Si, amigos, tened confianza en vosotros mismos; seguid predicando vuestros 
principios axiomfiticos con la fe absoluta en vuestra razön; seguid predicando 
la verdad que estä desprendiendose pura de vuestros labios Ilegarä a brillar, 
no lo dudeis, en todas las conciencias como sol de mediodia. (Yes, my 
friends, have confidence in yourselves; keep, preaching your axiomatic 
principles with absolute faith that you are right; carry on preaching the truth as 
that which flows pure from your lips will finally ignite all conscience like the 
mid-day sun, do not doubt that) [EI Dependiente, 17/12/1915: 1 j. 
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While expounding the virtues of syndicalism, the two men continually debated the 
viability of socialism.. Regular exchanges appeared in the periodical between 
Alonso/LÖpez and socialists Francisco Domenech, Antonio Correa and Manuel 
Arbizü, among others. Comments and observations made by socialists appeared 
alongside those of the anarcho-syndicalists in a column that soon became known as 
la Controversia Socialista-Sindicalista. The age-old row flourished not only in print 
but also in open meetings held in the Havana parks and squares, and Alonso held 
central stage in the vast majority of these, as orator or scribe, tirelessly promulgating 
anarcho-syndicalism among the Cuban workers. 
Throughout the 1910s, Alonso had also been a firm believer in naturism. A 
committee member of the Asociaciön Naturista de Cuba, he frequently contributed to 
the monthly naturist publication Pro-Vida and by 1918 had become the Editor.. In 
July 1917, Pro-Vida published the article 'Naturismo y Anarquismo: la Verdadera 
Ruta del Vivir' (Naturism and Anarchism: The True Route to Living] by Hilario Alonso 
[Pro-Vida, 16/07/1917: 6]. In this revealing piece, Alonso admitted that anarchism 
had evolved from its "primitive" state, as it had had to and would continue to, in order 
that the worker be able to digest the philosophy: 
... pretender demostrar que ei anarquismo no es mfis que lo que vulgarmente 
se conoce, es negar su valor filosöfica, es empequenecerlo. Las ideas como 
los individuos evolucionan y se transforman constantemente. Idea que no se 
transforma perece (... to try to show that anarchism is nothing more than that 
which is commonly known is to deny its philosophic value, to belittle it. Ideas, 
like individuals, evolve and constantly change. An idea that does not change, 
perishes) [Pro-Vida, 16/07/1917: 6]. 
Through this statement, Alonso was perhaps seeking understanding for his own 
evolution from anarchist-based thought to a more reformist outlook that would be 
adopted by him during the 1920s. However, if he had already sensed a change of 
personal direction, the Cuban authorities momentarily considered him a threat. Leon 
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Primelles. reported, in Crdnica Cubana 1915-1918 that, according to Pro-Vida 
[30/09/1918] Alonso and Lopez "han sido absueltos de la acusaciön de anarquistas" 
(... have been absolved of the accusation of being anarchists) [Primelles, 1955: 500]. 
A study of periodicals and other primary sources in Havana contain no later 
references to Alonso as an anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist. The Union de 
Depedientes de Cafes (UDC), of which Alonso had been a long-standing and active 
member, was expelled from the Federaciön de Obreros de la Habana (FOH) in 1921 
for refusing to support the boycott of La Polar brewery. The UDC and its members 
were shunned by fellow workers for publishing advertisements promoting La Polar 
beer in its monthly magazine Aurora. It appears, 'however, that it was not the 
workers per se who were guilty of boycott-breaking but the editorial team of Aurora, 
and the Secretary of the UDC at that time, Manuel Lopez, assured readers of El 
Progreso that not all service workers were hostile to the boycott [El Progreso, 1921, 
u: 2]. 
Although Alonso kept an uncharacteristically low-profile in the reformist Aurora, he 
was the Secretary of the UDC in January 1924, when his contrary behaviour finally 
led to his expulsion from this "radical" union [Shaffer, 1998: 184]. As far as El 
Progreso was concerned he was certainly guilty of amarillismo and the periodical 
launched countless attacks on Alonso, who was also Editor of the magazine Espana 
Nueva, a publication declared boycotted by El Progreso in 1923, also for its defiance 
of the La Polar boycott. 
If any doubt fell upon the reliability of SGOIF accusations that Alonso had been 
disloyal to the anarcho-syndicalist cause, these reservations disappeared when, in 
April 1924, the strike-breaking enemy of the SGOIF, the Federaciön Anticlerical 
Cubana (FAC) was formed, with Alonso as its Secretary (see Chapter 5). 
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Furthermore, he was accused by the anarchist periodical Nueva Luz of being an 
employee of the Cuban government [Shaffer, 1998: 184]120, referring to the fact, no 
doubt, that through the FAC's- involvement with the government-founded Union 
Nacional del Trabajo, he was seen to be instrumental in deceiving the working class. 
In his 1925 book, El Problema Social, Alonso openly condemned anarchism: "No 
queremos la anarquia, porque es el desorden, la arbitrariedad y la injusticia" (We do 
not want anarchism, because it is disorder, capriciousness and injustice) [Alonso, 
1925: 204]. 
and: 
El apoliticismo obrero, proclamado por los elementos anarquistas, nativos y 
extranjeros, ha producido graves danos a la nacionalidad cubana (The 
apolitical view of the workers, proclaimed by anarchists, native and foreign, 
has caused great harm to Cuban nationhood) [Alonso, 1925: 204]. 
Perhaps the evolutionary process that Alonso had detected in 1917 had, in him, 
reached its conclusion: in November 1925, he openly welcomed Machado's 
presidency, by which time workers had already been assassinated, exiled, 
imprisoned or deported by the secret police working under Machado, La Porra, 12' 
while unions had been suppressed on his orders. The UDC, however, escaped 
persecution and continued to function under the Machadato, changing its name to 
Union de Empleados de Cafes in 1928. 
In 1948 Hilario Alonso was still voicing his opinions to the workers when he wrote for 
and edited Unidad Gastronömica, Organo Oficial de la Federaciön Nacional de 
Trabajadores Gastronömicos y sus Conexos (Official Organ of the National 
120 These accusations appeared in Nueva Luz on 10/01/1924: 2 and 08/12/1924: 2. 
121 La Porra translates as The Stick. 
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Federation of Food and Connected Workers). He wrote of the history of May 1 "t and 
the continuing struggle to achieve the minimum wage for workers employed in the 
food sector. He most definitely did not consider himself to be an enemy of the 
workers; rather he believed that he had been a victim of syndicalist bullying, referring, 
no doubt, to the attitude of the SGOIF and the UDC towards him. The anarcho- 
syndicalists, he noted, would stop at nothing in order to transform any strike into a 
revolutionary one and those who did not agree with their tactics were' labelled 
"amarillistas y traidores a la clase obrera" [Alonso, 1928: 208] ("yellow" unionists and 
traitors to the working class). Perhaps in an attempt to clear his own name or maybe 
with true conviction, Alonso bitterly criticised such branding: 
De esa manera han podido predominar y expulsar del seno de las luchas 
sociales, a todos los obreros que han podido servir con honradez y buena fe, 
nobles propösitos y alteza de sentimientos, a los obreros cubanos, y servir a 
Cuba cuantas veces fuere necesario y lo exigiesen las circunstancias. A eso 
se debe que en, Cuba no haya una 'verdadera organizaciön obrera y una 
mejor legislacibn social [Alonso, 1928: 208] (By these means they have been 
able to dominate and to expel from the bosom of social struggles all those 
who could have served the Cuban workers with honour and good faith, noble 
intentions and grand sentiments and who could have served Cuba whenever 
necessary and as circumstances dictated. This is why there is not a true 
worker organisation and better social legislation in Cuba). 
If the above perspective was fact rather than opinion, Alonso was not the sole 
casualty of this browbeating. However, although some of the intentions of these 
anarcho-syndicalist "targets" could be considered to be in good faith, those of others 
seemed to be more harmful to the worker cause. 
Honest Worker Leader or Government Stooge? 
One career that closely followed the trajectory of that of Alonso was that of brewery 
worker, Felipe Zapata. In 1921 Zapata was very much a respected member of the 
SGOIF and, in 1921, he attended the first meetings of the FOH as SGOIF delegate. 
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Zapata was editor of EI Progreso at around this time and he periodically spoke to the 
workers through that medium. The article "Sin pan y sin rumbo" (Without bread and 
without direction) in EI Progreso was penned by him in 1921: 
El pueblo tiene hambre y debe comer, no hay posibildad de aplicar los 
metodos que sabemos eficaces sobre todos; no se nos ofrece ninguna 
perspctiva de alivio... Pues bien: el pueblo, debe buscar la comida donde 
este y del modo que pueda. Si necesita recurrir a la fuerza, que lo evitan los 
ünicos que tienen interes en que tal no suceda (The people are hungry and 
must eat, there is no possibility of applying the methods that we know are 
more efficient than any other, we are offered no prospect of relief... And so: 
the people must seek food wherever it may be and however they can. If it is 
necessary to resort to force, let those who have a reason to prevent this from 
happening, avoid it) [El Progreso, 1921, f: 1] 
Zapata took his role as worker educator seriously. In 1922, he was one of four men 
who met to discuss the role of anarchism in Cuba. 122 It seemed to them that very 
recently anarchism had fallen by the wayside: "EI elemento anarquista disperso y 
decepcionado habia abandonado la lucha" (The anarchist element, torn and 
deceived, had abandoned the fight) [Acciön Consciente, 1922, b: 2]. Libertarian 
periodicals such as Nueva Aurora and Tiempos Nuevos had survived for only a very 
short time (only five issues of Tiempos Nuevos went to print) and so the group 
decided that something had to be done to revive anarchism in Cuba. They founded 
Regeneraciön (Regeneration) which, shortly afterwards, was replaced by Acciön 
Consciente: Periddico Libertario (Conscious Action: Libertarian Periodical) on 10' 
November 1922. In their words: "Nuestro labor... ha sido genuinamente anarquista. 
Nadie puede decir lo contrario [Acciön Consciente, 1922, b: 2]] (Our work.. . has been 
genuinely anarchist. Nobody can say otherwise). The anarchist fortnightly attempted 
to organise an anarchist congress, which was unsuccessful, and support for Accidn 
Consciente was not enough to keep the paper afloat. The periodical was sold by 
only eight outlets, all in the city of Havana, and, in April 1923, this organ for anarchist 
122 His comrades were Vicente Ferrer, Eulogio Relova and Manuel Ferro. 
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propaganda, financially in the red, ceased to exist after just twelve editions [Acciön 
Consciente, 1923, b: 4]. 123 
Whether Zapata had become disillusioned completely by the failure of Acciön 
Consciente to attract worker support or whether he had strategic reasons for doing 
so, in August 1923, he became editor of the much-reviled Aurora. The boycott of La 
Polar remained a point of dispute for many and the constant bickering between El 
Progreso and Aurora revolved around the fact that the latter had openly defied the 
boycott. Aurora was a glossy monthly whose thickness and quality of print and 
paper, coupled with endless advertisements for consumer products, suggests that it 
was a well-financed publication and it was for precisely that magazine that Zapata 
decided to work. Of the boycott, Zapata insisted that he had previously defended it 
because he had been ordered to do so, to which El Progreso sarcastically replied 
"... lögicamente, ahora lo combate porque se lo ordenan tambien" (logically, he now 
fights it because they order him to do so as well) [El Progreso, 1923, k: 8]. 
Zapata worked at Aurora for two years. In August 1923, with Alonso, Zapata was 
instrumental in securing a dubious deal with drink suppliers, Pemartin. Aurora had 
declared a boycott against Pemartin but the boycott was called off when negotiations 
between Zapata, Alonso, one Guitian and the company resulted in a generous gift to 
the UDC's library. Senores Santamarla y Compania, importers of Pemartin 
products, donated a glass book case complete with four hundred titles for use by the 
workers (what literature was among these titles is not known). Henceforth, the 
magazine urged workers to "propagar, recomendar, introducir, vender y acreditar" 
(propagate, recommend, introduce sell and vouch for) Pemartin products in the 
workplace) [Aurora, 1923, e: 230]. 
123 The total deficit was calculated at $20.87. According to Dolgoff, Acci6n Consciente was one of those 
anarchist periodicals that gave way to the re-launching of ITierral in 1924: The tiny, scattered papers 
were consolidated into one really adequate, well edited, well produced periodical" [Dolgoff, 1976 : 46] 
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EI Progreso found his behaviour both despicable and confusing. In May 1924, the 
paper accused Zapata, along with Alonso, Juan Jose Sabates and Juan Arevalo (see 
below), of being involved in the Sindicato Industrial de Cuba (Manufacturing Union of 
Cuba - SIC), which, according to El Progreso, was a union that recruited strike- 
breakers at La Polar and was collaborating with the Compania Cervecera 
Internacional, the producer of La Polar beer. SIC had released a manifesto 
discrediting "la sin razön del boicott a La Polar" (The uselessness of the boycott of La 
Polar)" [El Progreso, 1924, s: 7], while El Progreso singled out each of these men and 
explained how they had betrayed the proletariat. Of Zapata, it said: 
No fue este individuo el que mientras fue - para baldön nuestro - director 
de El Progreso con mäs dedicaciön propagö el Boycott a La Polar en la 
Habana y fuera de ella? (Was it not this individual who while he was - to our 
disgrace - editor of El Progreso propagated the boycott of La Polar with the 
most dedication both in and outside of Havana? ) [El Progreso, 1924, s: 7]. 
This perplexity may well have been justified. In July 1925, Zapata was once again 
ostracised, this time by colleagues at his new workplace Aurora. Aurora noted that 
Zapata who was "hace poco considerado companero de clase y de causa" (until 
recently considered a comrade of class and cause) was not only an ex-anarchist and 
ex-member of the SGOIF but he was also a "defensor de todos los Reyes y tiranos 
del Planeta" (a defender of all Kings and tyrants on the Planet) [Aurora, 1925, c: 633]. 
Why this sudden denunciation? It was no secret that Zapata had once been faithful 
to SGOIF tactics and indeed, he had been an anarchist. Aurora certainly believed in 
forming strong, organised unions although it was not anarchist in outlook and most 
likely would have disagreed with Zapata's former opinions and actions. However, if 
Zapata's past had been too revolutionary for some, his move towards reformism was 
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about to take a leap forward, when, in 1926, he became Head of Print of the 
supposedly pro-worker Acci6n Socialista. 124 
Like Alonso, for whose essay El Problema Social he supplied an introduction, Zapata 
had left his revolutionary days behind him, although he continued to write about 
worker issues for many years and, from 1948 to 1951, he recorded his memories of 
Cuban working-class history in Unidad Gastron6mica. 125 
During the 1920s, both men had been subject to continuing abuse by the SGOIF 
organ. In fact EI Progreso dedicated more time to throwing mud in the, direction of 
the amarillistas than it did toward the bourgeoisie. In El Progreso, the anarcho- 
syndicalist Jose Gonzalez penned what was perhaps the periodical's most scathing 
attack on the men, fuelling the war of words with its journalistic nemesis Aurora in 
November 1923: 
Una docena de vagos capaces de vender a la mismisima madre que les 
pariö, y de morir de hambre en el ultimo rincön de la ciudad antes que 
empunar una herramienta y trabajar. Esos son los Zapata, los Bald6,126 Los 
Alonso y otros piezas que Aurora cobija y alienta para que sigan su camino 
de corrupciön, de degeneraciön y de miseria moral y fisica. Borrachos, 
cobardes y limosneros, no tienen en su vida una accibn que los levante de la 
cloaca del servilismo, de la negaciön de hombres, de la miserla y del vicio. 
Toda su existencia es un estigma, todo sus dias son testigos de su condiciön 
de parasitos (A dozen idlers capable of selling the very mother that gave birth 
to them, and of dying of hunger in the furthest comer of the city before 
grasping a tool and working. These are the Zapatas, the Baldos, the Alonsos 
and other pawns Aurora shelters and feeds in order that they follow their path 
of corruption, of degeneration and of moral and physical wretchedness. 
Drunks, cowards and beggars, they have done nothing in their lives that 
raises them from the sewer of servility, from the denial of men, from poverty 
and vice. Their entire existence is a stigma, each of their days a witness to 
their parasitic condition) [El Progreso, 1923, p: 2]. 
124 Accibn Socialista was a government backed reformist worker periodical. 125 Unidad Gastron6mica, 1948-1951. Although all editions of this magazine are held in the Instituto de 
Historia in Havana, most of the relevant pages have been removed. 126 For 7 months in 1923, Jose A. Baldb used the pseudonym Murcio Scevola in order to contribute 
anonymously to a section known as'Comentarios" in EI Progreso and'Crbnicas Morrocotudas' in El 
Product orPanadero, a scam that he admitted to in La Aurora, 1923, f: 306. 
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Gonzalez accused these men of being more harmful to the working class than the 
bourgeois press: "... ustedes dicen ser revolucionarios y amigos de los trabajadores y 
son lo contrario. " [El Progreso, p: 2] (... you say that you are revolutionaries and 
friends of the workers and you are the opposite). In a letter addressed to Hilario 
Alonso, Gonzalez, a member of the SGOIF, enquired: 
LUstedes volando por la organizaciön obrera? Los Zapata, Arevalo y Cia. 
Es una lastima que Joseito Bravo no estuviera aqua para que les ayudara 
(You're looking after worker organisation? The Zapatas, Arevalo and Co. It's 
a shame that Joseito Bravo isn't here to help you... ) [El Progreso, 1923, n: 1 ]. 
Reformist leaders Arevalo and Bravo 
Jose Bravo and Juan Arevalo, the amarillistas reproved by Gonzalez, were both key 
figures in the Cuban labour movement. In 1918, Jose Bravo had headed the 
presidency of the Executive Committee of the general strike in support of Havana 
dock workers (see chapter 1). According to Olga Cabrera, he had also formed an 
emergency committee in support of striking train drivers in 1919.127 
While leader of the cigar makers' union, la Federaciön de Torcedores de la Habana y 
Pinar del Rio, Bravo attended the worker conference held in April 1920 as its 
delegate. Bravo was, at the time, a popular worker leader, a position bolstered by a 
speech he made at the 1919 May Day demonstrations at the Payret Theatre in 
Havana. 128 He was never an anarcho-syndicalist. In fact, the dock workers', train 
drivers' and cigar, makers' unions were among the most reformist (and numerically 
strongest) of the era. j 
127 In both of these projects he worked closely with the anarcho-syndicalist printer Antonio Penichet 
JCabrera, 1969: 57]. 
28 According to Roberto Leon Exp6sito, Bravo was the object of great applause by workers when he 
entered the theatre [Leon Expösito, 1975: 333]. 
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Bravo initially presided over the April conference, from where he attempted to 
promote the recently formed COPA [see Chapter 1]. Bravo aimed to persuade 
others at the conference to send a delegate representing Cuba to the COPA July 
conference in Mexico. The move was not well-received and was promptly rejected by 
fellow delegates, the most vociferous of whom were anarcho-syndicalists, on the 
grounds that it was a "yellow" AFL entity headed by Samuel Gompers who "comia 
con reyes y presidentes", (ate with kings and presidents) and "era un burgues 
ensoberbecido y fanfarrön" (was a proud and flashy bourgeois) [quoted in Tellerla 
Toca, 1984: 99-100]. 
Although Bravo was elected to sit on the executive committee for Havana (the 
committee was grouped into the six provinces of the Republic) his name cannot be 
found in the records of the FOH, the organisation that rose from the ashes of-the 
April conference. Nor can any trace of him be detected in the national worker 
federation CNOC formed in early 1925. Stubbs has claimed that Bravo embezzled 
$39,000 from the tobacco workers' union and, according to Leon Exposito, ' he was 
later assassinated, by order of Machado, in prison on the Isle of Pines. Jose Bravo 
has not been remembered fondly, condemned in one account, along with Arevalo, as 
a stooge for Samuel Gompers [Estrada, "1951: 25]. 
If Bravo has received a bad press, then Arevalo has been vilified. A Galician who 
arrived in Cuba in 1907, -, Arevalo appears to have spent his working life attempting to 
build bridges between the Cuban labour movement and the AFL. At the April 1920 
congress, he, like Bravo, spoke up in favour of sending a Cuban delegate to the 
COPA congress. Editor of Acciön Socialista, Arevalo was also one of the founders of 
the Federaciön Cubana del Trabajo (FCT) in 1927, set up with the support of the 
Machado government, in reaction to the workers' initiative, CNOC. The FCT was 
affiliated to COPA (and through it to the AFL) and was denounced by members of the. 
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US Provisional Committee for Cuba in 1935 as "a fake labor organisation of two 
thousand workers, created by the dictator Machado" [Beals/Odets, 1935: 8). 
Arevalo continued to work in labour unions during the 1930s (when he was the 
General Secretary of the dock workers' union, the Federaciön de Bahia) and in 1937 
he was connected to the Communist Party through the Partido Union Revolucionaria. 
In 1946 Arevalo was expelled from the national Confederaciön de Trabajadores de 
Cuba (CTC), set up in 1939 to replace CNOC, of which he had been elected 
organisational secretary at its foundation. According to Hugh Thomas his expulsion 
was the result of his role in a conspiracy hatched to exclude the communists from the 
CTC [Thomas, 1998: 748], while Cuban historiography has recorded that Arevalo was 
banished from the union for initiating talks with the president of the AFL, William 
Green, in relation to the creation of a pan-American workers' union [IHMCRSC, b, 
1985: 171]. 
For the purpose of this study, it must be remembered that Bravo, Arevalo, and other 
reformist unionists such as Luis Fabregat and Francisco Carrera Justiz, were never 
anarcho-syndicalists and so Bonanno's observation that the journey from anarcho- 
syndicalism to a purer form of syndicalism is frequently a natural process cannot be 
applied here. These men had never purported to have anarchistic tendencies but 
had collaborated with politicians and employers from their early days as union 
leaders. Such men have been condemned by post-1959 Cuban historiographers as 
traitors, indeed amarillistas, to the workers' cause and they have been seen as guilty 
of colluding with the authorities to hinder worker solidarity and to quell rebellion. 
Likewise, they were ostracised by radical worker periodicals of the day. 
On the other hand, one-time anarcho-syndicalists who turned towards a purer form of 
syndicalism, such as Alonso and Zapata, get no mention in the official history of the 
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Cuban labour movement. A study of primary sources, however, uncovers the fact 
that they were leading figures in the struggle for workers' rights during their lifetimes, 
although they were undoubtedly perceived by their contemporaries to be enemies of 
the approaching working-class revolution. Their refusal to support the boycottat La 
Polar, in particular, roused the emotions of the propagators of that struggle, namely 
the SGOIF and El Progreso, and the argument over the boycott appears to have 
been a, watershed in the campaigning careers of, both Zapata and Alonso. For 
radical elements of 1920s working life, a failure to support the boycott was 
synonymous with amarillismo. Negative treatment by the pro-boycott faction had 
damaged the reputations of these men and their shift to a non-anarchist stance may 
well have been precipitated by the hostile attitude towards them. 
It could be argued that the closed shop. led by the SGOIF (in the matter of the' 
boycott) served only to alienate those who did not agree with it in principle and who 
otherwise had been, and could have continued to be, valuable accessories in the 
" fight against capitalism. Certainly, the likes of Zapata and Alonso had been alienated 
by EI Progreso and the potentially libellous attacks printed in the periodical read as a 
public display of personal vendettas and bitter arguments. Thus the term amarillista 
may have been used gratuitously, serving only to encourage the recipients to 
retaliate - away from their anarchist roots. 
Neither Zapata nor Alonso became political leaders. All evidence points towards their 
continuation as union men. and. writers on working-class issues and, as Bonanno 
supposed of any anarcho-syndicalist worker leader, -both dropped their anarchist- 
related standpoint. Other prominent union members joined political parties, such as 
Antonio Penichet, the anarcho-syndicalist typesetter, worker educator, printers' union 
president and influential FOH member, who joined the Partido Autentico after its 
foundation in . 1934. According to latter-day anarchist Frank. Fernandez, such men 
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were not shunned by fellow anarchists because, as mentioned above, anarchism . 
defends the, freedom to choose. Besides, argues Fernandez, Penichet and others 
like him did not adopt extreme right-wing policies and remained faithful to their 
principles [Fernandez, 2000: 99] (apart from, it could be argued, that basic anarchist 
principle of the rejection of party politics). 
Perhaps the label of amarillista should have been preserved for those who knowingly 
worked in collusion with elements harmful to working-class progress. Instead, 1920s 
anarchists appear to have rejected unnecessarily the support of honest leaders and 
educators who possessed genuine concerns for the physical and spiritual betterment 
of the workers. The elimination of choice is not compatible with anarchism: the 
questioning of SGOIF union action, however, was ridiculed and discouraged. 
Furthermore, internal bickering could only serve to hinder worker unity, a problem so 
often encountered among anarchists, or indeed any who envisage change. 
Pork Chop Mentality? The Workers of the SGOIF, 
Who were the workers? 
It has been widely accepted that those anarchists active in the Cuban labour 
movement of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were Spanish 
agitators. This view existed in official accounts of the day and has been reinforced 
by latter-day historians [Rosell, 1973: 19 and Cabrera, 1969: 49]. In 1925, the chief 
of police in Cuba reported that almost all SGOIF leaders were foreign radicals who 
were responsible for poisoning the labour movement with anarchy [AN, 390/11684: 
90-94]. Speaking, in 1918, of the Cuban workforce in general, the British Vice 
Consul in Cuba, Drury Cowen, reported that revolutionary seeds were being sowed 
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by - "Spanish anarchists, of whom there are believed to be many in Cuba" [FO 
371/3705: 2]. If a handful of Spanish anarchists were seen to be responsible for 
propagating anarchism among the labour force, what was the nationality of the 
majority of the day-to-day workers in the SGOIF? 
Of the 5,774 workers employed in the island's manufacturing industry in 1919,55% 
were based in and around the capital, the area from where the SGOIF attracted most 
of its support, and, according to the 1919 Cuban Census, 50% of all industrial 
workers were Spanish [Ibarra, . 1992: 459]. From 1921-1925,81% of Spaniards 
arriving in Cuba landed in the port of Havana [Secretaria de Hacienda, 1927: 5]. The 
1919 Census also shows that black employees made up 11% of the manufacturing 
workforce, although no clue as to the geography or provenance of black workers is 
given. EI Progreso makes little mention of the race or nationality of SGOIF members, 
all workers being equal in the eyes of the union regardless or sex, race or. 
nationality. 129 
Although no statistics are available regarding female industrial workers in urban 
Cuba, it is apparent from various editions of EI Progreso that many were employed in 
factories and either belonged to the SGOIF or were among those being courted 
constantly by the union and its periodical. Female SGOIF members could be found 
in those jobs that demanded dexterity, such as were employed in match, paper, 
chocolate, noodle and biscuit factories, among others. 
Those employed in manufacturing industry, therefore, constituted male and female, 
black and white, Spanish and Cuban workers. In examining the radicalism of these 
workers, it is necessary to understand those components that may have contributed 
129 Although there was a large influx of Jamaican and Haitian immigrants during the same time period, 
these were mostly employed by sugar companies in rural areas. It is therefore assumed that the 
majority of those black workers employed in urban factories were Cuban. 
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to a rebellious consciousness. Estrada observed that the push towards radicalism in 
Cuba was fostered by an amalgam of factors: economic exploitation; lack of union 
rights; radical propaganda; governmental terror and the attitudes of bosses towards 
the workers [Estrada, 1951: 21]. 
Before assessing the above ingredients it is necessary to consider suffrage among 
SGOIF workers. The 1901 Cuban Constitution, which "contained no reference to the 
rights of labor" [Benjamin, 1975: 69], stated that all male Cubans over the age of 21 
were eligible to vote in parliamentary elections. In order that foreigners receive this 
privilege they had to have been resident in Cuba for five consecutive years. Only 
after this length of time, but not within two years of first applying for naturalisation, 
could a foreign individual be considered a naturalised Cuban, then receiving voting 
rights. - Between 1921 and 1925,624,985 people entered the port of Havana from 
Spain, while 466,310 Spaniards left the shores of the capital during the same time 
period [Secretaria de Hacienda, 1927: 5]. This was a massive turnover of workers 
from Spain and those who did not reside in Cuba for any substantial length of time 
conceded the right to vote. Given these statistics, it is likely that many Spanish 
workers employed during the 1920s had not been naturalised. 
Women enjoyed no suffrage, regardless of nationality or age. Furthermore, male 
suffrage was not available to those under 21 years and, through a study of El 
Progreso, it is apparent that children were employed in some urban factories, 
noticeably the Ambrosia Industrial chocolate factory [El Progreso, 1923: I, 2]. 
A great number of SGOIF members, therefore, were probably disenfranchised. 
Unable to air their opinions through the ballot-box, these workers may well have 
opted to choose alternative avenues to express feelings of discontent, and the 
anarcho-syndicalist SGOIF would have provided such an outlet, allowing workers to 
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articulate a collective voice. However, it should not be ' assumed that-even those 
Cubans who were eligible to vote did indeed do so. According to 1918 British 
Foreign Office records, many Cuban workers chose not to exercise their electoral 
power, not through apathy but because the voting process was seen by that sector of 
society to be invalid: political parties were not particularly worker-friendly (no strong 
socialist party existed) and, furthermore, parties were accused of mal-administration 
[FO: 371/3195 and 371/3198]. Both those able and unable to vote, therefore, may 
have had little option but to turn to radical unions in order to find a political voice and 
to rally against economic and social hardship. 
Radicalisation 
During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Southern European workers 
uprooted themselves from their homeland to countries such as Brazil [Albert, 1988: 
258] and Argentina [Thompson, 1984: 98], not with the intention of planting 
anarchism among the workers in their host countries, but in an effort to improve their 
personal economic, and at times social, -standing. It was not an inherently radical 
outlook that pushed them to discover, and then to embrace, anarchism, it has been 
argued, but the harsh conditions that they encountered as workers in these countries, 
which forced them to consider alternative forms of survival, and anarcho-syndicalism 
was especially attractive to those immigrants who could not vote. Likewise, Spanish 
workers fled to Cuba in search of economic betterment [Cabrera, 1969: 49]. - They 
had already employed one survival strategy (emigration) when locating to a new 
country. Other strategies that may have been open to workers elsewhere were not 
viable in Cuba: that many were not able to vote precluded joining or voting for a 
socialist party (or any other, for that matter) and penny capitalism was rarely an 
option in a country with such a low standard of living. Anarcho-syndicalism, on the 
other hand, was an avenue open to all. 
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The vast majority of Spanish workers arriving in Cuba from 1921-1925 were 
considered to be unskilled hands: over that five-year period, an overwhelming 88.2% 
of all immigrants from Spain had been jomaleros (day labourers) or labradores 
(farmhands) in their native country [Secretaria de Hacienda, 1927: 16]. Low skills 
often meant low economic benefits, reinforcing the impression that these workers did 
indeed travel to Cuba in order to gain a better financial foothold, with a view to 
returning to Spain with a greater wealth that was rarely forthcoming. 
According to Ibarra, workers in urban Cuba experienced a fall in the value of real 
wages (annual salaries set against food prices) between 1916 and 1926 with the 
exception of 1922, when real wages were at a premium [Ibarra, 1992: 4571.130 
Established in 1917, it is likely that SGOIF was a reaction to the slump in real wages: 
employees became unionised in order to strengthen their bargaining positions so 
they could more forcibly demand a better standard of living. Furthermore, at around 
the same time, the domestic manufacturing sector was experiencing a period of 
growth, the number of industrial workers employed having risen 6-fold in twelve 
years. 131 This increased workforce further necessitated a central point of contact; a 
place where workers could meet up outside of the confines of the factory. 
It should not be overlooked that the five or six thousand workers employed in the 
manufacturing sector did not constitute the mass of urban workers; many thousands 
were employed in transport, print and construction or were artisans. That is, 
numerically, factory workers were not the largest group of employees. It is 
interesting then that members of the SGOIF should have seen themselves as a 
major force in fighting for better conditions. 
130 Ibarra used 1909 as the base year. The statistics consider the wages of the head of a family of four 
over 300 days. 131 Comparing the 1907 and 1919 Cuban censuses, figures show that the number of workers employed 
in the manufacturing industry rose from 895 in 1907 to 5,774 in 1919 [Ibarra, 1992: 459 and Direccibn 
General del Censo, 1921: 749]] 
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That the industry had undergone expansion may be one reason for the foundation of 
the union, although other factors appear to have influenced its continued attraction to 
workers until its dissolution in 1925. Economic conditions were responsible for the 
lack of faith in employers and it was in 1920, when real wages slumped to a mere 44 
% of their. value in 1909, that the propagandist El Progreso was first published. 
Members were discontented with their meagre standard of living during 1920 and 
1921, which is reflected in the great number of strikes declared throughout this 
period, almost all of which demanded either a rise in wages or else attempted to 
prevent them from being reduced further still. Strikes aiming to discourage 
employers from providing the barest of survival wages were staged at ice, beer and 
fabric factories throughout 1920 and 1921 [El Progreso, 1920: a, 1921,1: 1 and 1921, 
p: 1 ]. Even the ill-fated, long-running boycott at La Polar was prompted by workers' 
calls for fairer wages [Aurora, 1923, a]., 
El Progreso urged, workers not to accept poverty wages, bemoaning the increased 
cost of living experienced by brewery workers, in particular. Towards the end of 
1921, the " periodical - noted that, although the cost of . living had begun to fall, 
employees still suffered long hours and tiredness. Beer prices had fallen and "Si la 
cerveza es mäs barata, tambien las materias primeras valen menos... " (if beer is 
cheaper so are the primary materials worth less) [El Progreso, 1921: 1: 1]. Workers, 
then, were a primary material and the SGOIF mouthpiece suggested that lower 
consumer prices would inevitably lead to wage cuts. For years, the SGOIF had 
appealed to workers by providing the means to counteract any falling standards of 
living. Bread-and-butter issues were tackled through union strikes and so it appears 
that, initially at least, membership of the union had been bolstered by cultivating a 
"pork-chop mentality". 
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However, in 1922, urban workers finally received a boost in real -wages, which 
stretched to almost 129% of 1909 levels [Ibarra, 1992: 457]. This long-awaited 
increase did not slow union membership: indeed, the workers must have felt a new 
confidence in their efforts to raise wages and, besides, they could now better afford 
financially to strike or to offer support others on strike. Throughout 1923 and 1924, 
although workers continued to strike for better working conditions, this was not their 
sole demand in the face of improved economic conditions. Examining El Progreso, it 
is clear that the call for union recognition by employers had become a strong enough 
reason to cease work. In factories that made products as diverse as paper, matches 
and biscuits, workers left their posts in retaliation against the sackings of fellow 
employees who had been fired for belonging to the SGOIF [EI Progreso, 1923: a and 
1924: j]. This call for re-instatement served to increase union membership as 
unaffiliated workers confronted their bosses over the unjust treatment meted out to 
those who had recently joined union ranks. In opposition to company management, 
these- ranks swelled further, bolstering union membership and enraging company 
administrations. Furthermore, solidarity was expressed for ousted workers not just 
through collections but also through sympathy strikes in other factories [EI Progreso, 
1924, v: 2]. 
Undoubtedly, such strikes were encouraged through the SGOIF mouthpiece, which 
was eager to strengthen the union and to cultivate a feeling of hatred for the 
employer-capitalists. In a time of relative economic prosperity (as compared to 
1920), it is doubtful whether propaganda alone would have sustained interest. 
Belonging to a union was one thing, but having the conviction that they, the workers, 
were important and that their demands were well-founded was entirely another. So 
where did the self-belief of urban workers stem from? 
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The Perceived Importance of Breweries in 1920's Cuba 
As previously mentioned, manufacturing industry had grown throughout the 1910s 
and this trend continued through the 1920s. Chapman observed that, during this 
period, high tariffs were set by the Cuban authorities in order to protect emerging 
industries, in particular those industries producing beer, cement and soap132 
[Chapman, 1927: 627]. This financial protection facilitated the growth of these infant 
industries, ensuring higher production and therefore an increased demand for 
producers, i. e. factory workers. Admittedly, the nascent industries were relatively 
unimportant to the Cuban economy, given the overall value of sugar and tobacco 
exports, and the country still had to import the majority of goods for domestic 
consumption [Chapman, 1927: 619]. However, beer must have been in especially 
high demand during the early days of prohibition in the neighbouring USA. Prohibition 
began in 1918 and the search for alcohol appears to have had a knock-on effect in 
Cuba: Hennessy pointed out that during the early 1920s, Havana had become a 
"refuge for gangsters and a paradise for whoremongers and gamblers" [Hennessy, 
1988: 247]. This was a consequence of liquor laws in the United States of America, 
he maintained, and one that encouraged anarcho-syndicalism among the waiters and 
barmen on the island, the very people who had to serve the newly acquired 
customers. It is also likely that those employed in the beer factories of Cuba would 
have felt the repercussions of the prohibition laws due to the fact that beer imports no 
longer crossed the Florida Strait, coupled with increased demand for such products 
on Cuban soil. 
It appears to be more than coincidence that the absence of a legal supply of alcohol 
in the United States came about just as the SGOIF decided that interest in anarcho- 
syndicalism among producers of beer, in particular, was substantial enough to 
132 Members of factories producing these products belonged to the SGOIF. 
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champion the creation of a worker periodical dedicated to the ideology. El Progreso 
was so convinced of the importance of beer in Cuba that, in August 1921, the SGOIF 
committee proclaimed that: 
"Los productos de cerveceria, a pesar de ser un articulo de lujo, se ha 
convertido en un articulo de primera necesidad, por eso nuestra lucha 
interesa profundamente a la opinion püblica, y todos los hombres razonables 
estarän de nuestra parte, sea cual fuere su profesiön o posiciön social" (Beer 
products, despite being a luxury item, have been converted into an article of 
primary necessity, because of this our struggle interests profoundly public 
opinion, and all reasonable men will be on our side, whatever their profession 
or social position) [EI Progreso, 1921,1: 1 ] 
Through such statements, the periodical helped to convince the workers that they 
were important to the Cuban economy, assuring them that the product they toiled 
daily to produce had recently been promoted to the status of a basic necessity. 
Boycotts were markedly popular tools of direct action among consumers of beer [see 
chapter 5] and were strengthened by the workers' conviction that they were justified 
in their struggle and by the perception that they would be fully supported by a cross- 
section of the population. Boycotts, however, were not popular among employers and 
SGOIF members were subject to increasing hostility by the authorities who used 
repression to silence protest. 
Repression is dealt with to a greater extent in Chapter 5. SGOIF members, along 
with the union itself and the periodical it produced, were persecuted by the 
Machadato from 1925, the repression coming to a head in September 1925, when 
the union and El Progreso were dissolved. That the workers' cause was weakened 
by repression is evident in Estrada's testimony, when he documented the failure of 
the workers to replace those expelled, imprisoned or killed by Machado's forces: 
... fue una carga muy pesada para nuestros 
debiles hombres, la mayoria no 
hablamos recibido integras sus lecciones y solo teniamos sin capacidad, el 
valor desesperado de afrontar el terror de la machadocracia, dispuestos a 
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caer en nuestra funciön de dirigentes de trabajadores, en aquella lucha sin ., 
cuartel contra la dictadora desaforada ... (... it was a very heavy burden for 
our weak men, the majority of us had not fully incorporated its lessons and we 
only had the futile and desperate strength to confront the terror of the 
Machadocracy, prepared to fall in our role as worker leaders, in that struggle 
without quarter against the violent dictatorship... ) [Estrada, 1951: 29]. 
Repression had, at times, led to an increase in solidarity among the workers, who 
fought to be heard and to secure what they believed to be their rights. However, the 
level of repression in 1925 was the final blow to the SGOIF, which had 
underestimated the power of the government and, throughout the life span of the 
SGOIF, the principal enemy was not perceived to be the state but the people who 
paid the wages: - the bosses. 
The arguments put forward in Chapter 1 regarding the effects of rationalisation on an 
existing workforce cannot be fully applied to urban industrial workers in Cuba. As 
most of the industries were new and workers had been employed in the sector for a 
relatively short time, a low-skill level would have sufficed in these factories. Instead, 
the majority of workers would have been employed as unskilled workers, and therein 
lay the strength of the employer over employee as the bosses' attempted to ensure 
that industrial workers never obtained a high skill level, hoping to keep them 
"incultos" (uneducated) and "inconscientes" (ignorant) [Mendoza Rodriguez, 1985: 
91]. The workers would have received little training and, in this respect, they were 
easily replaceable with the minimum of cost to the company. Aiming to hinder a 
growth in consciousness among workers, managers were prompted to fire those 
perceived to be a threat to the stability of the work place and so those vociferous in 
the union became the victims of sackings. However, the response to such action 
was not anticipated by employers, as workers demanded re-instatement and 
solidarity intensified. Being unskilled, the vast majority of these workers were easily 
able to migrate from factory to factory and from product to product while strike- 
breakers could, and were, employed at any time, allowing factory workers little sense 
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of job security or control. This mobility may well have given these employees the air 
of the casual worker for whom: 
There was no opportunity for long-term planning of resistance, or for building 
up a strike fund or a powerful trade union organization, or for engaging in 
time-consuming processes of mediation or arbitration. Such working 
conditions naturally encouraged tactics of immediate economic action against 
the employer [van der Linden, Thorpe, 1990: 8/9]. 
Factory workers in 1920's Cuba, however, did have the luxury of an established trade 
union, which served as a prop to those devoid of skill and already predisposed to 
direct action tactics, seemingly having little to forfeit. The SGOIF handed these 
workers a lifeline, a chance to fight for their positions and to increase prosperity. 
However, it must be remembered that not all workers adhered to every union whim, 
and many workers may have simply joined the SGOIF for the duration of a strike in 
the factory where they worked. Furthermore, as the jobs they were temporarily 
vacating often required few skills, picketing workers were always at the mercy of 
strike-breakers. From 1920-1925, strike-breakers were employed at beer, noodle, 
chocolate, biscuit and soft drink factories, usually leading to consumer boycotts of 
products at whichever workplace was out on strike. 
The reaction of SGOIF members to employers of "miserables rompe-huelgas" (vile 
strike-breakers) [EI Progreso, 1924: r1,2] is interesting. From evidence gathered 
through the SGOIF periodical, it appears that such a manoeuvre had little effect on 
the morale of workers; boycotts that followed strikes continued, sometimes for years, 
and EI Progreso published regular updates on those products that had been declared 
boycotted by the union due to the employment of strike-breakers. These calls to 
boycott must have been backed by the rank-and-file for such action to be so 
consistent and, at times, lengthy. 
154 
Violence was used against some bosses who insisted on defeating union strikes: the 
boss of Ambrosia Industrial was assassinated in the midst of a strike demanding 
union recognition and a bomb was placed at the home of the director of the 
boycotted La Polar beer, a factory that used strike-breakers through the drawn-out 
worker-employer clash (see Chapter 5). Whether such acts were those of individual 
terrorism by frustrated workers has never been proven, but it is clear that tensions 
ran high enough for murder to be committed in the first case and attempted in the 
second. 
Bosses were also accused of forging divisions among wage earners, as they 
colluded to form parallel unions in an attempt to cajole employees into abandoning 
the radicalism of the SGOIF. At times, these bosses succeeded in destroying worker 
unity. At La Estrella biscuit company, for example, what was seen by the SGOIF as 
disloyalty occurred among female workers when union members wished to stage an 
all-out sympathy strike with Cuba Biscuit. Some workers, sceptical of such action, 
refused to back fellow workers at Cuba Biscuit, reluctant to endanger their own jobs 
for little obvious personal benefit, and the owner of the company was blamed by El 
Progreso for any confusion placed in the minds of workers. 
During a strike at La Gloria chocolate factory, not all members of the work force 
wished to join ranks with the SGOIF and so a parallel union was founded in response 
to it. Set up in April 1925, the Unibn de Empleados y Obreos de la Fdbrica de 
Chocolate, Galleticas y Confituras 'La Gloria' solicited legal support, through the Ley 
de Asociaciön, with a view to convincing the SGOIF that it had to abide by national 
laws and could not use boycotts to threaten the stability of workers at the chocolate 
factory. Neither, it maintained, could it operate a closed shop. 
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Such instances illustrate examples of a lack of solidarity with the union and although 
not regular, it can be ascertained that, although strong enough to pose a real threat 
to both the authorities and the employers, the SGOIF did not always enjoy the 
support of all workers. Perhaps if the demands put forward by the union had 
promised material gains to potential strikers, action would have appealed to a greater 
number of workers. In the cases cited above, however, they acted cautiously, not 
wishing to sacrifice their own jobs purely to illustrate solidarity with workers whom 
perhaps they did not know. 
However, from 1920 to 1925, the union rank-and-file generally showed tremendous 
support for strikes, whether it was in a bid to secure financial gains or, as was more 
frequent in times of relative prosperity, to demand union recognition and/or to display 
solidarity with others in the same industry. Although many industrial workers 
espoused "pork-chop mentality", in that many were desperate to raise wages in times 
of hardship, they also pursued moral goals, not abandoning union ranks in the event 
of relative financial security. 
As such a large number of members were disenfranchised, being Spanish 
immigrants or women, and taking into consideration that many Cuban nationals were 
unconvinced of the validity of party politics, workers tended to substitute voting rights 
for an option that promised better concessions to them. Such an option was possible 
through the union and the SGOIF offered expression to factory workers through 
anarcho-syndicalism, the majority, of whose members possessed a low skill, base 
within the industry. 
Low job skills precluded high wages but did not. appear to diminish the notion of job 
worth and this feeling of usefulness was seemingly uninhibited by employer bids to 
deny solid training to workers. Infant domestic industries had experienced a period 
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of growth in the 1910s and capital continued to be injected into the manufacturing 
sector during the 1920s. This financial influx may have given workers the sense that 
they provided an important service, while prohibition laws necessitated a growth in 
the brewing industry in Cuba, which, in the minds of those workers, catapulted them 
to key producers of an "essential luxury". 
Through the SGOIF, industrial workers expressed solidarity with each other, 
essential to the survival of the union, and many, if not all, wage earners showed 
considerable interest in helping their fellow workers, not only through sympathy 
strikes but also through financial contributions to such projects as the rationalist 
schools set up in and around Havana. Furthermore, frequent meetings staged by the 
SGOIF were well attended and members generously offered the little they were able 
to donate in support of striking workers and their families. El Progreso was also well 
subscribed to, indicating that workers were responsive to the anarcho-syndicalist 
propaganda put forward in the periodical. 
The failure of anarcho-syndicalism to maintain worker interest was partly induced by 
the repression unleashed on the union and some of its members. Workers were little 
prepared to overcome the violence meted out to them, although organisational 
weaknesses also contributed to the downfall of the SGOIF (see Chapter 4). Those 
remaining in the industry during the post-purge era regained some of their confidence 
after the collapse of the Machadato in 1933, when the union was reformed, 
suggesting that an underlying current of discontent with employers and with the 
working conditions they faced continued among factory workers in the interim. Prior 
to the onslaught by the authorities, however, SGOIF members fought daily to 
improve their lot through direct action tactics, while the union continued to expand its 
support base, believing that industrial unionism was the form of organisation most 
suited to those employed in the factories of Cuba's manufacturing industry. 
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Chapter4 
The Struggle for Industrial Unionism 
Why Industrial Unionism? 
Considerando: que las Organizaciones de Oficio dividen al trabajador y lo 
entregan indefenso ante sus explotadores, y que las Organizaciones 
Industriales son el arma m6s eficaz que puede esgrimir el proletariado. 
Resolvemos: constituirnos en una Organizaciön que abarque a los obreros 
de todos los ramos industriales, dentro de un nexo solidario ... (Considering: that Craft Organisations divide workers and render them 
defenceless from their exploiters, and that Industrial Organisations are the 
most efficient arms that the proletariat can brandish. 
We resolve: to build ourselves an organisation that embraces workers from 
every industrial branch, within a mutually binding web) [SGOIF, AN 
390/11684: 29-38]. 
The perceived invalidity of craft unionism encouraged members of the SGOIF to 
espouse industrial unionism as the means to achieving immediate benefits and 
realising the revolution. The SGOIF believed that craft unionism was limiting and so 
attempted to construct the first workers' association in Cuba to be formed industrially. 
Craft unionism, it was believed, often operated a closed shop in the respect that only 
skilled artisans, for example, could join a union, which. then concentrated on 
fomenting fraternity solely among that group. 
In the USA such craft-unionism had resulted in a monopoly of workers in one union 
that could then establish wage levels for union associates, to the detriment of non- 
unionised workers [Guerin, 1998: 58]. The Industrial Worker, 133 printed in London, 
accused such unions of driving down the supply of workers trained in a particular 
craft and so maintaining high wages for those artisans, a tactic not possible in 
industries where skills were limited [The Industrial Worker, 1914, b: 1]. This labour 
aristocracy may have benefited members in the short term but it hindered solidarity 
among workers as a class, a problem that industrial unionism aimed to address by 
133 The Industrial Workerwas also printed in Seattle, USA, on behalf of the western local of the IWW. 
158 
grouping together all workers regardless of trade or level of skill. Guerin has pointed 
out that, in the USA, the AFL's tendency to group workers by craft meant not only 
that class solidarity suffered but that employers gained strength [Guerin, 1998: 59]. 
After all, if the workers did not communicate, while the bosses did, the latter could 
only become more powerful. 
In -the USA, some members of the IWW believed that the growth of industry was 
responsible for the displacement of workers who, as a direct result of, large scale 
business, had been stripped of any skill-based employment: "Economic development 
has destroyed crafts and reduced nearly all workers to a dead level" [The Industrial 
Worker, 1914, b: 1]. Cuban industry was indeed a growth area, if a nascent one, in 
urban areas. In 1899, only 53 people were recorded as working in factories 
[IHMCRSC, 1985, a: appendix 1], a number that had increased to a staggering 5,774 
by 1919 [Cuban Census, 1919: 749]. Craft unionism was not seen as a viable option 
in the organisation of Cuban factory workers. Firstly, skilled crafts rarely existed in 
the industrial sector, the majority of factory workers being employed as low-skilled 
and low-paid help, and so possessing no definite craft, thus negating the need for 
craft unionism. A lack of skills also meant that workers could easily transfer from 
factory to factory, and in a sense they became a "jack of all trades", able to function 
in various posts without the need for, or cost of, extensive training. The SGOIF 
understood the need to form an all-embracing union that did not deny membership to 
any worker and that allowed members mobility and, one supposes, a certain 
freedom. Industrial unionism was universal in that it had the potential to group all 
workers employed in manufacturing industry and in doing so, the SGOIF gave 
members the opportunity to overcome any feelings of unworthiness and to help build 
an entity that would, through sheer size, combat the increasing wealth and power of 
the industrialists. 
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Forming a solid nucleus of unionised workers would strengthen the proletariat's 
cause, enabling it to fully face the might of the employers, maintained those writing in 
El Progreso. Furthermore, the inability (or unwillingness) to unionise was seen to be 
a form of collusion with the powers-that-be: 
Cerremos las filas; ahoguemos las rencillas todas, elevemos las corazones, y 
agrupemonos, decididos, junto a nuestros explotadores. En epocas de paz, 
asociarse es un deber; hoy es un deber y una necesidad; quien lo olvida, 
ayuda a nuestros explotadores (Let us close ranks; strangle all quarrels; lift 
our hearts, and group together, resolute, next to our exploiters. In times of 
peace, to organise is a duty; today it is a duty and a necessity; whoever 
forgets that, helps our exploiters) [El Progreso, 1921, h: 1 ]. 
Industrial Unionism, it was anticipated, would provide the workers with a tool with 
which to counteract the exploitative nature of employers who had the authority to hire 
and fire workers in the manufacturing sector. A lack of craftsmanship had given 
employers a free reign as regards payment, as minimal training ensured a surplus of 
factory hands and, by the laws of supply and demand, employers may have felt 
justified in offering near starvation wages. The anarcho-syndicalists hoped to tackle 
employers at base level, that is on the factory floor, and, as strength was seen to be 
in numbers, the union aimed to unite as many workers as possible. Once this was 
achieved, it was believed, the proletarian army could fully engage in revolutionary 
battle. The equation "workers versus employers" led industrial unionists in the USA 
to declare that "an injury to one is the concern of all" [The Industrial Worker, 1914, b: 
2]. This sentiment was replicated in Cuba through El Progreso, which echoed the 
IWW in statements such as "la injuria hecha a un trabajador es la injuria hecha a 
todos los trabajadores" (Insult made to one worker is an insult made to all workers) 
[El Progreso, 1921, t: 1]. This particular statement comes from an article by the strike 
committee in Puentes Graudes declaring support for the strikers at La Polar. Time 
and time again El Progreso aimed to reinforce the awareness that strength lay in 
unity: 
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Si en los momentos actuales en que mäs precisamos la cohesion, 
permanecemos desunidos, la fiera burguesa nos acometera para devoramos 
(If today, when we most need cohesion, we remain disunited, the bourgeois 
monster will set upon us to devour us [El Progreso, 1924, e1: 7]. 
A more cohesive workforce would allow less room for employer manoeuvre as there 
would be less chance of contracting strike-breakers from among the domestic 
masses. On numerous occasions, strike-breakers had filled vacancies left by 
discontented members of the SGOIF and so, it was reasoned, more union members 
would facilitate in the denial of a replacement workforce so frequently used by 
company bosses. 
Industrial unionism also aimed to halt the collusion between employers and union 
bosses, which, according to advocates of industrial unionism, was a frequent 
problem wherever craft unionism was prevalent, in particular in the USA. Guerin 
reported that companies often employed "business agents" from the ranks of the 
AFL, who concentrated on securing higher wages for union members and placating 
company bosses, while living well off high union subscriptions and monies obtained 
from employer pay-offs [Guerin, 1998: 58]. The determination to end such behaviour 
was voiced by the IWW mouthpiece in Britain in 1914: 
Trade unionism permits of leadership - industrial unionism does not - therein 
lies the difference. The IWW is a fighting organisation where there is no room 
for leaders, "intellectuals" or "superiors" [The Industrial Worker, 1914, a: 1]. 
Industrial unionism, then, aimed to block the cult of leadership and, in keeping with 
this, the SGOIF boasted yearly elections to enforce fairness, replacing regularly its 
financial and organisational secretaries. Instead of following the lead of certain 
individuals, industrial unionism, it was agreed, should be formed from below, that is 
the will of the workers should determine the path to be followed: their fate was in their 
own hands. From this idea grew the SGOIF's preoccupation with direct action and 
161, 
education, two of the mainstays of anarcho-syndicalism. Class-consciousness was 
cultivated among individual workers so that, collectively, they were more equipped to 
challenge the destiny planned for them by bureaucrats and employers. Guerin 
believed that unskilled workers had the advantage of the downtrodden over artisans 
because, through maltreatment, "their class-consciousness often proved more 
advanced than that of the skilled workers" [Guerin, 1998: 60]. Malatesta had already 
noted that "the origin and justification for authority lies in social disintegration" and 
observed that "the less organised we have been, the more prone are we to be 
imposed on by a few individuals" [Malatesta, L'Agitazione, 11/06/1897: 1]. The 
SGOIF proposed to construct a large union that would counteract such imposition 
and provide industrial workers with a collective voice and point of contact through 
which to achieve this. 
Whom did the SGOIF aim to organise? 134 
EI dia que logremos una organizaciön homogenea y poderosa habremos 
formado el verdadero ejercito combatiente por los betlos principios de la 
emancipaciön humana (The day that we realise a homogenous and powerful 
organisation, we will have formed the true army, fighting for the beautiful principles of 
human emancipation) [EI Progreso, 1923, p: 1 ]. 
Initially, the union recruited those who were employed in breweries, rapidly 
expanding to incorporate workers in soft drink and ice factories. During the early 
1920s, the union's efforts to be the sole organisers of the manufacturing sector were 
further accomplished through the recruitment of those who helped produce a wider 
range of products. In its attempt to incorporate all factory workers, the union secured 
delegates in workplaces that may have employed only a handful of workers. From a 
134 The logistics of the SGOIF are covered in Chapter 3. 
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study of non-sugar producing factories in Cuba in 1925, it is apparent that many were 
operating on a small scale, some employing perhaps only nine or ten workers. In 
1925, for example, just 357 workers were employed in 40 ice factories and flour 
workers totalled 72 in ten factories [Ibarra, 1992: 444/45]. 
The SGOIF urged those workers employed in small factories to help themselves and 
others by affiliating to the union, as in May 1924 when El Progreso used its success 
in recruiting employees in one pasta factory to attract other pasta workers. However 
small or insignificant such industries seemed, it contended, it was essential that all 
workers unite [E! Progreso, 1924, b: 1]. Indeed, in 1925, no more than 183 people 
made up the workforce in Cuba's nine pasta producing factories. Through the 
periodical, propaganda aimed at these workers was frequent, as was that directed at 
those employed in other areas where the SGOIF attempted to build upon scant 
victories. In particular, in 1923 and 1924, it focussed on workers employed in paper, 
confectionery and match factories, hoping to enlist entire workforces, as although 
these were relatively few in number, the union would eventually be able operate a 
closed shop, making it more difficult for company bosses to refuse union demands, 
thus securing further victories and cultivating a positive reputation for the SGOIF 
among workers in other, perhaps non-affiliated branches, of Cuba's manufacturing 
industry. 
Of the workers in the above-mentioned factories recruited to the union from 1923, 
and those it further hoped to enlist, many were women. A campaign hoping to gain 
the interest of female workers led EI Progreso to debate women's issues from 1924, 
a subject barely touched upon in the periodical prior to the appearance of women on 
SGOIF books. It could be argued that, as more women became union members, 
they demanded a voice through El Progreso, but it is equally likely that articles 
advocating women's rights were an attempt by the paper's editorial team to attract 
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women to union ranks. After all, no women appeared on the SGOIF committees and 
there is no record of direct female participation in the union. For the organisers then, 
perhaps it was sufficient that previously unorganised female workers were 
represented by them, as opposed to emerging unions not yet founded. In any case, 
articles such as La emancipaciön de la mujer [EI Progeso, 1924, g: 4] and Los ninos 
y las madres [EI Progreso, 1924, e: 5] urged women to fight for equality in the home 
and in the workplace. Using the success of strikes staged at Cuba Biscuit and La 
Ambrosia as examples of what could be achieved, workers were encouraged to 
defend their rights as women and as associates, and membership of the union would 
help them on the path to emancipation: 
Volved hermanas por los fueros perdidos, volved sobre vuestros pasos y 
reclamad unidas el derecho de asociadas y ei respeto a que sois acreedoras. 
Mn no es tarde; nosotros os apoyamos, os defendemos, y si preciso es, nos 
sacrificamos. (Return sisters to lost privileges, retrace your steps and 
together reclaim the right of association and the respect you are worthy of. It 
is still not too late; we will support you, we will defend you, and if necessary, 
we will sacrifice ourselves) [El Progreso, 1924, v: 5]. 
Thus, female workers were offered unbounded support from male members of the 
SGOIF if they joined forces with them, although today the call to action seems 
somewhat patronising. For example, in the article mentioned above, workers at the 
biscuit making factory, La Estrella, were referred to as "companeritas" (little [female] 
comrades). Regardless, the promise of support must have been welcome to those 
female workers wishing to improve their lot. Disenfranchised and with no alternative 
avenue, the union offered the promise of a lifeline to many of these factory workers. 
Writers in El Progreso tended to marry traditional patriarchal views, which saw 
women as homemakers and raisers of children, with a progressive attitude, which 
viewed women as fellow workers and allies. The periodical indicated that future 
generations of women would benefit from the immediate education of children: 
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iO, mujeres, en. vuestras manos estä la felicidad de la humana especiel 
ITomad el libro y sed amigas, madres y maestras de vuestros hijosl (Oh 
women, the happiness of human kind is in your hands! Reach for the book 
and be friends, mothers and teachers to your children! ) [EI Progreso: 1924, 
j: 4]. 
Women then were seen to be responsible for the education of their children and so, it 
was hoped, any class-consciousness absorbed by them through unionisation would 
be passed onto their offspring. It is evident that women did take an interest in 
education, as in August 1923, when female workers were dismissed from the Vicente 
Real match company for attending the opening of the rationalist school set up by the 
SGOIF in Puentes Grandes [El Progreso, 1924: d]. Goods produced by the company 
were immediately declared boycotted by the periodical and workers were 
encouraged to prevent unfair dismissals from reoccurring by becoming union 
members. 
It appears that the SGOIF rarely missed the opportunity to draw oppressed and non- 
represented workers to its fold but if, at first, the union sought to dominate small- 
scale industries, its master plan was decidedly more ambitious. One of the first types 
of factories to be targeted by the union (outside of beer, soft drink and ice 
companies) were those producing confectionery products. 53 such factories were in 
operation by 1925, and although the majority of them employed few workers, the total 
number of employees in that particular industrial branch then numbered 1,127, a 
substantial figure for a single branch. The first section of the "Galleticas, Chocolates, 
Confituras y Similares" (Biscuits, Chocolate, Jams and Similar Products) industry 
joined the union in October 1923 and, thereafter, endless reports of strikes in 
associated factories and subsequent boycotts of related products were announced 
through El Progreso. The union went on to successfully recruit members in paper, 
match, tin can, soap and noodle factories. 
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If the SGOIF had aimed to organise all workers in manufacturing industry, it did not 
fully manage to extend its influence to those employed elsewhere, although, 
seemingly inspired by the inclusiveness of IWW's "one big union", the SGOIF 
became involved in discussions surrounding sugar workers. This is not unusual to 
anarcho-syndicalism, or indeed all socialist-based ideology, which is concerned with 
the lot of all fellow workers both nationally and internationally, but the SGOIF failed to 
take the organisational lead. In the midst of the threatened country-wide general 
strike in late 1924, sugar workers were urged by one of the future founders of the 
PCC, Alejandro Barreiro, to organise along libertarian lines. Quoting Bakunin and 
praising the principles of anarcho-communism, Barreiro also foresaw the need to 
expand propaganda to areas outside of Havana and to create an industrial branch of 
sugar workers [El Progreso, 1924,11: 2]. The ideas of the SGOIF enjoyed a following 
among these workers and thousands of editions of El Progreso, in which letters and 
articles written by sugar workers were published, had been sold in rural areas since 
its foundation. 
The inclusion of sugar workers would have been a natural progression for the SGOIF 
as many toiled in conditions akin to those in urban factories and were unskilled 
hands, victims of long hours in return for meagre wages. Work on sugar plantations 
and in the mills was seasonal and so, many hands were used as casual labour, 
employed only during harvest time, usually from January to June, precisely the type 
of itinerant workers represented by the industrial unionists in the USA. In addition, a 
high percentage of sugar mills had been subject to increased rationalisation and so 
workers had experienced a dilution of skills, a situation that should have spurred 
industrial unionists to recruit among the ranks of sugar workers. In Cuba, 
rationalisation did increase tension among sugar workers, heightened by the fact that 
some companies had given more power to the management and so bosses had 
gained fuller control over the workers. During the post-Great War period, "corporate 
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reformers set about revamping the sugar mills management, production and labor 
systems" [O'Brien, 1996: 215] and this acted as a catalyst for increased radicalism 
among workers employed there. Included were demands by sugar workers for more 
worker control in the workplace, inasmuch as they called for the right to associate 
and to exercise a say in how factories were run, including more influence in 
determining who should be employed and under what conditions. 
Writers in El Progreso were aware of the great unionising potential in sugar industry 
and regularly encouraged workers to form a solid association. They noted the vast 
"ejercitos de parias" (armies of pariahs) [El Progreso, 1923, s: 1], namely those 
Jamaican and Haitian immigrants who had been imported to Cuba as cheap labour 
and who, in the view of company management, were not predisposed to 
confrontation. However, observed the periodical, low wages, long hours and insults 
had bred discontent among the many West Indian labourers and factory hands and, it 
maintained, this discontent must be built upon: 
... no debe despreciarse el movimiento que se ha iniciado, pues, tal vez, por 
medio de el, pudieran ilegar a mejorar en mucho los jomales de la zafra, y tal 
vez, a establecer la jornada de ocho horas en los ingenios, una de las mäs 
urgentes necesidades de la lucha obrera en Cuba (the movement that has 
been started must not wane, as, perhaps, through it, wages earned during the 
harvest will be able to increase drastically, and perhaps, the eight-hour day in 
the sugar mills, one of the most urgent needs of the Cuban labour struggle, 
will be established) [El Progreso, 1923, s: 1 ]. 
Throughout 1924 and 1925, the periodical frequently publicised the many strikes 
declared in sugar mills and plantations in those years, whilst offering support through 
meetings and propaganda. 135 Through El Progreso, the SGOIF helped to raise the 
class-consciousness already in evidence in the campo, although the union did not 
attempt to unionise these workers even though, on more than one occasion, one 
worker organiser in Las Tunas in the Oriente Province, Jose Marla Soler, pleaded for 
135 Sugar strikes in 1924 are discussed'in chapter 5. 
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assistance. In an article printed in both the anarchist fortnightly El Sembrador (The 
Sower), and El Progreso, Maria Soler called for support from the experienced 
organisers in and around the Capital: 
En el campo hay obreros conscientes que desean organizarse, y es 
necesario pensar que no solo en La Habana debe de haber gremios y 
Federaciones ...... Los obreros del interior pedimos un poco mäs de acciön 
por parte vuestra" (In the country, there are conscious workers who want to 
organise themselves, and it is necessary that unions and Federations exist 
not solely in Havana ... We, the workers of the interior, ask for a little more 
action on your part) [El Progreso, 1924: o]. 
The country-side, then, was ripe for organisation; so why did the SGOIF fail to take 
the opportunity to promote both industrial unionism and anarcho-syndicalism 
throughout the region? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider 
the role of the FOH and the CNOC in the Cuban labour movement and how 
significant a role the SGOIF played in the movement as a whole. 
The SGOIF in a Wider Context - Its Relationship with the FOH and CNOC 
As earlier discussed, the first FOH Congress of May 1922 revealed a decidedly 
anarcho-syndicalist hue. The Congress agreed to forge a unified proletarian front 
that would build worker resistance and act as educator, while embracing class 
struggle and direct action and rejecting electoral action. The paper that resulted from 
the Congress echoed resolutions passed in the preamble and statutes of the SGOIF, 
such as the right of each union to retain autonomy and liberty, along with those listed 
above. The SGOIF was one of the founding members of the FOH and would 
continue to play a role in it until closed by Machado's forces in September 1925. A 
study of financial contributions to the FOH reveals that SGOIF membership to the 
FOH was economically essential to the very survival of the Federation. According to 
FOH records, from October 1923 to December 1924, some 26% of all per capita 
contributions to the FOH was by provided by SGOIF members, who were around 
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1,500 strong in the local federation [AN 383/11540: 34]. 10 It may have been 
assumed by the SGOIF that such a hefty donation, together with the large 
membership subscription, afforded the union a voice in the recently formed FOH, 
although, in keeping with the Federation's statutes, only one vote could be cast by 
the SGOIF in any election or resolution, regardless of membership numbers. Indeed, 
the SGOIF did attempt to exert its influence on the FOH on more than one occasion 
and tempers often ran high between SGOIF delegates and the FOH's Central 
Committee. 
One vociferous member of the SGOIF, Paulino Diez Martin, who had been active in 
anarchist circles in Spain, regularly opposed what he saw as the centralist workings 
of the FOH Central Committee. In 1923, he had been nominated Secretary General 
of the anarchist Confederacidn Nacional del Trabajo (CNT - National Confederation 
of Workers) in Spain and arrived in Cuba in July 1924, fleeing government repression 
after a period of imprisonment, having been accused of plotting against the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Very soon after his arrival in Cuba, Diez began 
employment as a brewery worker and almost immediately became a prominent figure 
in the SGOIF and, in September 1924, he urged workers to unite along anarcho- 
syndicalist lines through ITierra!. He claimed that, unless the FOH altered its 
organisational structure, it was doomed to failure, as the structure that it had did not 
respond to the needs of the workers: 
EI Onico terreno apto para la armonfa de todos los esfuerzos, de todas las 
actividades y las individualidades y apto tambien para la lucha es el del 
Sindicato Ramo (The only sphere suited to the harmony of all efforts, of all 
activities and individualities and suited too to the struggle, is that of the 
Industrial Branch) [I Tierra! 25/09/1924: 1]. 
136 In the 15-month time period, SGOIF per capita contributions totalled $1134 (Cuban pesos) of a total 
of $4292. $1134 averaged among fifteen months is $75.6 [AN 383/11540: 34]. The monthly 
subscription to the FOH was ¢5, giving the figure 1,512 SGOIF members (own calculations). 
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That both the FOH and the CNOC did not organise industrially was a bone of 
contention for Diez, who often entered into bitter quarrels with the Central 
Committee, and with its then Secretary Alfredo Lopez, in particular. When 
confronted by Diez, who asked why the CNOC had failed to organise according to 
industry, Lopez replied that such organisation was extremely difficult, considering 
that at that time few local federations or industrial branches existed in Cuba. 
Individual branches would first need to be founded in order that the national 
confederation could follow suit, he contended [IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 417]. 
Tensions among the two men were heightened when, in late 1924, sugar workers 
struck country-wide for union recognition, higher wages and shorter hours. By early 
October 1924, sugar strikers in Cruces had already won some concessions, and 
workers in Moron, Camaguey, followed their lead in trying to secure the right to 
organise and receive better conditions. In light of these events, the FOH aimed to 
orchestrate a propaganda drive that would rally workers into solidarity strikes, but 
elements in the SGOIF did not agree with the campaign. In an article entitled 
Dictadura Federal (Federal Dictatorship), Diez accused the FOH of not responding to 
the wishes of all members: 
El Pleno de la Federacibn Obrera es un incubo de dictadorzuelos, para los 
que la Ibertad (sic) es algo metafisico o imaginario. Digo esto porque la 
Federaciön ha negado al Sindicato Fabril el derecho de discutir su actuaciön, 
a formular proposiciones en oposiciön a un programa de escursiön de 
propaganda por la Isla presentado por ella [The Assembly of the Worker 
Federation is an incubus of little dictators, for whom liberty is something 
metaphysical or imaginary. I say this because the Federation has denied the 
Sindicato Fabril the right to discuss its role, in making proposals in opposition 
to the propaganda excursion programme of the Island put forward by (the 
FOM] (El Progreso, 1924,11: 1). 
Diez so vehemently opposed the propaganda campaign because it was due to take 
place at the same time as the country's presidential elections. It was an inopportune 
moment for such a tour, in which all efforts would be wasted and anyhow, he argued, 
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the FOH had not formed a structured response to the strikes and was in a state of 
disorganisation. Diez pleaded that, before the tour was embarked upon, an 
extraordinary meeting be called to discuss the matter further. The reason for his 
outburst also involved a request by the Federation to the SGOIF for $700 in order to 
realise the project. According to Diez the FOH exercised a "centralizaci6n odiosa" 
(hateful centralisation) over its associates and it had: 
... un programa cerrado, somete a conocimiento, no a la aprobacidn de los Sindicatos. De antemano se fija a cada Sindicato conque debe contribuir a 
tal fin. (... a closed programme, subject to information, not to the consent of 
the unions. It fixes, in advance, the amount each union must contribute to 
such ends) [El Progreso, 1924,11: 1 ]. 
The union had a right to know how the money was to be spent and to propose 
modifications to FOH plans, Diez contended. Despite his efforts, Diez did not 
possess the backing of the majority of the SGOIF, whose members held a meeting to 
discuss the matter, the results of which were published in El Progreso. The SGOIF 
distanced itself from Diez's ravings, reporting that the General Assembly had indeed 
agreed to foot the amount requested by the FOH with a view to organising Cuban 
workers [EI Progreso, 1924: n1: 1]. 
Alfredo Lbpez and Pena Vilaboa had responded to Diez's observations through a 
signed flyer, circulated in Havana, in which they were uncomplimentary toward Diez 
and his criticisms of the FOH. However, observed one worker calling himself 
"Universo", Diez, as an anarchist, had every right to criticise, as: 
"La critics - en nuestro concepto - es la depuracibn del pensamiento humano y gracias a ella es que las cosas van hacia la perfeccibn (Criticism - in our opinion - is the purification of human thought and thanks to it things 
become closer to perfection) [El Progreso, 1924: nl :1]. 
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That such views did exist among other union members may have prevented the . 
SGOIF from expelling Diez, or maybe he was given another chance due to. his 
reputation as a powerful and competent worker organiser in the CNT. In any case, 
when the FOH rejected Diez as SGOIF delegate, the union stood by him, insisting 
that he continue to serve on the Comite Pleno (Plenary Committee) of the FOH, a 
stance that caused the Federation to revoke the demand for his removal. Diez 
continued to voice concern about the workings of the FOH, accusing it of failing to', 
organise sugar workers and of causing confusion surrounding the threatened general 
strike and, in his dismay, he proposed a solution. Having accepted the responsibility 
of drawing up new regulations for the SGOIF, Diez and one Rafael R. Gonzalez 
suggested that the reform build upon the industrial unionism already practised by the 
SGOIF. The new entity, to be named Sindicato del Ramo de la Alimentacion y sus 
Anexos de la Habana y su Radio (The Union Branch for Food and Related Products 
of Havana and its Radius), aspired to anarcho-communism and would embrace all 
workers concerned with the production of food and drink, including sugar workers, 
the new Comisiön de Reforma del Reglamento (Commission for the Reform of the 
Regulations) proposed. Cuban sugar workers had never been federated into one 
union, which prevented solidarity and, as far as the anarcho-syndicalists were 
concerned, weakened strike action. The proposal was never accepted, but what is 
interesting is the realisation by Diez that sugar workers needed to belong to a strong 
union and his belief that the SGOIF could, in part, be responsible for their 
organisation. He was undoubtedly disillusioned by the FOH and their attempts at 
centralisation, and he aimed to promote anarcho-syndicalism through the island while 
it was still the most popular radical thought in Cuba. Having very recently arrived 
from Europe, he must have been aware of the centralising tendencies of communism 
and its threat to anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism. 
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The general strike in support of sugar workers nation-wide was never realised and 
Diez placed the blame at the feet of the FOH. That the strike had been "una derrota 
para el proletariado entero de Cuba" (a defeat for the entire proletariat of Cuba) was 
neither the fault of the sugar workers nor the leaders of the strike but of the 
organisers of the general strike in Havana, that is the FOH, maintained Diez [EI 
Progreso, 1924, vl :1J. The FOH Comite Conjunto de Huelga (CC) (Joint Strike 
Committee), he continued: 
... es el responsable del fracaso, con sus apiaiamientos incesantes y 
la 
verborrea ridicula y fantasmagbrica por 61 empleado (is the one responsible 
for the failure, with its incessant postponements and the ridiculous and 
phantasmagorical torrent of words employed by it) [El Progreso, 1924: v1 ] 
The cowardliness, passivity and insensitivity displayed by the FOH had undermined 
the commitment and bravery on the part of the workers, he persisted, and, instead of 
the continued threat of action, the strike committee should have acted sooner and 
declared a general strike when the country was poised and hungry for such action. 
The FOH denied responsibility for the failure and appeared to resent SGOIF criticism. 
In a previous meeting called to discuss the approaching general strike, the CC had 
been convinced by Alfredo Lopez (according to Diez) that the SGOIF was an 
irregular organisation, given that five of its members sat on the strike committee, 
while other unions posted just one delegate. Two delegates were duly expelled from 
the CC, an injustice, complained Diez, taking into account that only one joint vote 
was apportioned to the five members. Furthermore, Diez was convinced that the 
representatives from the campo "perversamente han sido inducidas a manifestar su 
hostilidad al Sindicato Fabril" (have been perversely induced to show their hostility to 
the Manufacturers' Union) [El Progreso, 1924, v1: 1]. He further contended that it 
was not the role of the CC to dictate to a congress, but instead that the organisations 
themselves should propose any congress agenda. 
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The general strike had been called for 14th December, although the organisers of the 
sugar strikes reached an agreement with the authorities two days before the set date. 
An Asamblea-Congreso (Congress Meeting) was held on 140' December, in what 
was to be the first step in creating a national worker federation, soon to be known as 
the CNOC. The meeting was spontaneous in nature and so no agenda had been 
drawn up. How then, enquired the SGOIF, could delegates truly represent their 
organisations if the points of the meeting could not be discussed beforehand? The 
union argued that, instead of taking into consideration the views of the majority of its 
members, delegates would be merely expressing their own opinions. Thus, the 
SGOIF drafted a proposal, stating that, in future, an agenda should be set out and 
agreed in advance of any national congress and that the recent failure of the general 
strike should be examined and solutions reached as to how to avoid further such 
catastrophes. The proposal was read out to the delegates and the reception was, 
unfavourable. Lopez "gritö, estentöreamente: `jEsto es un boletön a las' 
Delegaciones del Congreso! " (shouted in a stentorian voice `This is a shoddy ballot 
for the Delegations in the Congress) [El Progreso, 1924, v1: 1], to which SGOIF 
delegates took offence and drafted a reply, condemning what they saw as hostility 
directed towards their delegation. They maintained that they were entitled to voice to 
the Congress the opinions of SGOIF members. As true anarcho-syndicalists, the 
three delegates (Rafael Serra, Paulino Diez and Amadeo Perez)137 emphasised their 
discontent through direct action: 
... presentamos al Congreso nuestra retirada del mismo, aclarando. que 
comprendemos la razbn de los Delegados del Interior at verse defraudados 
en los propösitos que tralan, pero esta Delegaciön -aclara que ella no es 
culpable de que no haya habido el verdadero y necesario orden y 
puntualizaciön al citar a este Congreso Nacional (We present to the Congress 
our withdrawal from it, making it clear that we understand the reasoning of the 
137 Rafael Serra Marrero was a black Cuban who had previously been a tobacco worker and was known 
by the authorities as a "consciente y viejo anarquista" (politically aware and long-standing anarchist) 
[FOH, 88-90]. Amadeo Perez was a Spaniard expelled from Cuba by Machado in August 1925 [Paldez 
Groba, 1991: 90] 
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Delegates from outside of Havana, on being robbed of their purpose for 
attending, but this Delegation makes it clear that is does not bear 
responsibility for the fact that that the true and necessary agenda and 
specifications were not present at this National Congress) [El Progreso, 
I924: vl]. 
Through the periodical, the delegation explained publicly its reasons for withdrawing 
from the Congress, although the consequences of the trio's actions tarnished the 
reputation of the SGOIF among fellow workers: 
Sabemos que al retirarse la Delegaciön del Sindicato del Congreso, se 
denostö a nuestra colectividad por algunos companeros, que consideramos 
buenos, y por otros que son de muy poca solvencia moral [We know that by 
withdrawing the Union Delegation from the Congress, our collective was 
insulted by some comrades, who we thought were good, and by others who 
have very little character) [El Progreso, 1924, v1: 1]. 
Through questioning both the FOH's handling of the general strike and the 
organisation of the national congress, the SGOIF had partly alienated itself from 
other unions in Cuba. What may have been an effort to discredit the FOH had 
actually backfired and, instead, the credibility enjoyed by the SGOIF had suffered, 
especially in the eyes of the sugar workers, precisely one of the groups that Diez had 
planned to embrace in his aborted plans for a larger union. However, whether 
through strong convictions or stubbornness, the SGOIF could not be silenced, even 
though hostilities were exchanged between the FOH and Diez, who was labelled a 
traitor and a parasite by the local federation [EI Progreso, 1924: w1: 3]. 
In February 1925, at the Second National Worker Congress (SCON), Diez and Serra 
once again represented the SGOIF, indicating that they enjoyed the backing of the 
majority of union members and proving that their outburst at the previous meeting 
had not led to expulsion from the FOH. On'the contrary, both men were nominated 
to the Comisibn Dictaminadora (Consultation Commission), which was responsible 
for organisation and education, two issues close to the hearts of the SGOIF 
delegates. The Congress passed a resolution to work towards freeing Arias, Rivera 
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and Quirös, the SGOIF members accused of causing death by poisoning (see 
chapter 5). The delegation, however, still had a grievance.. When a resolution from 
the December Congress was read out for ratification, Diez and Serra complained that 
they considered two phrases to be offensive and asked that they be duly removed, 138 
to which Lopez replied that the resolution simply relayed what had been discussed 
previously. Once again, the SGOIF delegation asked that a motion proposed by 
them be read to the Congress, although, after having read the motion, Lopez decided 
that it in turn was offensive, an opinion that was not shared by all present: 
... las opiniones de los delegados se dividen, pues mientras que unos opinan 
que en la Mociön no hay ofensas, otros creen que si, siendo esto motivo de 
largos y acalorados debates por espacio de dos horas (the opinions of the 
delegates are divided, as while some believe that the motion is not offensive, 
others believe that it is, this being the motive for long and heated two-hour 
discussions) [Telleria Toca, 1984: 124] 
The debate, in fact, became so heated that the session was suspended until the 
following day. Although the phrases considered offensive were not omitted from the 
resolution, the SGOIF had once again upset the otherwise smooth running of the 
Congress. Later in the Congress, both Serra and Diez spoke at length about the 
organisational direction the CNOC should follow in order that it be successful, a 
direction presumably based along anarcho-syndicalist lines. 
When the CNOC was formally set up in August, the body agreed to fight class 
struggle through direct action, while collectively rejecting electoral action, like the 
SGOIF and FOH before it. As Telleria Toca observed °como era de esperarse, la 
idea anarcosindicalista fue la dominante" (as was expected, anarcho-syndicalism 
was the dominant idea) [Telleria Toca, 1973: 158]. Serra and Diez were once again 
put forward as SGOIF delegates to this Congress, now accompanied by Angel Arias, 
who had recently been released from prison and who, having been so intimately 
138 It is unclear exactly what had caused the SGOIF to complain. 
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involved in the boycott of La -Polar, addressed other delegates regarding the 
problems often encountered when -a product was boycotted. The Congress resolved 
to I intensify the long-running boycott of La Polar along with those of eight cigar 
brands. 
All three SGOIF delegates spoke at the closing meeting of the Congress on 7t' 
August alongside the tobacco worker Juana Maria Acosta139 and the printers Alfredo 
Lopez and Antonio Penichet. Despite previous run-ins with Lopez, Diez worked side 
by side with him throughout this congress, both men playing a prominent role. Thus, 
on the eve of the repression of the SGOIF, it shared an affinity with the FOH and the 
CNOC, both of which unreservedly supported the SGOIF in its struggle against La 
Polar. However, issues surrounding centralisation and industrial unionism had, at 
times, weakened unity, threatening to ostracise the SGOIF from other worker unions 
in Cuba. In the meantime, communism had entered Cuba. 
If Diez had worried that the FOH was too centralised, communism was even more 
so; and with the purge on anarcho-syndicalists in Cuba, and the SGOIF in particular, 
the ground that would prepare the way for communist penetration into the unions was 
clearing. The anarcho-syndicalist voices raised at-so many worker meetings would 
soon be silenced by the brutal repression, orchestrated by Machado. SGOIF 
delegates had spoken regularly at conferences held by the local and national 
Federations, in which the SGOIF had always been active. There was a distinct 
ideological link between the FOH, CNOC and SGOIF in 1925, as all, to some extent, 
aspired to anarcho-syndicalism, - although they failed to agree on the finer 
organisational details. That the same delegates were nominated to each of the three 
CNOC meetings (Diez and Serra, in particular), -indicates that. the constant 
139 Maria Acosta was the only woman present at the Congress, of which she was elected provisional 
president. 
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congressional disturbances instigated by these delegates truly reflected the views of 
the majority of SGOIF members. Complaints made by the delegation regarding 
offensive words and phrases used by those responsible for drafting CNOC 
resolutions may well have been attempts by the SGOIF to challenge the authority of 
the Confederation, although that seems to have backfired on the union. What is 
certain is that anarcho-syndicalism was the central ideology celebrated in these 
conferences and that the SGOIF, in turn, was one of the largest supporters of the 
ideology in Cuba. That the FOH and CNOC did not organise according to industry 
infuriated members of the SGOIF, Diez being the most vociferous spokesperson on 
this theme, while the failure of the general strike in late 1924 must have further 
convinced the union that the industrial unionism supported by it offered a solution to 
the apparent weakness of worker organisation throughout the island. After all, the 
SGOIF had strengthened considerably since its foundation in 1917, having gained 
the support of workers, women among them, in so many small-scale factories, an 
industrial expansion unprecedented in the Cuban labour movement. 
However, the union failed to promote industrial unionism in Cuba. This failure was in 
part due to its loss of credibility among members in the campo, partially blamed by 
them for the defeat of the general strike. This mistrust was exacerbated by 
representatives of the union, who publicly doubted the FOH's role in the doomed 
strike. The SGOIF did not seize the opportunity to become involved more fully in the 
organisation of the general strike and, through this, of the majority of sugar workers 
in Cuba. Maybe the union was not fully prepared to organise so many workers, who 
were employed in their thousands. Diez had intended to build a larger union that 
would embrace sugar workers but the SGOIF was compromised by its membership 
to the FOH, and union members, being so important financially to the general running 
of the FOH, may well have misjudged the power they held in the Federation. SGOIF 
suspicion surrounding centralist tendencies had also created rifts between the union 
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and the FOH. - Very soon, the push towards industrial. unionism and anarcho- 
syndicalism would be halted and the SGOIF would cease to exist. 
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Chapter 5 
Anarcho-Syndicalism and Direct Action as a Revolutionary Tool 
Types of Direct Action 
Marcel Van der Linden has questioned whether the importance of the ideology of 
revolutionary syndicalism has been exaggerated. In his opinion, analysis of the 
ideological - principles of the movement, although beneficial, is of secondary 
importance to the study of its organisational structure and its popularity among the 
workers themselves [Van der Linden, 1994: 101/2]. The essence of anarcho- 
syndicalism in particular, he argues, rests upon its ability to motivate the rank-and-file 
and on their reception and interpretation of it. He further suggests that the actual 
structure of unions, union subscriptions (and how these were spent) and the use of 
direct action play a pivotal role in the organisational study of a movement. The 
analysis of these factors should also reveal the popularity of a movement at shop 
floor level. 
An insight into anarchist-related unions can certainly be achieved by examining the 
type of direct action practised by workers and unions: the two are not 
interchangeable as workers often supported strikes and other forms of direct action 
initiated by unions of which they were not members, or else they joined a union only 
for the duration of a strike. Alfredo Bonanno has pointed out: 
The essential point of anarchist syndicalism was the concept of direct action, 
a logical consequence of their being apolitical (in the party sense), and of the 
spontaneity of the syndical organisation [Bonanno, 1998: 28]. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the outcome to be achieved through anarcho-syndicalism 
was two-fold and aimed to improve worker conditions in the present and in so doing 
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to educate and organise workers so that they would be well prepared for the 
imminent revolution. Rudolph Rocker explained: 
(The anarcho-syndicalist trade unions) have a double purpose: 1. To enforce 
the demands of the producers for the safeguarding and raising of the 
standard of living; 2. To acquaint the workers with the technical management 
of production and economic life in general and prepare them to take the 
socio-economic organism into their own hands and shape it according to 
socialist principles [Rocker, 1973: 31]. 
For the revolution to triumph, anarcho-syndicalism promulgated direct action through 
trade unions, which often involved strike action. Partial strikes were regarded as 
preparatory ground for the General Strike which, it was assumed, would bring about 
the permanent collapse of the existing political system. In the meantime, other 
revolutionary tools were used in order to raise awareness among the workforce, to 
encourage solidarity and to allow the workers to voice their discontent. Such 
weapons included the boycott, the label14° (the reverse of the boycott) and sabotage. 
It was believed that these tactics would both ensure immediate improvements and 
help prepare workers. This chapter will illustrate that direct action (strikes, boycotts 
and sabotage) used by the anarcho-syndicalist SGOIF was a major determinant 
(though not the sole factor) in both the closure of that particular union and in the 
eclipse of anarcho-syndicalism by communism in Cuba. 
Strike! 
The use of the strike as a revolutionary tool was seen by supporters of anarcho- 
syndicalism to be the true expression for the voice of proletarian discontent. The 
strike could help workers to fight on the two fronts so favoured by anarcho- 
syndicalists, considering that a successful strike would afford material benefits, while 
140 The label, a positive boycott, whereby a stamp informed consumers that a product had been made 
by organised workers, was little used in Cuba. It appears to have been reserved for well-established, if 
less radical, unions such as the AFL in USA and Union General del Trabajo in Spain. (See Alonso, 
1928: 243). The SGIOF proposed the introduction of the label at the Second National Worker Congress 
in February 1925 and its future use was agreed by the CNOC. 
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acting as a revolutionary training ground. In fact, no strike could be wholly 
unsuccessful, even if the immediate benefits were not secured, as it would still have 
the effect of fomenting solidarity and awakening the workers to revolutionary action. 
Furthermore, strikes gave an automatic voice to those brandishing it as a weapon, 
through which the workers became responsible for their own actions, while such 
expression of solidarity helped to illustrate vividly their position. Thorpe has termed 
the strike "the ideal weapon" of the syndicalists, and the weapon which, for them, 
held the greatest significance in the worker struggle (Thorpe, 1989: 20). The 
preparatory value of the strike was not underestimated by supporters and any partial 
victory through strike action acted as a "temporary armistice" rather than a "peace 
treaty" for the workers, affording them a degree of success and a more solid ground 
on which to continue the fight for emancipation (Ridley, 1970: 105). The triumph of a 
given strike, therefore, lay not solely in immediate benefits achieved but also in the 
educational development of the working class. 
Organisers of the SGOIF realised that a strike forcing employers to concede worker 
demands would arouse the strikers' sense of achievement and draw new members 
to union ranks. After all, if a few days without pay (assuming the strike was short- 
lived) secured better working conditions, then surely others would notice these 
benefits and be more willing to join the union and, in turn, declare further strikes. This 
action, it was hoped, would cause a domino effect of strike-new members-strike, and 
so on. 
"Las huelgas ya no son huelgas" noted one writer in El Progreso "son la misma 
Revoluciön Social que llama a gritos la transformaciön de los pueblos" (Strikes are 
no longer strikes, they are the very Social Revolution that calls loudly for the 
transformation of society) [EI Progreso, 1921, g: 1 ]. In a bid to promote the 
revolutionary potential of strike action, the periodical regularly reported on strikes 
nation-wide, and those staged by SGOIF members in particular. Internationally, 
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strikers usually demanded better conditions (shorter working days, higher wages and 
union recognition), 'and in Cuba, SGOIF strikes that secured such demands were well 
publicised, acting as a recruitment drive for the union. In one edition alone, no fewer 
than six, triumphant strikes in factories producing various goods were detailed, 
alongside newly declared strikes in pasta factories [EI Progreso, 1924, d1, I]. 
Workers at the pasta factory Productos Cubanos had vacated their positions for two 
months, due to the owner's refusal to recognise the right of workers to organise, and 
so the news of so many success stories, it was hoped, would give hope to those 
pasta producers who, after all, had not received wages for weeks. 
Strike funds were collected for SGOIF members who faced prolonged strike action, 
while sympathy strikes were commonplace, when producers belonging to the same 
branch of the union supported one another; for example those employed in factories 
making biscuits, came out on strike in support of fellow striking biscuit workers. 
Employers would sometimes work a step ahead of the union and exercise lockouts at 
factories that produced similar products to other factories where workers were 
already on strike. When workers at the soft drink factory, La Habanera, petitioned 
the company for improved conditions, they were locked out of the factory, without 
being given . the opportunity to declare a strike. Collusion amongst employers 
resulted in a spate of lockouts at all soft drink companies, inasmuch as any worker 
organised by the SGOIF was refused entrance to the factory and their place was 
filled by non-affiliated members (or strike-breakers, according to the SGOIF) [E! 
Progreso, 1925, x. 1]. It had been precisely the threat of unified employer action that 
had spurred the SGOIF to organise along industrial lines and to engage in warfare 
backed by a larger army. After all, if the employers consulted one another, so should 
the proletariat form a stronger bond, it was reasoned. 
Analysis of El Progreso shows that solidarity strikes (strikes in support of action by 
other unions) were not normally practised by SGOIF members, the union preferring 
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Instead to cultivate Its own base first, before extending solidarity to non-related 
unions"'. That many other unions did not aspire to anarcho-syndicalism, and none to 
Industrial unionism, may have been a factor for SGOIF unwillingness to rally 
members to strike In solidarity with them. Instead support was offered through the 
boycott, an action that showed solidarity with tobacco workers, for example, without a 
loss of members' wages, while preserving strike action for personal, more-tangible 
benefits, 
Strikes staged by SGOIF members were exclusively non-political, that is they waged 
war on employers rather than the state. The union did not petition the government in 
a bid to transform workers' rights; there was no demand for a country-wide eight hour 
day for all workers regardless of trade, for example. The union's anarcho-syndicalist 
position opposed any political system and so It never attempted to lobby politicians in 
the struggle for better conditions. Although the union had to gain strength through 
popularity, it did not pursue it at any cost, refusing to betray the anti-politics common 
to all strains of anarchism. Strikes declared by SGOIF members were fought on an 
economic front, tackling employers at base level, since a striking workforce did not 
produce goods, hurting the bosses financially. However, for a strike to fully halt the 
wheels of a particular industrial branch, more than a partial cessation of work needed 
to be Imposed and the SGOIF could never guarantee that all workers would support 
strikes, Furthermore, It could not prevent the bosses from enlisting strike-breakers 
from the ranks of the under-employed or unemployed (see below). 
o Gcncra nka 
If partial strikes were reckoned to be one of the most effective anarcho-syndicalist 
tools, the General Strikt was considered the ultimate revolutionary act. In a general 
"' One exception to Its was the Intention to join the General Strike In support of sugar workers in 1924, 
see below. 
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strike, all producers In every Industry (or as many as possible) would cease work, 
although just what the strike would achieve depended largely on the Ideology of 
unions and their members. Ridley pointed out that the more reformist unions 
understood that the strength of the General Strike lay In its ability to persuade 
governments and/or employers to accede to strikers' demands through legislation. 
Ana rcho-syndica lists, on the other hand, believed such treaties to be extremely short- 
term and limiting, preferring to use the General Strike as a truly emancipating act 
(Ridley, 1970: 141). The advent of a well-prepared general strike, It was hoped, 
would be the first step in the expropriation of the means of production by the workers 
and would usher In the revolution. Rocker certainly believed In the might of the 
collective cessation of work when he stated: 'It Is the most powerful weapon which 
the workers have at their command and gives the most comprehensive expression to 
their strength as a social factor' (Rocker, 1973: 39). 
The coming together of workers throughout Cuba was almost realised in late 1924, 
when a great many unions pledged to orchestrate a general strike in support of sugar 
workers in Camaguey. In September, workers in Cruces staged a successful strike, 
after which company bosses agreed to increase wages by ten percent and to 
recognise the right of employees to associate. Aiming to duplicate that victory, 
workers at the Moran sugar mill called a strike but were denied the right to unionise. 
Instead, a wave of repression was unleashed on strikers, in particular at the Pi(a mill 
at Morbn at which EI Progreso strongly protested: 
Un gnto de dolor. de desesperac16n, nos Ilega de Moron. AIII la sangre 
proletarla ha tefido el pavimiento de las calles ... AIR hay un pueblo bajo el terror del sable militar, bajo la dictadora brutal del Sr. Ponce, administrador 
del Central 'Pina', que ordenb el desalojo en masa do las trabajadores y sus 
tamilias (A cry of pain and desperation has reached us from Moron. More, 
proletarian blood has dyed the streets.... Thorn exists a community under tho 
military sword, under the brutal dictatorship of Mr Ponce, director of 11,0 Pita 
mill, who ordernd the mass removal of workers and their families) (El 
Progreso, 1924, j 1: 1 J 
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The, periodical urged solidarity with these displaced and repressed workers and 
before long train drivers in Camaguey became involved in the dispute. The Union de 
Obreros del Ferrocarril del Norte de Cuba (North of Cuba Rail Workers' Union) 
refused to ferry anything to those mills involved in the atrocities, while helping to 
relocate the 42 families of sugar workers, evicted from their homes by employers for 
voicing opposition to the sackings of striking workers [EI Progreso, 1924: 11 and n1]. 
Likewise, workers at the Tarafa port struck, refusing to deport foreign workers, 
resulting in the forced closure of their union headquarters and leading to the arrest of 
union members [EI Progreso, 1924, s1: 1]. 
Strikers began to confront the repression and, according to Chapman, conservative 
periodicals of the day accused workers of destroying up to 25,000 arrobas of sugar 
cane, which came as no surprise, he observed, as the sabotage of sugar plantations, 
through burning, was an easy option [Chapman, 1927: 630]. As the repression 
spread to plantations in Cespedes in Camaguey, where more families had been 
ejected from their homes and more arrests were made, EI Progreso reported that "los 
huelguistas han jurado, que si no se reconoce sus derechos de asociaciön, Cuba 
sera un desierto sin plantaciones que moler" (the strikers have sworn that if their 
rights of association are not recognised, Cuba will be a desert with no plantations left 
to mill) [El Progreso, 1924, s1: 11. - jTierral detailed the cruelty of the company bosses 
toward the workers and urged the downtrodden to retaliate, assuring them that "la 
fuerza solo puede repelerse con la fuerza" (force can only be repelled by force) 
(ITierra!, 1924, e: 2]. 
Repression of sugar workers continued, appearing to receive the full support of 
Zayas' government while non-worker periodicals condemned strikers, accusing them 
of destroying national wealth, to which jTierra! replied that the wealth accrued from 
sugar did not help to support the island nor the majority of its inhabitants but was 
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concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie [ITierra!, 1924, g: 2]. However, reported 
EI Progreso, the government had now shifted from inactive observer of repressive 
measures to protagonist, protecting not only capital in general but, more specifically, 
foreign capitalist interests. Sugar workers: 
Se ven atropellados y vejados por las autoridades cubanas, puestas 
incondicionalmente al servico de las grandes empresas americanas (are 
being trampled underfoot and harassed by the Cuban authorities, 
unconditionally at the service of the large American companies) [El Progreso, 
1924, s1: 1]. 
The unrest in the interior would have been worrying to the US companies who had 
poured millions of dollars into the sugar industry in Cuba, an investment that the 
Cuban government was keen to see protected. Strikes were staged at a propitious 
moment for the workers, the uprising taking place on the eve of the cane-cutting 
season when labour was in great demand. Furthermore, solidarity with the sugar 
workers was immense throughout the island, acting as a trigger for discontent nation- 
wide as unions in the cities and countryside alike planned to -stage a supportive 
general strike, in opposition to company and government repression. Combined, 
these factors unnerved both company bosses and the government who increased 
repression, serving only to anger workers into organised resistance. 
On 21St November 1924, a meeting was held at the Centro Obrero in Havana "Ante el 
dilema planteado por la represiön del Gobiemo" (Facing the dilemma posed by 
governmental repression) [El Progreso, 1924: r1]. Worker organisations present at 
the meeting agreed to be ready for a general strike and each union was to set up a 
fund to help the strikers and their families. A Congress was planned for 14th 
December to discuss the way forward for the workers of Cuba "en estos momentos y 
en el futuro" (now and in the future) [EI Progreso, 1924, s1: 1 ]. 142 
142 This meeting resulted in the formation of the FOH 
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However, before the meeting took place, a deal was reached between the 
Camagüeyan strike committee and the Government, in which it was agreed that an 
arbitration committee be set up consisting of five representatives: two from the 
Sindicato de Trabajadores de Ingenios (Sugar Workers' Union), two from the 
Asociaciön de Hacendados y Colonos de Cuba (Association of Mill Owners and 
Planters) and one from the Government. The Government promised that the 
committee would investigate the charges of worker mistreatment while sugar and 
train strikes were called off. Thus, the General Strike was aborted, infuriating radical 
elements in El Progreso although jTierra! was less scathing. Some demands had 
been met, it contended, presumably referring to the fact that at least one union was 
now being recognised: 
Si para los trabajadores no ha sido un completo fracaso para Zayas ha sido 
un triunfo absoluto y resonanate (If, for the workers, it has not been a 
complete failure, for Zayas it has been an absolute and tremendous triumph) 
[ITierra!, 1924,1: 1] 
It did, however, concede that: 
Fue Como un vaso de agua fria arrojado sobre (Ia protesta)...... ha sido 
liquidada esta situaciön, la mfis importante y trascendental que en Cuba se 
ha presentado en las luchas proletarias (It was as though a glass of cold 
water was thrown over [the protest]....... The situation has been eliminated, 
the most important and momentous situation that the proletarian struggle in 
Cuba has faced) [I Tierra! 1924,1: 1]. 
The SGOIF hoped that rather than completely quelling unrest, the deal was simply a 
temporary truce and once the findings of the committee were made public, the 
workers would again rise up and the General Strike would succeed. The union tried 
to soften the blow to morale, taking the line that any strike boosted solidarity and 
helped prepare the proletariat for future struggles, besides: "entre la clase capitalista 
y la clase trabajadora no existen intereses comunes" (no common interests between 
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the capitalist class and the working class exist) [EI Progreso, 1924: v1]. The struggle 
would not finish, it maintained, until all, workers had been organised by industry. 
Members of the SGOIF were not happy with the outcome of the strike, contending 
that the proletariat had not been sufficiently prepared to carry out a general strike. 
Writing seven months prior to the planned strike, A. Moyano observed that it was 
necessary for an all-out strike to sweep the country very quickly [EJ Progreso, 1924, 
q: 1]. Ridley has pointed out that, although a general strike must be sudden, certain 
conditions are necessary if one is to be successful, namely a strike fund is needed, 
propaganda must be carried out and it must be well prepared, ensuring co-ordination 
and support [Ridley, 1970: 144]. Furthermore, key federations and unions must 
participate. In December 1924, transport workers (trains and docks), vital to the 
running of the country and for the transportation of Cuba's principal export, sugar, 
became involved in the dispute. The strike was also supported by a myriad of unions 
in Havana, through the FOH, and so it seems that there was no lack of support 
among key workers. The FOH tried frantically to promote the strike to ensure its 
success but, as the SGOIF pointed out, the workers were not ready for such action. . 
Members of the manufacturers' union had been struggling for years to associate, 
whereas many in Cuba had not, and the sugar workers, in particular, had not yet 
been federated into one union, a problem that industrial unionists within the SGOIF 
hoped soon to rectify (see chapter 4). 
The SGOIF understood the importance of the General Strike but felt the time was not 
yet ripe. Workers were encouraged to prepare for such instances by regularly 
staging partial strikes that were ordinarily coupled with well-publicised boycotts of 
goods made in those factories where strikes had been declared. 
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The Boycott 
At the 1898 Rennes congress, the French revolutionary syndicalist union the 
Confedederation Generale du Travail (CGT), first discussed the use of the boycott as 
a revolutionary tool [Mitchell, 1990: 28]. Thereafter, the boycott, along with sabotage 
and the label, was accepted as a viable weapon in the fight against the ruling class 
and was adopted throughout the anarcho-syndicalist world [Thorpe, 1989: 20]. Its 
implementation, it was hoped, would constitute part of that preparatory ground in 
which the workers would build a common bond, a sense of "us against them". It 
formed part of direct action, which helped forge worker solidarity. After all: 
A small improvement achieved by'one's own effort is worth more, in its effect 
on morale - materially too, in the long term - than a large scale reform 
granted by government or capitalists for doubtful ends or even out of the 
"kindness of their hearts" [Malatesta, Umanitä Nova, 06/04/1922]. 
Boycotts were certainly held up as an example of worker cohesion as it was part of 
that popular struggle which benefited the revolutionary cause, bolstering solidarity, 
while being employed as a pressure tactic against bosses in particular [Van der 
Linden, 1994: 111]. The refusal to buy a given product, as well as giving voice to the 
discontented producer/consumer, pressurised the employer into conceding to worker 
demands. According to the worker leader Hilario Alonso, the boycott was a valuable 
tool against oppression, although in Cuba, he believed, it had been abused, being 
depended on far too frequently [Alonso, 1927: 248]. 
Indeed, during the early twentieth century, worker unions in Cuba wielded the boycott 
on countless occasions. It had been written about in jTierra! as early as 1902, 
although it enjoyed its heyday during the mid-1920s. The cafe, restaurant and hotel 
workers brought the boycott to the forefront of their own struggle against employers 
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during the 191 0s. In La Voz del Dependiente (1907-1911) and El Dependiente (1911- 
1918), the practicality of all forms of direct action was detailed, and readers were 
informed of those boycotts being operated at any particular time. 
One of the earliest examples of worker boycotts in Cuba was the curious boycott 
exercised against certain railway trains in 1909. Ironing staff on trenes de lavado 
(trains with a washing service) had declared a strike in an attempt to secure higher 
wages and, as a result, the authorities had reportedly stormed trains, injuring twenty- 
five workers and arresting sixty. As a result, trains that normally employed those 
workers now in prison were shunned as were those belonging to companies that had 
refused to increase starvation wages [La Voz del Dependiente, 1909, b: 2]. This case 
is unusual in that workers enforced a consumer strike on a commodity so rarely used 
by the general populace at that time as to render the boycott futile. 
Boycotting had been most advantageous when the (type of) product ostracised was . 
ordinarily used every day by the " populace. In early twentieth century Cuba, 
passenger carriages were seldom, if ever, used by the proletariat, as Cuban railroads 
mainly served private investment, usually transporting sugar between plantation, mill 
and dock. Thus the (non-)consumer had very limited bargaining power with the train 
company or owner. In defence of the boycotting workers, though, this appears to 
have been a one-off situation and subsequent consumer strikes would target 
"boycottable" goods. 
Van der Linden has pointed out that boycotted goods should be easily identifiable: "it 
is easier to boycott pre-packaged goods than items without brand names" [van der 
Linden, 1994: 112]. They should also be replaceable, so consumers need not 
sacrifice the type of product. completely. After mistakes made, Cuban workers 
applied this rule in their fight for union recognition, improved conditions and higher 
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wages. The most popular products boycotted (from around 1912) were specific 
bottled beers, soft drink and cigarettes, as such products could be identified without 
problem; they were non-essential products and could be easily replaced with other, 
similar brands. Interestingly, El Dependiente seemingly failed to appreciate the irony 
of promoting boycotts against particular alcoholic beverages while disseminating the 
anarchist ideals of temperance and healthy living and, throughout the 1910s, the 
periodical printed weekly advertisements selling beer, spirits, wine and cigarettes. 
Indeed, "capitalist" adverts may have been the reason for the rare longevity of the 
periodical, providing the funds necessary for its very survival and it is probable that, 
needing to attract workers to the cause, anarchists had, in part, to compromise their 
ideals. The desire to further solidarity through a boycott of Tropical beer for example, 
contradicted anarchist articles in the same paper concerning the evils of all alcohol 
[El Dependiente, 1912, a and b]. Concessions of this type have led to a string of 
attacks against unionism, whether anarchist-led or not. Non-syndicalist anarchists, 
such as McGowan, have declared that the very nature of anarcho-syndicalism (i. e. 
trade unionism) is fatal to the survival of anarchism. In a bid to draw as many 
workers as possible to its ranks, a union will eventually lose its anarchist identity, 
although to remain true to anarchist principles, its disciples "must exercise a 
revolutionary influence by keeping an uncompromising position" [McGowan in 
Bonanno, 1998: 3]. 
Boycotts in Cuba were often simultaneous with strikes. In most cases, unsuccessful 
strikes (i. e. those where bosses refused to surrender to demands) metamorphosed 
into worker boycotts, which often tended to not, only complement strikes but to 
replace them, attracting the support of workers who wished to demonstrate their 
discontent and camaraderie by means other than the, more direct strike action route. 
The sheer volume of boycotts exercised in Cuba must point towards their popularity 
although their success rate is somewhat dubious. Attitudes surrounding the boycott 
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of La Polar beer, for example, may have been the trigger for the eventual downfall of 
anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba. What does seem certain is that company 
bosses/administrators would not be dictated to by employees. 
A Case Study: The Boycott of La Polar Beer 
Mäs cop/as ineditas de Zorrilla143 
Si eres obrero consciente 
Y la causa to interesa 
No dejes de BOYCOTEAR 
De la Polar la Cerveza 
Si acaso ves a Zorrilla 
Dile que estä fracasado 
Porque tienen tarabilla 
De la FABRIL los soldados 
Fijate en lo que to digo 
Que ello es lo que mäs anhelo 
Que no tomes nada frio 
De la Polar con hielo 
Si ves algün rompe-huelga 
Que trabaje en la Polar 
Formale pronto la GUERRA 
No to vaya a deg radar 
Jüzgate tü por ti mismo 
Y tambien por el ajeno 
No tomes de la Polar 
Porque sirve de veneno 
Serenate y cosidera 
Que la HUELGA has de ganar 
Sonandole al rompe-huelga 
Que trabaja en la Polar 
(More Unpublished Verse about Zorrilla //If you are a conscientious worker/ And the 
cause interests you/ Do not fail to BOYCOTT/ Polar beer// If you happen to see 
Zorrilla/ Tell him that he has failed/ Because they are a dead loss/ The FACTORY 
soldiers// Take heed of what I say to you/ That which I desire the most! Is that you do 
not drink anything cold/ From la Polar with ice// If you see some strike-breaker/ Who 
works in la Polar/ Tell him swiftly that the WAR/ Is not going to degrade you// Judge 
143 Emerterio Zorrilla was the administrator and owner of the Compaßla Cervecerla, the company to 
which La Polar beer belonged. 
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for yourself/ And for others/ Do not drink la Polar/ Because it poisons// Be quiet and 
consider/ That you have to win the STRIKE/ Be heard by the strike-breaker/ Who 
works at la Polar) [El Progreso, 1921, t: 1]. 
The above poem appeared in El Progreso on November 23,1921, just one month 
after the strike at La Polar brewery had been declared. The strike made way for a 
worker/consumer boycott of La Polar brand of beer, a bitter obsession that lasted 
almost 4 years, one that led to death, expulsions and imprisonment and that was 
partly responsible for the downfall of the SGOIF. In the opinion of Cordova, the 
demise of the union and public anger surrounding its use of direct action were very 
much contributory factors in the weakening and eventual collapse of anarcho- 
syndicalism in Cuba [Cordova, 1997: 140]. In order to determine the importance of 
the La Polar case in the decline of the SGOIF, this study will follow the trajectory of 
the strike/boycott, drawing information from a number of sources, both pro- and anti- 
boycott. 
The Cause of the Strike 
In October 1921, dozens of brewery workers laid down their tools at La Polar factory 
in a demand for better working conditions. According to the reformist worker monthly 
Aurora, the strike began over a dispute for Sunday overtime. Reportedly, workers 
throughout the industry had acceded to a cut in pay although the Companla 
Cervecera (CCIa), owners of the factory, had agreed to award the employees double 
pay for any hours worked over the standard 48-hour week. However, as brewery 
work was a continuous process, the 6-day week began as soon as work 
commenced, i. e. if an employee started his week's work on Saturday, he would finish 
that week on Thursday, having Friday free. In this instance, Friday would be, for that 
worker, the day that double pay would come into force and Sunday was treated as a 
normal working day for which the overtime rule did not apply (unless Sunday 
194 
happened to fall on the worker's day off). The employers had not been clear on this 
point and so the brewers assumed that they would receive extra wages for Sunday 
work. Also, the cut in wages introduced at La Tropical factory had been less severe 
than that at La Polar. The union resented such treatment and sent an ultimatum to 
the CCfa, which refused demands, leading to the declaration of a strike among 
associated members at the factory [Aurora, 1923: d]. 
As with many other branded names, the strike quickly evolved into a boycott of La 
Polar beer by the SGOIF. Through El Progreso, the SGOIF relentlessly propagated 
the boycott and endless verbal, and sometimes physical, confrontations ensued. 
Sabotage: the Poisoning of La Polar beer 
The boycott at La Polar was a long, drawn out affair, the union refusing to 
compromise and the CCia declining to meet demands, although Emeterio Zorrilla, 
administrator of the CCla, did approach the SGOIF at their headquarters at Zulueta 
37. Zorrilla requested that the union send a commission to La Polar factory in an 
attempt to resolve the conflict, a request that SGOIF leaders refused [El Progreso, 
1923j: 1 ], adamant that demands be met in full, stubbornness perhaps related to fear 
that a failure at La Polar would result in irreparable damage to the union. 
During 1922, a bomb was placed at the home of Zorrilla for which the black Cuban 
Margarito Iglesias (sometimes Secretary General, sometimes vice-Secretary General 
of the SGOIF, but always a major figure in the union) was held responsible [AN 
390/11694: 89]. The grandson of slaves and a native of Pinar del Rio, only in his 
mid-20s at the foundation of the SGOIF, Iglesias was labelled aggressive by the daily 
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press and was known to the police as a dangerous anarchist. U4 However, Iglesias 
was acquitted of the bombing through lack of evidence and he continued to play a 
leading role in the union. 
According to Cordova, other bombs were also placed on company premises 
[Cordova, 1997: 140]. The SGOIF was accused but the allegations were vehemently 
denied through El Progreso, which insisted that the union was being framed and that 
the CCfa was aiming simply to discredit those members of the union they believed to 
be key figures. Such dirty tactics would fail, however, as: 
.... tantos y tantos miles 
de trabajadores (que) en Cuba laboran y laborarän 
incansablemente hasta que la "Polar" desaparezca o se rinda" (... thousands 
and thousands of workers fight and will fight tirelessly until La Polar 
disappears or surrenders) [El Progreso, I 923, i: 1 ]. 
The SGOIF continued to accuse the company and their allies, the government and 
the secret police, La Porra, of conspiring to harm fatally the reputation of the union. 
The battle became bloodier when bottles of beer bearing the boycotted label of La 
Polar appeared on the market laced with poison. Allegedly, Angel Arias Trillo, Luis 
Quirbs Presa and Eduardo Rivera, all prominent members of the SGOIF, bought four 
bottles of La Polar beer from Cafe Arena in the Havana district of Vedado. One of 
them then took the purchase to a car and swapped one of the bottles of beer with 
another laced with strychnine. The poisoned bottle was then returned to the cafe and 
exchanged for a bottle of mineral water. A young Spaniard, Luis Gomez Lopez, 
consumed the contaminated beer the following day and he died instantly. The same 
1 44 El Heraldo, 18/071924, cutting found in AN, 390/11684: 81. The periodical stated that'su secretario, 
el cklebre y agresivo Margarito Iglesias, ha sido acusado por la policla de dcrata y pemicioso" (its 
secretary, the famous and aggressive Margarito Iglesias, has been accused by the police of being an 
anarchist and dangerous). 
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procedure was apparently followed at Cafe Japön where two consumers, Pablo 
Navarro Torres and Domingo, Martinez, . were 
intoxicated, although the effects were 
not fatal [La Lucha, 03/10/1924: 3]. Before long three well-known members of the 
SGOIF were arrested. The news of the arrests of Quirös, Arias and Rivera was first 
broken in El Progreso on 3rd January, 1924. The periodical declared that the three 
prisoners had been framed: they had previously been persecuted and accused of the 
placing of a bomb at the home of the deputy chief of police, Senor Delane. The 
charge was unfounded. EI Progreso claimed that the three SGOIF comrades were 
"victimas inocentes de infames,, venganzas de la burguesia" (innocent victims of 
infamous bourgeois vengeance), [EI Progreso, 1924: a] and denounced the poisoning 
as a "crimen bärbaro, crimen monstruoso" (barbarous crime, monstrous crime), [EI 
PrQgreso, 1925, g: 1] -, I 
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The Strike Committee insisted that Zorrilla had targeted the men specifically, alleging 
that the brewery was on the verge of bankruptcy as a direct result of the boycott 
imposed by the SGOIF and that, through blind panic, the company administration 
had contaminated its own product. Thereafter "Emeterio Zorrilla, en la imposibilidad 
de encarcelar a todo ei proletariado de Cuba decide declarar responsable a los 
camaradas Arias, Riviera y Quirös' (Faced with the impossibility of jailing the whole 
of the Cuban proletariat, Emeterio Zomlla decided to declare our comrades Arias, 
Riviera and Quirls responsible), [EI Progreso, 1925, b: 1]. According to the periodical, 
he then paid police, judges and the press to help to convict the workers. 
On numerous occasions, however, state correspondence maintained that the three 
workers were indeed the protagonists of the poisoning. Aurelio Acosta, Chief of the 
Secret Police, informed the Governor of the Province of Havana that "el sabotaje es 
empleado por los directores de ese Sindicato, con una naturalidad pasmosa 
(sabotage is employed by the leaders of this Union with an astonishing naturalness), 
[AN, SGOIF: 110. ].. Indeed, the three men had been both longstanding members of 
the union and active in the promotion of the boycott. Arias, Quirös and Rivera were 
all Spanish workers known to the Cuban authorities. Although it had apparently been 
proven that Angel Arias possessed Cuban citizenship, he had previously been 
expelled from the island under the Menocalato and transferred to prisons in Spain 
and her possessions, Fernando Poo and Cabo Jubi. After some years under the 
Spanish penal system, Arias returned to Cuba where he was noted for "su actuacibn 
en los grupos anarquistas, y mäs aün, su incensante campar a de agitacibn en las 
masas obreras... ' (his conduct in anarchist groups and more still, his incessant 
campaign of agitation among the workers), [El Progreso, 1924: il]. Such action led to 
his persecution by the authorities and ultimately jail. By the admission of El 
Progreso, Arias was one of the most ardent propagandists of the boycott at La Polar 
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[El Progreso, 1924,1: 1]. 145 Quirts was, at the time of the poisonings, Secretary of the 
union in which both he and Rivera had been members since its foundation and, 
according to Amadeo Perez, a member of the men's defense committee, they 
possessed even more influence than Arias in the struggle of the union and "su 
actividad en la propia lucha de la "Polar" no ha sido igualada" [Their activity in the 
"Polar" boycott has not been equaled], [El Progreso, 1924, i1: 1]. The men could not 
be convicted of the crime, he went on, as there had been no witness to the deed. 
Cordova has suggested that workers did, in fact, tamper with the ingredients of La 
Polar beer due to union dismay at the failure of the boycott [Cordova, 1997: 140]. 
Certainly, El Progreso did capitalise on the poisonings, using the sub-standard 
product as pro-boycott propaganda. In September 1924, for example, the periodical 
urged its readers to "I! BOICOT a la Cerveza POLAR, por ser hecha con rompe- 
huelgas y estar envenenada! I". (BOYCOTT POLAR beer, as it is made by strike- 
breakers and is poisoned) (El Progreso, 1924, g1: 1]. The article then went on to 
warn, in English, that "Drinking? (sic) POLAR beer means death" . 
140 The guilt of 
Arias, Quirös and Rivera was never proven and the men were eventually freed, 
public support for them having been formidable, according to the periodical. 
Released on 10'hMarch 1925, the accused had spent over a year in police custody 
and during that time endless propaganda was printed in El Progreso in support of 
them. A Comite de Defensa y Propaganda (Committee of Defence and Propaganda) 
was formed within the SGOIF: "para esclarecer la criminal infamia que le quieren 
imputar a nuestra organizaciön ya nuestros camaradas presos" (to clear up the 
criminal infamy that they wish to pin on our organisation and on our imprisoned 
comrades), [El Progreso, 1924, k: 2]. Throughout the campaign to free the men, large 
145 Arias died on 20/08/1947, then an active member in the PCC, [see IMSHRC, a, 1985: 202] 146It is possible that this warning appeared in English in a bid to attract the attention of consumers from 
the USA of whom there was an influx in the midst of US prohibition. 
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collections were made at various breweries, soft drink and bottling factories, where 
workers belonging to the SGOIF made generous contributions. During the early 
period of the collections, weekly amounts in excess of $1,000 were raised; a sizeable 
sum considering that the average daily wage earned in a drink factory was 
approximately $3.147 
In addition, protest meetings were staged each week in various parks around the 
capital. 148 Editions of EI Progreso proudly printed photographs of such 
demonstrations to show the extent of public support for the SGOIF prisoners. Also, 
the anarchist group El Sembrador hosted a soiree in Havana, raising $103. 
However, the protests were not limited to Havana and before long "vibrantes y 
numerosos mitines" (vibrant and well-attended meetings) were being held in 
Camaguey, Moron, Caibarien, Sagua la Grande, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos and 
Victoria de las Tunas [EI Progreso, 1924: o]. In the city of Santa Clara, a pro-prisoner 
demonstration reportedly lasted for two days [El Progreso, 1924, t: 2]. In Regla, a 
suburb of Havana, a protest meeting resulted in clashes between workers and the 
police, although the SGOIF maintained that the workers were provoked into 
retaliation by an administration that was so profoundly worried at the growing 
strength of the union, especially considering the solidarity display by hundreds of 
workers [El Progreso, 1924,0: 3]. 
However, it is evident that popular backing began to wane as the months passed. In 
September 1924, EI Progreso reported that a meeting held in support of the accused 
at Parque Jesüs Maria in Havana had been poorly attended. The boycott was 
entering its fourth year and the prisoners were soon to be threatened with the death 
147 In the first to weeks of the collection $1,033 and $1,259 was raised, respectively. See EI Progreso, 
1924: a. 148 For example, well attended meetings were held in Havana on 23 January, 7 February, 9 February, 
16 February and 1 March. 
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penalty or 35 years imprisonment. By this time, emphasis had shifted from the 
boycott and its "victims" (although the case was still covered by El Progreso) to the 
wider, national worker struggle; in particular the fate of rural workers and the use of 
direct action at numerous sugar mills dominated both the worker press and solidarity 
protests. It seems likely that fellow workers, and by extension the general public, 
were becoming disillusioned by the longevity of La Polar boycott and by its failure to 
generate positive results. 
Despite the apparent flagging enthusiasm for the case, EI Progreso continued to 
publicise the men's plight. The accused were frequently compared to the two Italian 
anarchists awaiting trial for murder in Boston, through slogans such as "Sacco, 
Vanzetti, Arias, Quirös y Rivera son inocentes' (Sacco, Vanzetti, Arias, Quiros and 
Rivera are innocent) [El Progreso, 1924: q1]. Neglect of the dispute would have 
admitted defeat at a time when the union still hankered after industrial unionism. 
Covering the trial of the alleged contaminators in February and March of 1925, EI 
Progreso reported that Alfonso Luis Fors, 19 the Chief of Judicial Police, "(D)ijo poco 
mäs o menos que Arias, Quirös y Rivera han sido los colcadores de todas las 
bombas que han estallado en el continente americano desde que Colon tuvo la feliz 
idea de descrubrirlo" (He more or less said that Arias, Quirös and Rivera had placed 
every bomb that had ever exploded on the American continent since Columbus had 
had the great idea of discovering it), [El Progreso, 1925, e: 1]. They were accused of 
being "terribles anarquistas..... monstruos.... destructores de instinto de cielo, mar y 
tierra" (terrible anarchists... monsters ... 
bom destroyers of the sky, sea and earth) [El 
Progreso, 1925, e: 1]. Despite such denunciations by the authorities, the three 
members of the SGOIF were acquitted and EI Progreso was jubilant as it gloated that 
"una vez mäs ha triunfado la razön y la justicia" (Once more reason and justice have 
149 El Progreso referred to Fors as 'el Nick Carter criollo, con mas Cara de bobo que de otra Cosa' (the 
creole Nick Carter, with more of a fool's face than anything else) [EI Progreso, 1925: e]. Nick Carter 
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triumphed) [El Progreso, 1923: f]. "IMANTENGAMOS EL BOICOTI" (We will continue 
the boycott! ), cried the periodical [El Progreso, 1925, h: 1 ]. The boycott continued. 
Propaganda and Support 
For almost four years El Progreso urged workers and readers of the periodical to 
boycott La Polar beer and other products made by Compania Cervecera (e. g. Agua 
Gaseosa San Francisco). Phrases such as "NO TOME CERVEZA POLAR" QUE 
ESTE BOYCOTEADA; ES ELABORADA POR ROMPE-HUELGAS"150 (Don't drink 
Polar Beer as it is boycotted; it's made by strike-breakers) and "iIBOICOT!! a la 
cerveza POLAR (y) al agua SAN FRANCISCO..... " (Boycott!! Polar Beer (and) San 
Francisco Water) were regular weekly features in the worker periodical [El Progreso, 
1924: n1 and 1923: i, respectively]. Reference to the boycott appeared continually 
and updates were published, while any union communication with the CCia was 
reported and commented upon, and the attack on Zorrilla gained strength with the 
passing, frustrating months. 
A Strike Committee was formed at Puentes Grandes. Created by members of the 
SGOIF, the Committee naturally displayed wholehearted support for the strike at La 
Polar. 
Este Comite de Huelga moverä todo lo que hays que mover para triunfar, los 
companeros de las distintas Fdbricas que componen nuestro Sindicato, 
cooperan con nosotros con todos los medios a su alcance para hacer bajar la 
cerviz a aquellos que creyendonos pequenos se atrevieron a jugar con 
nuestro honor. (The Strike Committee shall do all that it must in order to 
triumph; comrades in the various factories that make up our Union will 
cooperate with us by every means possible, to bring into submission those 
who, believing us be insignificant, dare to play with our honour) [El Progreso, 
1921, t: 1]. 
150 Written in upper case in original version. 
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The Strike Committee promised the strikers at La Polar that they would receive the 
cooperation of all SGOIF union members, a figure that they reported to be around 
4,000 [El Progreso, 1924: v and w]. Beside the support of members of their own 
union, the strikers at La Polar could rely on the solidarity of unions throughout the 
country. Early on in the campaign, El Progreso reported that the boycott had 
received the backing of unions in Santiago de Cuba, Cienfuegos and Camaguey, 
from workers employed in a wide range of trades [EI Progreso, 1921, u: 1]. 
According to Hilario Alonso, the boycott was indeed a popular success, albeit one 
that he understood to be misleading. Fiercely against the boycott of La Polar, Alonso 
said of it: 
Quisose convirtirlo en nacional y se enganb con el (sic) a toda la ciase obrera 
de Cuba de una manera ignominiosa, particularmente a los trabajadores de 
provincias, que desconocedores de lo que ocuria alrededor del mismo y del 
poco caso que le hacian los trabajadores de la Habana, no radicales, que 
concoclan los secretos de 61, prestaronse a darles oldo a los excursionistas 
que peribdicamente solian recorrer la Republica, alentandolo y propagändolo, 
a fin de hacer el caldo gordo a todos los que vivian del boycot de 
referencia.... '(Wanting to make it national and so shamelessly deceiving the 
whole of the Cuban working class, especially the workers in the provinces, 
who were unaware of what surrounded the boycott or of the fact that the non- 
radical workers of Havana, who knew of its secrets, did not pay heed to it, 
they listened to the excursionists who periodically toured the Republic, 
encouraging it and propagating it, in order to make life easier for those who 
were making a living from the mentioned boycott [Alonso, 1928: 247]. 
This statement unequivocally illustrates that Alonso viewed the SGOIF as deceitful, 
and the workers of the interior as gullible and unaware of working-class issues. The 
fact that sugar workers had previously fought for benefits in the mills and factories 
along anarchist lines and would continue to do so, especially in 1924, contradicts 
Alonso. Workers did possess a political consciousness, one that had, for years, been 
manifested through trade union membership and/or anarchism, for which they had 
suffered persecution by the authorities. Neither is his view that the workers of 
Havana, outside the SGOIF, were against the strike at La Polar entirely true. 
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Unions throughout Havana swiftly responded to the call for solidarity in direct action 
against the CCia. The FOH which had only very recently been formed, announced 
itself a supporter of the boycott of La Polar just days, after it was declared in 
November 1921 and its Committee took the boycott seriously. A FOH flyer 
promoting a cultural evening added a postscript reminding workers to boycott La 
Polar and Agua de San Francisco [FOH, 22] while action was taken by the FOH 
against those worker unions that refused to collaborate. Through its organ, Aurora, 
the Union de Dependientes de Cafe broke the code of the boycott when it advertised 
the prohibited La Polar beer in its pages. The FOH promptly expelled the union from 
its ranks [IMHRSC, b, 1985: 351], also castigating the Union de Vendedores (Sales 
Union) during the summer of 1923 because of defiance of what Aurora labelled "el 
maldito boycot a la cerveza 'Polar'" (the cursed boycott of La Polar beer) [Aurora, 
1923: b]. 
In, November 1924, El Progreso admitted that, although many organisations had 
supported the boycott, the financial, crisis of 1921 and 1922 had demoralised the 
worker movement and so the boycott had not had the desired outcome during that 
time. - However, the periodical continued, the economic situation in Cuba had 
improved during 1923 and according to El Progreso, worker organisation 
strengthened at around that time and with it the effectiveness of La Polar boycott [El 
Progreso, 1924: gl]. Furthermore, such dedication and solidarity by the workers had' 
served to damage the interests of the CCfa, insisted El Progreso [El Progreso, 1924, 
q l: 2]. 
Despite such optimism, the boycott of La Polar did attract hostility. Besides the 
constant bickering between Aurora and El Progreso, anti-boycott sentiment appeared 
elsewhere, as in July 1924 when rail workers held a banquet in the grounds of La 
Polar for the purpose of celebrating the successful outcome of a rail strike. The 
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reformist railworkers union, La Hermandad Ferroviaria de Cuba (HFC), denied official 
involvement in the banquet, stating through the periodical E/ Heraldo that they had 
not wished to exacerbate the already high tensions between those workers who 
supported the boycott and those who did not [El Progreso, 1924, b1: 2]. It remained, 
however, that some workers did work in the factory gardens, perhaps indicating that 
not all workers favoured SGOIF tactics. 
Anti-boycott sentiment was not limited to reformist unions, the Government and 
company loyalists. The orthodox anarchist periodical Acciön Consciente did not 
support the boycott on the grounds that the factory produced beer and that they, 
being orthodox anarchists, felt compelled to boycott all alcohol. They asked, 
"l, Tenemos nosotros la culpa que estos miles de obreros y companeros no 
produzcan algo de mas utilidad para todos? " (Is it our fault that these thousands of 
workers and comrades do not produce something of more use to all? ) [Accidn 
Consciente, 1922, a]. A strand of the moralistic anarchist tradition of the 1910s (see 
Chapter 2) was still evident, albeit to a lesser extent. Acciön Consciente would only 
survive a few editions, presumably selling too few copies to continue production. 151 
Anarcho-syndicalism had surplanted anarchism in Cuba. In the meantime, anti- 
boycott (and so anti-anarcho-syndicalist) propaganda and action was not only 
growing outside the industry, but was also evident within it. 
Strike-breakers and Parallel Unions 
In its 3 April, 1924 edition, El Progreso published an article under the heading 
SINDICATOS CATOLICOS [El Progreso, 1924, m: 1]. The piece informed of a 
Catholic strike-breaking union being formed at La Polar brewery, an amalgam of 
151 In the last known copy of the periodical, the editorial team complained of lack of funds, stating that it 
would have to cease production if no financial help was acquired. Only twelve copies went to print. 
(Accibn Consciente, 1923: g]. 
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Government-funded anti-labour agitators, a small church group and, curiously, an 
anti-clerical and rationalist federation. 
The Union Nacional del Trabajo (UNT) was formed on 30 May 1922, three weeks 
after the meeting of Havana unions and the consolidation of the FOH [Montejo 
Arrechea, 1976: 40]. In the wake of the FOH Congress, the Government had 
founded the UNT in an attempt to confuse and weaken the labour movement in 
Cuba. According to Felipe Zapata, a well-known SGOIF traitor and subsequent 
editor of Machado's pseudo-worker periodical Acciön Socialista, the UNT was the 
joint brainchild of the Cuban priest Padre Paco and of the founder of the Academia 
Catölica de Ciencias Sociales (Catholic Academy of Social Sciences), Dr Mariano 
Aramburu [Unidad Gastronömica, 1950: a]. In order to broaden the appeal of the 
UNT, Aramburu employed known worker leaders Juan Jose Sabates and Alfredo 
Padrbn to head the Union. Both men, however, were neither Catholic nor pro- 
Government. Zapata described Sabates as being Marxist, atheist and anti-clerical 
and Padrön as a semi-anarchist, semi-Marxist, anti-clerical Mason . [Unidad 
Gastronömica, 1950: a]. Despite seemingly radical leanings, the appointed UNT 
leaders understood the necessity of attracting support for the evolving union and, 
rather than attempt to infiltrate the ranks of existing organisations, such as the FOH 
or the SGOIF, decided to recruit members who might help to combat these 
predominantly anarcho-syndicalist unions in Havana. 
In contradiction to their principles, the Secretary of the UNT, Padrön, and its 
President, Sabates, headed a UNT propaganda meeting at the conservative and 
Catholic Congregaciön Mariana Obrera (CMO), which was also formed in 1922. The 
CMO headed by Padre Camerero, was: 
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Una instituciön ostensiblemente confesional y catölica, estrechamente regida 
canbnicamente por su Consilario esclasiästico: esas particularidades 
chocaban violentamente con la formaciön mental anarquista y anticlerical de 
las masas obreras cubanas (An ostensibly confessional and Catholic 
institution, rigidly and canonically ruled by a church Council. Those 
characteristics clashed violently with the anarchist and anticlerical education 
of the Cuban working masses) [Unidad Gastronömica, 1948, a: 1] 
The CMO never flourished, and would die along with Padre Camerero in 1929. 
Perhaps the reason for its failure lay in the collective radical mind of the working 
class. In Brazil, a predominantly Catholic country, popular Catholic belief was 
contrary and at times hostile to the anticlericalism of anarchist worker leaders [Wolfe, 
1991: 818]. In Cuba, however, the population was decidedly less Catholic, so more 
readily responded to the iconoclasm disseminated by anarchists. As a result, 
Catholic worker groups in Cuba were short-lived. The UNT had professed their 
Catholic faith at two meetings with the CMO, whose sole organ, Boletfn Official de la 
Anunciata, praised the UNT, calling it: 
... una Agrupacaciön Obrera que pretende unir a todos los trabajadores de la Republica que aspira a su regeneraciön mediante los principios salvadores 
del Cristianismo (a worker group which is trying to unite all those workers 
throughout the Republic, which aspires to - its regeneration through the 
salvation of Christianity) [Unidad Gastronömica, 1950, a] 
Despite this overt appreciation of the UNT, Padre Camerero, determined to maintain 
the independence of his Congregation, did not join its ranks. The UNT was not 
deterred by that decision and, instead, searched for support elsewhere. 
By 1924, the boycott of La Polar and the strike at its factory had become a matter of 
some concern both for the CCIa and the Government: under Machado, the 
Government went on to persecute the union (see below). Perhaps for this reason, 
the UNT became involved in organising strike-breakers at the La Polar factory. It is 
curious, however, that a- recently formed anti-clerical group, the Federacibn 
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Anticlerical Cubana (FAC), should join forces with the Catholic UNT in its attempt to 
bring the strike to a conclusion. 
The FAC was founded in April 1924. It boasted the prominent Marxist student and 
future founding member of the Cuban Communist Party, Julio Antonio Mella, as its 
President, and the well-known anarchists Antonio Penichet and Adrian Del Valle as 
members of the Committee. The initial position of the FAC certainly appeared to have 
been wholly anticlerical. Article One of its Statutes declared: 
La Federaciön Anticlerical Cubana es una asociacibn cuyo fin primordial lo 
constituye la defensa de los principios liberales que rigen en los pueblos 
libres civilizados y la necesidad de contrarrestar en todos los campos que 
sea necesario, la labor en cuanto sea funesta del clero catblico romano (The 
Cuban Anticlerical Federation is an association whose primary goal is built 
around the defense of the liberal principles that govern free and civilized 
societies and shall, wherever necessary, undo the doomed work of the 
Roman Catholic Church) [AN, FAC, 5]. 
Factions of the FAC, however, did not follow these guidelines and, from its 
foundation, the federation supported strikebreaking tactics at La Polar. The 
aforementioned ex-anarcho-syndicalist and, by 1924, reformist member of the cafe 
workers' union, Hilario Alonso, was Secretary of the FAC. Alonso had exchanged 
endless hostilities with El Progreso, particularly concerning the La Polar boycott. In 
the April 3'd edition of EI Progreso, he was accused of approaching CCIa President, 
Zorrilla, reportedly asking him to allow the strike-breakers at the factory to organise 
under the banner of the UNT. El Progreso failed to understand how the FAC could 
have permitted such behaviour and urged the Federation to investigate the matter (El 
Progreso, 1924, m: 1]. 
It appears that the Federaciön Anticlerical Cubana was a misnomer and its Statutes 
were entirely misleading. By May 1925, all trace of anarchist or Marxist membership 
of the Federation had disappeared, although Alonso remained on the Committee and 
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was joined by the Government employee and enemy of the radical elements in, the 
labour movement, Juan Arevalo. According to El Progreso, both Arevalo and 
Alonso, along with fellow amarillistas Sabates and Zapata, had helped to organise 
the newly denominated Sindicato Industrial de Cuba (SIC), an entity made up of 
strikebreaking elements at La Polar factory and supported by the administration of 
the CCfa. The paper attacked these men for their betrayal of the working class, 
using them to illustrate that only such traitors would dare defy the union and its 
boycott of La Polar. 
The SIC had splintered from the UNT in January 1925 "por considerarlo 
suficientemente capacitado para gobernarse por si solo" (considering itself 
sufficiently able to govern itself) [AN, SOIC: 4]. It was set up to counter the disruption 
caused at La Polar factory by the SGOIF and, like its adversary, the SIC was based 
in Puentes Grandes. The union aimed eventually to organise precisely those 
industrial workers who had been attracted to the SGOIF, including beer, chocolate, 
sweet and paper producers. However, the union's close relationship with employers 
appears to have limited its popularity among workers as, even after the demise of the 
SGOIF (and so in the absence of any other entity to represent workers in the 
manufacturing industry) the SIC struggled to gain support. In a letter to the Governor 
of the Province of Havana, SIC administration admitted that, due to a falling number 
of members, it could no longer afford to pay rent on its premises (AN, SOIC: 15). 
With the demise of the SGOIF, perhaps the main role for which the SIC was originally 
founded, to run the SGOIF into the ground, had -ceased to exist. The push to 
organise workers in the manufacturing industry had thus lost its urgency for the SIC, 
which then became an invalid enterprise with nothing to fight against. In any case, in 
addition to illustrating the weakness of the SIC, the fact that workers did not flock to it 
emphasises the strength of the SGOIF. The SGOIF did not attract the support of 
workers simply because it was the only option available to them, but it appears that 
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its members really did share the union's radical outlook, as they were willing to join 
an openly anarcho-syndicalist union but not to a famously reformist one that began 
life as organiser of those who, it had hoped, would help to break SGOIF strikes. 
Although the SGOIF tried to discourage strike-breaking, El Progreso did not verbally 
attack those acting as strike-breakers. Nor did it advocate violence against strike- 
breakers, although, on at least one occasion, there were reports of aggressive 
behaviour by union members. At La Polar beer factory, it was reported that a strike- 
breaker, one Ferreiro, had been threatened with a gun to his head if he did not quit 
his post. The incident was dismissed by the SGOIF as, it pointed out, the report 
came from a dubious source -a letter penned by the much maligned and frustrated 
company boss, Zorrilla. [El Progreso, 1923, j: 2]. Periodically, however, writers in El 
Progreso did attempt to demoralise strike-breakers while simultaneously advertising 
union strength, in a hope to both halt work and attract potential new members. In 
November 1921, a list of strike-breakers was published in El Progreso, a ploy that 
aimed to name and shame "scab" labour and to deter further anti-strike action [El 
Progreso, 1921, t: 2]. 
Rather than completely alienating potential allies, the periodical ordinarily did not 
place the blame on those workers struggling to make ends meet (even the strike- 
breakers had demanded higher wages [EI Progreso, 1924, g: 1]. ) They were seen to 
be the pawns of the organisers, and more vitriolic attacks were launched upon those 
responsible for the counter-organisation of industrial workers, the employers and the 
likes of Alonso, Arevalo and Zapata. Instead, workers were encouraged to join 
forces with the union: 
Decidle a vuestro amo que ya es hora que reconozca que es muy pequeno 
para luchar contra la solidaridad proletaria (tell your boss that now is the time 
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that he realises that he is too small to fight against proletarian solidarity)(El 
Progreso, 1924, s: 2]. 
The end of the strike-boycott was due neither to waning support for the boycott, the 
strength of strike-breakers nor SGOIF weakness. The fight against La Polar factory 
and any goods made by the Compania Cervecera came to a definite close as a 
result of the persecution of the workers during the early Machadato (see below, this 
chapter). Direct action in support of the boycott contributed-to the Government's 
intolerance of the union and all it stood for, although it was by no means the sole 
cause of concern on the part of the Government. Sabotage, boycotts, strikes, 
murder and demonstrations for which the SGOIF were reportedly responsible were 
seen as a threat to order in Havana (other instances of revolutionary action taken by 
the union are discussed below). The study of the La Polar boycott illustrates the 
determination of the workers employed in the manufacturing industry in their struggle 
against the injustice experienced by the workers at the hands of just one company. 
The boycott was well supported by workers throughout the country (see above), and 
there is little evidence to suggest that the public was ever outraged by SGOIF 
behaviour. The opinion that the Cuban masses were against this direct action is 
derived from a study of the bourgeois and reformist worker press that wished to give 
the impression that the boycott was weak and unpopular. 
For its part the SGOIF continued to state its case a week after the governmental 
decree of 16 September 1925 to suspend the manufacturers' union. Continuing the 
fight, the last issue of EI Progreso reminded its readers "NO SOMOS 
ENVENENADORES" (WE ARE NOT POISONERS) [EI Progreso, 1925, t: 1]. 
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Anarcho-Syndicalist Use of Sabotage and Violence 
"Sabotage means to push back, pull out or break off the fangs of capitalism" 
confirmed "Big Bill" Haywood, a leading syndicalist organiser of the US branch of the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and propagator of direct action. Syndicalist 
elements of the IWW were ardent propagators of the use of sabotage in the run-up to 
the General Strike and the subsequent demolition of the state. In its attempt to 
promote a mimetic "one big union" in Great Britain, the London based Industrial 
Worker traced the roots of the tactic: 
The term "Sabotage" is derived from the old and widespread habit of 
oppressed and badly paid workers, acting on the principle of "Poor or slow 
work for low wages" to deliberately lessen the quantity and quality of their 
products [Industrial Worker, 1913, a: 1]. 
This definition of sabotage, however, was overshadowed by the use of spontaneous 
acts of violence and the wrecking of property and/or products by anarcho-syndicalists 
world-wide. David Miller explained: 
Sabotage was advocated as a way of harassing the employer without loss of 
pay, and as a means of preventing him from importing blacklegs to break a 
strike [Miller, 1986: 126]. 
Workers were encouraged to use sabotage to air their grievances without, it was 
hoped, endangering their position as producers. However, Alfredo Bonanno has 
questioned whether the use of sabotage by workers could always be considered 
revolutionary as, in his opinion, the tactic can only be defined as anarchist depending 
on the conditions surrounding its use. He argued that, to be revolutionary, sabotage 
must be spontaneous. When acted out through union orders, on the other hand, it 
could never be anarchist in nature as anarchism allowed the workers themselves to 
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decide when the time was ripe for action and what -form that action should take 
[Bonanno, 1998: 40]. 
Spontaneous worker action involving sabotage was exemplified on Cuban railroads 
in 1924. The HFC, founded in Camaguey, was reformist, although not all railworkers 
shared the union's dedication to collaboration with employers. In February 1924 the 
sacking of two hundred railway employees following their participation in 1st May 
demonstrations resulted in the "21 days strike". Acts of sabotage ensued: fights 
broke out between strikers and strike-breakers, while dynamite was used in an 
attempt to destroy bridges. A telegram sent by the acting British Charge d'Affaires in 
Havana informed London of a: 
... strike on Cuban railroads which is now assuming alarming proportions 
owing to acts of violence. Brigadier Gen. Jack Manager of British Railway 
was shot through the head yesterday evening and is in grave danger. 
Have urgently requested Government to grant all protection possible to British 
personnel and property and suppress incitements to violence [FO 371/9538: 
A3223]. 
The following day, a second telegram reported that the Cuban Government had 
deployed troops to quell the unrest, and had even suppressed the local newspaper at 
the insistence of the British Consul [FO, 371/9538: A3561]. Mr Jack lived, although 
he resigned from his post. Aurora declared that some members of the HFC were 
"reformist" while others were "revolutionary". One such revolutionary was the 
anarcho-syndicalist leader Enrique Varona (see below). An organiser of rail and 
sugar workers in Moron, Camaguey, Varona constantly fought with members of the 
HFC committee in a bid to employ direct action over arbitration, although it is certain 
that the union would not have officially advocated violence as a means of reinstating 
workers. In fact, under the Machadato, in an attempt to polarise the movement, 
some leaders became agents of the police and the bourgeoisie. Thus, if this 
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sabotage was employed by workers and not by "secret agents", the attacks appear to 
have been, by Bonanno's definition, truly revolutionary acts. 
The union most often accused by the Cuban authorities of illegality and the use of 
violence was the SGOIF. Through E/ Progreso, the union certainly advocated the 
use of violence in the war against capitalism, although whether it "ordered" workers 
to carry out specific attacks remains unclear. The union unequivocally considered 
sabotage to be a valid response to capitalism, but if SGOIF members were 
responsible for terrorism in Havana (as opposed to police agents) were they acting 
on their own initiative? 
A Violent Means to a Peaceful End? Brewery Workers Wreak Havoc in Havana 
On 21 August 1921, the Governor of the Province of Havana informed his superior152 
that a criminal investigation into the SGOIF had not borne fruit, as no detection of 
"foul play" by the brewers' union had been made and so no decree against the union 
could be issued [AN, 390/11694: 56]. Six months earlier, Rogelio Cavames, an 
inspector with the Policia Especial (Special Police) had relayed his own findings on 
the union to the Provincial Secretary. He had visited union headquarters in order to 
verify claims that SGOIF members had been the protagonists of threatening 
behaviour towards factory owners. Reportedly, some brewery workers had warned 
employers that, unless they agreed to workers' demands, lawless tactics would be 
used against them (he failed to specify the nature of these tactics or the concessions 
sought) [AN, 390/11684: 46]. 
152 In the Sindicato (General) Obrero de la Industria Fabril records, Registro de Asociaciones at the 
Archivo Nacional de Cuba, correspondence often appears between the Gobemador de Provincia de la 
Habana (Governor of the Province of Havana) and the Secretario de Gobemaci6n (Secretary of State). 
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Cavames " believed that union conduct contradicted Article 9 of the Ley de 
Asociaciones (Law of Association) and Articles I and 5 of the Ley. de Reuniones 
Püblicas (Law of Public Meetings). However, after an inspection of the minutes book 
and the members' register and having interviewed various people, he found no 
apparent evidence of failure to adhere to public law. Despite this semblance of 
order, the authorities kept a watchful eye over union activities, inducing the SGOIF to 
continually accuse the police of persecution of the union, its members and workers in 
general. 
In November 1920 the anarchists Antonio Penichet and Marcelo Salinas, not 
members of the SGOIF, were arrested and sentenced for three months for "el 
imaginario delito de coacciön en una fäbrica de gomas" at Puentes Grandes, 
Marianao... (the imaginary crime of conspiracy at a tyre factory.. ) [EI Progreso, 
1920: e]. Supposedly, the seditious meeting had led to the explosion of various 
bombs in parts of Havana. Salinas and Penichet were threatened with the death 
sentence for the dissemination of their radical views but, warned El Progreso, "... con 
ahorcar a Penichet ya Salinas, las ideas no mueren ni se lesionan en lo mds 
minimo" (Hanging Penichet and Salinas will not kill the ideas nor hurt them in the 
slightest) [El Progreso, 1920, e: 1 ]. 153 
In August 1921, the periodical reported a further 21 arrests (including, 
uncharacteristically, that of a woman, Ramona Penabad). The imprisoned were 
either part of El Progreso's editorial team or SGOIF-associated factory workers or, it 
is supposed, both. They had been detained as: 
... un petardo en las calles de la Habana, y la rotura de algunos vidrios, con 
su formidable estampido, colmö la medida para justificar al parecer un 
periodo de inicua violencia contra hombres de determinadas tendencias 
153 The two men were eventually freed. 
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ideol6gicas (...... a small explosion in the streets of Havana and the breaking 
of a few windows, with its formidable bang, seems to have justified a period of 
iniquitous violence against men of certain ideological tendencies) [El 
Progreso, 1921, n: 1]. 
For the next four years, until its final suppression in September 1925, El Progreso, 
insisted that it had never been the instigator of any violence in Havana. Union 
members, it maintained, were simply the product of authoritarian victimisation. It is 
interesting, therefore, that just a fortnight before the above article, the headline on 
Page One of El Progreso screamed "Queremos la paz, pero estamos preparados 
para la guerra" (We want peace but we're prepared for war)" [EI Progreso, 1921: I]. 
"Hot off the press" news revealed that since consumer prices for beer and soft drink 
had recently been lowered, it followed that the wages of workers employed in the 
industry should also decrease. Despite the SGOIF's refusal to accept a drop in 
wages, the Nueva Fdbrica de Hielo cut pay to 1919 levels and other companies 
looked set to follow suit. The SGOIF were ready to fight, although according to El 
Progreso, the union only combated such unjust treatment by their employers with 
strikes and boycotts while the secret police planted the bombs that would justify the 
imprisonment and deportation of union members. 
Notwithstanding such claims, EI Progreso could not be said to deter violence, as the 
very first issue in 1920 clarified: 
... para el enemigo, armado y dispuesto a vencernos, debemos armarnos, 
para que as[ Ia lucha sea mds o menos equilibrada; para la tirania de arriba 
la tirania de abajo " (... to face the enemy, armed and ready to defeat us, we 
must arm ourselves, so that the fight is more or less equal; for the tyranny 
from above, tyranny from below) [EI Progreso, 1920, a: 1 ]. 
and, it concluded: 
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Ante un ejercito, aunque inferior en nümero, no se puede jr a pretender 
vencerlo, desarmado. (Before an army, although we are inferior in size, we 
cannot try to defeat it unarmed) [El Progreso, 1920, a: 1 ]. 
On the one hand, the periodical accused the powers-that-be of harassment and 
maltreatment, while on the other it propagated anti-authoritarian behaviour and 
openly declared itself to be anarchist: 
iSi, Soy Anarquista! 
El gobiemo y la burguesia, con la cohorte de mercenario de la pluma y la 
detritus social - los esbirros y los chotes (sic) - se han puesto de acuerdo 
para eliminarnos, encarcelandonos arbitraria - (sic) e injustamente, 
acusändonos de innumerables delitos que no hemos cometido. 
Ya sabeis, jSoy anarquista! Z, Quereis evitarlo? jHacedlo! Pero no lo evitareis 
encarceländome. 
(Yes I'm an anarchist! / The government and the bourgeoisie, together with 
the mercenary, who uses his pen, and the social scum - the informers and 
the parasites - have agreed to eliminate us, arbitrarily and unjustly 
imprisoning us, accusing us of innumerable crimes that we have not 
committed/ You already know, I am an anarchist! Do you want to avoid this? 
Do it! But you will not avoid it by throwing me in jail) [El Progreso, 1920, a: 1]. 
As the use of violence spread so did the apportioning of blame, although E! Progeso 
was outwardly convinced that conspiracy between the authorities and the 
bourgeoisie had been responsible for the sabotage of this boycotted product. 
Hilario Alonso seemed convinced of the culpability of the SGOIF in its use of 
sabotage and violence: 
De todos son bien conocidos las demasias del °Sindicato Fabril" que se 
queria imponer el terror, no solo a los patronos ya las autoridades, sino 
tambien, a los mismos obreros, que no compartian sus ideas. (Everyone 
knows of the excesses of the Manufacturers' Union that wished to impose 
terror, not only on bosses and the authorities, but also on those very workers 
who did not share their ideas) [Alonso, 1928: 260]. 
It must be borne in mind that, at the time of this work, (written in 1925, but not 
published until 1928) Alonso was heavily pro-Government. In fact, he dedicated his 
book, El Problema Social, to General Machado, the President who, in his role of 
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Minister of the Interior, had been responsible for working-class repression as early as 
1910, and who would ultimately repress the SGOIF into oblivion, helping to destroy 
anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba. Therefore, the reliability of Alonso's testament must be 
questioned. He was a "parasitical" amarillista, accused by the SGOIF of being a 
government employee, in collusion with bourgeois elements of society. 
Doubtless, reformist union members wished to rid Cuba of its radical elements in 
order to gain a stronger foothold within the labour movement and in particular, the 
amarillistas aimed to discredit the SGOIF. However, condemnation of the use of 
violent direct action stemmed not only from pro-governmental entities but also from 
fellow libertarians. Acciön Consciente denounced the use of the direct action so 
favoured by anarcho-syndicalists. The periodical was pacifist and believed violence 
to be counter-revolutionary. Unlike EI Progreso, the periodical was short-lived, '' a 
fact that helps to illustrate the predominance of anarcho-syndicalism as the radical 
worker ideology. in Cuba. Acciön Consciente was used as an educational tool for 
moralistic anarchism rather than as a means to spur workers into action against their 
oppressors. It propagated naturism, vegetarianism, and free love, while condemning 
the Bolsheviks, violence and any form of centralised worker organisation. Of 
sabotage, someone writing under the pseudonym of Le Vieux declared: 
En nuestro concepto ei empleo del sabotaje no es obra revolucionaria, ni ütil, 
ni moral, y salve en algunos raros ocasiones, su aplicaciön es muy poco viril" 
(In our opinion the use of sabotage is not a revolutionary act, it is neither 
useful, moral and, except in rare cases, its application is not very manly) 
[Acciön Consciente, 1922, a: 1]. 
Whether or not the SGOIF was responsible for the majority of violent attacks 
committed in 1920s Havana, as it stood accused, the fact remains that it was "el 
organismo mäs combativo de esta etapa" (the most combative organism of this era) 
154 El Progreso, on the other hand, survived five years of regular print and eventually folded, not due to 
unpopularity but government suppression. 
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[Palez Groba, ý 1991: 631.155 Through its mouthpiece, the union regularly declared 
itself to be anarcho-syndicalist, an ideology that certainly saw the use of sabotage as 
a means to achieving a state-free society. Refusal to admit itself party to violent 
occurrences in the capital was, probably more to do with self-preservation than 
wishing to express condemnation of the tactic. 
The Bombing Campaign" 
When, in 1923, numerous bombs exploded in Havana, fingers pointed to the SGOIF. 
An inventory of lawsuits filed against the union included no fewer than five infractions 
of the Ley de Explosivos, all committed within just a few months. The Chief of Police 
was convinced that the detonations were "verdaderas manifestaciones terroristas, 
siempre bajo la direcciön del SGOIF" (true terrorist protests, always under the 
direction of the SGOIF) [AN, 390/11694: 89]. A bomb placed at Zorrilla's home led to 
the arrest, and subsequent release, of the prominent SGOIF member, Margarito 
Iglesias. Denying any role in the planting of the bomb, El Progreso suggested that 
Zorrilla himself was responsible for the sabotage of his own company products (fig. 1 
shows him fleeing a bomb explosion at the abandoned La Polar factory, while a mass 
of workers bear witness to his treachery). 
During a strike against the Compania Papelera Cubana, a bomb exploded at the 
home of the Deputy Secret Police-in-Chief. On the front page of EI Progreso, under 
the headline °ACUSAMOS (WE ACCUSE) [EI Progreso, 1923,01: 1], the editing 
team protested worker innocence: 
La bomba que expiotb dias pasados en una Casa del segundo Jefe de la 
Policia Secreta, ha sido como fueron las de Puentes Grandes y uHabana- 
Madrid" viles recursos de la policia para poder ensanarse con determinados 
155 Palfiez Groba referred to the 1917-1925 stage of the Cuban labour movement. 
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trabajadores que luchan sin descanso para ilustrar a las masas y hacerles 
comprender la indignidad de este regimen de violencia y miseria.... (The 
bomb that exploded a few days ago at a house of the second chief of the 
secret police was, like those at Puentes Grandes and 'Habana-Madrid, vile 
means by the police to enable them to teach a lesson to those workers who 
fight tirelessly to enlighten the masses and to make them understand the 
indignity of this regime of violence and poverty) [El Progreso, 1923, o1: 1]. 
The explosion at "Habana-Madrid" cited above referred to the placing of two bombs 
at the "Habana-Madrid" cafe. Workers at the Companla Cigarrera Cubana (Cuba 
Cigarette Company) [CCC] had been on strike and the SGOIF agreed to support 
workers by means of a boycott of CCC products. At the time of the blast, a number 
of strike-breakers employed by the company were at lunch at the cafe. Serious 
injuries occurred among them and the SGOIF was held responsible. Likewise a 
bomb placed at the cigarette factory La Competidora Gaditana drew the attention of 
the authorities, and once again accusations were directed towards Puentes Grandes, 
the home of the SGOIF. Aurelio Acosta, the Chief of Secret Police, had no doubt as 
to the identity of the authors of a planned countrywide bombing campaign: 
Este Sindicato (SGOIF), dirigido por expertos agitadores, se inmiscuye en 
cuantos conflictos obreros existen en todo el temtorio de la Republica (This 
union, headed by expert agitators, meddles in whatever worker conflict exists 
in the whole of the Republic's territory) [AN, 390/11684: 110] 
Acosta labelled the accused a "nefasto group" (evil group) that still had a large 
quantity of explosives to hand and, if they had not yet been deployed, it was: 
... precisamente por la estrecha vigilancia que les tiene establecida 
la Policla 
y nunca por falta de deseos (... precisely due to the strict vigilance that the 
Police has subjected them to and never due to lack of desire) [AN, 
390/11694: 110] 
In September, 1925 the Government would use these damning police reports as the 
basis for the final suppression of both the SGOIF and El Progreso. Added to the 
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charges of sabotage, sedition, bombings, " poisonings and generally causing public 
unrest, the union was accused of the greatest sin of all: murder. 
Tyrannicide: the Killing of Don Felipe Femändez y Diaz Caneia 
Early in January 1925, Felipe Fernandez y Diaz Caneja, the Director of Ambrosia 
Industrial biscuit factory and President of the Centro Castellano de la Habana was 
fatally shot on the comer of Flores and Agua Dulce in the neighbourhood of Cerro in 
Havana. The factory was the workplace of a number of SGOIF members who had 
previously instigated strikes, complaining of maltreatment, lack of hygiene and low 
wages, strikes backed by the union. Worker demands were usually met by the 
company but, on the eve of Machado's accession to power, a strike in the biscuit 
department of Ambrosia Industrial ended in cold-blooded murder. 
On 20 December 1924, an SGOIF member, Marcelo Navarro was made redundant 
by the ill-fated Femändez y Diaz Caneja "por causas de economia" (for economic 
reasons) [AN, 390/11684: 90]. Two days after the sacking, the SGOIF declared a 
strike against the Ambrosia Company. Twelve other workers, all union members, 
were subsequently laid off by the director. The factory boss had therefore 
transformed the protest into a lockout and, although the SGOIF stubbornly insisted 
that it was still exercising a strike against the company, in reality their declared action 
made little difference to the company's production and regular output continued. 
Apparently, the union felt ridiculed by the fact that strike action had not had the 
desired outcome and that its struggle was effectively being ignored. The company 
did eventually agree to reinstate the workers, but union success was secured at the 
highest price. Fernandez y Diaz Caneja was already dead and the police were 
convinced of SGOIF's complicity in the killing of the company boss: 
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... Ia muerte violenta del Senor Felipe Fern6ndez y Diaz Caneja ...... es el producto de un acuerdo de la direcciön de dicho Sindicato (the violent death 
of Senor Felipe Fernandez y Diaz Caneja ..... is the product of an agreement by the leadership of the aforementioned union) [AN, 390/11684: 90]. 
Four members of the SGOIF were initially accused of his murder. The Cubans Julio 
Herrera y Ortega and Margarito Iglesias y Oven and one unnamed Spaniard were 
arrested for conspiracy to murder, while the Andalusian Jose Rodriguez y Villar was 
charged with the act of firing the fatal shot. The two Cuban "aggressors" were 
arrested on the basis of a conversation overheard by one Estela Vega. The young 
worker had reportedly been at SGOIF headquarters at no. 869 Calzada del Cerro, 
when she heard Iglesias tell Herrera that "se encargarfa acabar con Don Felipe" (he 
would be entrusted to "do away with" Don Felipe) [AN, 390/11684: 90]. An involved 
and active member of the SGOIF, Iglesias had been subject to police arrests on 
numerous occasions. As always, he escaped conviction and was released within a 
matter of days. As regards Herrera, the deceased had informed police that he had 
been in daily contact with him as an employee and union delegate. Furthermore, 
Herrera had been spotted in the vicinity of Flores and Agua Dulce at around the time 
of the assassination. 
A 24-year-old from Huelva, Jose Rodriguez y Villar was seen fleeing from the scene 
of the crime and, after pursuing him, the police conducted a body search, uncovering 
"la pistola disparada" (the pistol that had been used) and bullets [AN, 390/11684: 90]. 
Despite such incriminating evidence, El Progreso professed his innocence, declaring 
that he was simply scared and therefore ran. Not having been an employee at 
Ambrosia, he had no reason to detest, let alone kill, its director, it maintained. In any 
case, the SGOIF was still in the educational and propagandist stages of the 
Revolution, it insisted, and the shooting had nothing to do with the union. The 
situation was "lamentable" but: 
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... ei atentado es una expresiön de la venganza individual. Cuando se 
generaliza, recibe ei nombre de revoluciön armada, y en esto no han 
pensado aun nuestras instituciones. (The attack is an expression of individual 
vengeance. When it becomes general it is called armed revolution, and our 
institutions have not even considered this). (El Progreso, 1925, d1 j. 
The SGOIF argued that for this reason the union was still in existence and that the 
survival of the organisation depended on its innocence in such violent matters. 
Interestingly, the periodical reported the end of the strike a week before it mentioned 
Femändez y Diaz Caneja's death, although the killing occurred at the very least five 
days before the strike was resolved. The justification for the delay was that they had 
needed to make a calm and detached analysis of the shooting. The authorities were 
little convinced. 
The SGOIF had always denied culpability in violent crimes while simultaneously 
propagating violence as a means of attaining Utopia. After all, it proclaimed: "EI 
verdadero revolucionario es un ilegal por excelencia" (The true revolutionary is the 
ultimate illegal) [El Progreso, 1924, al: 1]. 
The Bitter End: The Closure of the SGOIF 
Accusations of violence and murder were instrumental in the closure of the SGOIF. 
In his final condemnation of the union, the judge, Augusto Saladrigas y Lunar, offered 
nothing short of an inventory of judicial cases against it. From 1922 to 1925, the 
union faced at least fourteen charges of either murder or the placing of bombs. 
Cases such as the poisoning at La Polar and the killing of Don Felipe Fernandez had 
certainly contributed to governmental intolerance while helping to legitimise its 
actions. In the resolution printed in Boletin Official, on 160' September 1925, the 
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Provincial Governor of Havana, Antonio Ruiz, catalogued the numerous violent acts 
for which the union was being held responsible. 
15' 
Notwithstanding these allegations, it is interesting to note that the SGOIF was seen 
not only as a menace to society but also a real threat to the very existence of the 
Machadato. The union was not alleged to be the only culprit, however, and the 
government was convinced that a number of radical worker newspapers: 
... no son mäs que 
örganos de anarquia, opuestos a la moral y la tranquilidad 
del pals ........ que insulta(n) a las autoridades y ataca el regimen 
establecido157 (... are nothing more than organs of anarchy, opposed to the 
morality and tranquillity of the country.... that insult the authorities and attack 
the established regime) [AN, 390/11684: 110]. 
While the periodicals disseminated radical thought, worker association posed an 
even greater problem. Governmental correspondence maintained that two unions in 
particular, the SGOIF and the FOH, had been created under the illusion that they 
adhered to public law when in reality they were illegal entities that: 
.... no tenian otros fines que los de la anarquia y el colectivismo y 
dirigian 
aquellos atentados, con grave dano del Erden y de la tranquilidad püblica, 
amenazan, inclusive, a la integridad nacional y regimen de gobiemo, 
amenazas que en otros paises se han convertido en tristes realidades ... ( had no other ends than anarchy and collectivism and they organised those 
attacks, with grave damage to order and public peace, they also threaten 
national integrity and the rule of the government; threats that in other 
countries have been transformed into sad realities... ) [AN, 390/11684: 107]. 
These "sad realities" were also observed by Alonso, who cited the examples of Spain 
and Italy where worker rebellions had, he argued, provoked the rise of the ultra right- 
wing leaders Primo de Rivera and Mussolini, respectively. Likewise, direct action 
156 Among the charges he listed: 961 de 1923,1200 de 1923,749 de 1923,761 de 1923,1976 de 1925, 
1121 de 1925,465 de 1925 and 1161 de 1925 for counts of sabotage; 1839 de 1922 and 1205 de 1925 
for counts of poisoning; 1541 de 1925 and 1544 de 1925 for sedition and 61 de 1925 for assassination. 
[AN, 390/11684: 120]. 
167 Periodicals noted included E1 Progreso, Nueva Luz, Educacidn Obrera, 1Tierra! and Justicia. 
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had resulted in worker repression by the authorities in the USA and Argentina. Such 
tactics, he insisted, were disastrous for workers: "... Ia acciön directa no produce mäs 
que victimas" (direct action produces nothing but victims) [Alonso, 1928: 240] 
In September 1925, many of these "victims" were to be found within the ranks of the 
SGOIF. The judicial case for the closure of the union and its mouthpiece listed 42 
known members of the union. A further eleven names appeared on a declaration by 
factory owners, accusing the unionists of using threatening behaviour towards them. 
All named members, insisted the lawyer Saladriga y Lunar, were to be provisionally 
detained at Mines Prison, pending $500 bail158 [AN, 390/11684: 131]. "Pernicious 
foreigners" had already been expelled from Cuba and other union members, 
presumably Cuban, were serving jail sentences. 
Evidence against the alleged saboteurs was weak, however, and for this reason 
many had been or, it was hoped, would be charged with lesser crimes. The union 
had been consistent in its illegality, according to the authorities who were unsettled 
by the frequent changes to the address of the union's headquarters: minute books 
and union documents had not been made available for inspection (although meetings 
had been held). The authorities also upheld that leaders had forced their will onto 
associates, demanding subscriptions of up to one peso although no official record of 
expenditure was produced [AN, 390/11684: 131]. 159 
In fact, EI Progreso regularly published expenditure summaries under the heading 
NOTAS ADMINISTRATIVAS. The bulk of subscriptions either helped to support the 
rationalist school set up in Puentes Grandes or was spent on the printing and 
distribution of up to 5,000 copies weekly of EI Progreso. Separate, specific 
158 The accused protagonists of the La Polar poisoning, Angel Arias, Eduardo Rivera and Luis Quiros 
appeared on these lists. 
'9 In fact, subscriptions to the union were, according to union statutes, ¢40. 
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collections were- made and fund nights were held to ensure that any striking or 
imprisoned members received financial assistance. The SGOIF openly published the 
results of meetings and no apparent secrecy surrounded union meetings or 
subsequent resolutions made. As Malatesta pointed out, the unavoidably public 
nature of newsprint obliged radical periodicals to reveal inner workings, even to the 
adversary. Nevertheless, he argued, "... there are situations in which the enemy 
must not be informed" [Malatesta, Umanitä Nova, 27/02/1920]. It is likely that 
information acquired by government officials was restricted to the consultation of 
such newspapers and it is also probable that articles published may well have 
concealed information that the union held to be sensitive or damaging to it and its 
members. 
That the SGOIF often failed to communicate directly with the authorities (and through 
the legitimate channels) led the courts to accuse it of being a covert, and therefore 
illegal, operation. Such behaviour made government surveillance of the union difficult 
and, besides, it contradicted the Law of Association and those violating Cuban Law, 
while being liable to prosecution, left themselves open to investigation by the 
authorities. 
In its antepenultimate edition, EI Progreso condemned what amounted to persecution 
of union members. Reporting the victimisation experienced by all SGOIF associates, 
it observed the brutality imposed by the authorities: 
Hemos visto como las garras de la policia, calan sobre nuestros hermanos 
de fatiga arrancdndolos de sus hogares y del taller para ser conducidos al 
barco que los Ilevard a otras playas; otros hermanos quedan aün enerrado en 
la cärcel acusados del horrendo crimen de ser trabajadores y de luchar para 
mejorar la miserable vida del trabajador.... (We have seen how the clutches 
of the police have come down upon our tired brothers, tearing them from their 
homes and from the factories in order to lead them to the boat that will take 
them to other shores; other brothers are still locked up in prison, accused of 
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the terrible crime of being workers and of fighting to improve the miserable life 
of the worker.... ) [El Progreso, 1925, s: 1 ]. 
That the SGOIF had broken the law of the Republic was sufficient reason to detain 
and/or deport recalcitrant unionists. Government disapproval of SGOIF behaviour 
was substantiated in a communique to them detailing the utter disgust of fellow 
workers towards the union. In a letter of complaint to the Secretary of Law, the UNT 
accused SGOIF members of violently pressurising non-interested workers into 
accepting anarchistic and terrorist practices [AN, 390/11684: 89]. The UNT was itself 
keen to organise strike-breakers and, more importantly, it was a government tool that 
hoped to smash the power of the SGOIF, a detail that overshadowed the reliability of 
the testimony. 
Contrary to the UNT's letter, during late May and early June 1925, telegrams of 
support for the SGOIF reached the Governor of Havana, Antonio Ruiz. The island 
over, unions unrelated by trade pleaded that the government show leniency and that 
it avoid outlawing the manufacturers' union. 1B° To Severino Diaz, President of El 
Comite de Braceros y Estivadores de Puerto Tarafa, Nuevitas, Ruiz replied that since 
the government treated all registered associations with respect, the SGOIF would not 
be subjected to any unjust treatment [AN, 390/11684: 103]. Just days before, 
however, the chief of Police had labelled the union as having neither "... un 
funcionamiento normal ni licito" (... a normal nor legal function) [AN, 390/11684: 112). 
That the union should be suppressed had already been decided. 
160 Telegrams were sent by: the Union Obrero Ferrocarril, Guantanamo, 14/06/1925, [AN, 390/11684: 
100], El Comite de Braceros y Estivadores de Puerto Tarafa, Nuevitas, 30/05/1925 [AN, 390/11684: 
102] and from Banes, 01 /06/1925 [AN, 390/11684: 108] 
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The "Mussolini of the Caribbean"161 Puts his House in Order 
Since the new President assumed office in May last, there has been a 
marked improvement in the government of Cuba ... a genuine attempt is now being made to administer the country [FO, 371/11138: A3178/14]. 
So ran a 1926 communication between the British Consul in Havana and the Foreign 
Office in London. At the time of writing, a public works programme was being 
prepared when, under the new government, some $300 million would be pumped 
into improving infrastructure in Cuba. According to the British Consul, President 
Machado displayed "... good sense, moral wisdom and ... great simplicity". 
162 Of 
course, the structural improvement of Cuban roads, buildings and ports would benefit 
any foreign interests on the island, as would the quelling of a rebellious workforce. 
Machado ensured both. 
Whereas the Zayas administration had exercised relative leniency towards the labour 
movement, the Machadato would prove ruthless [Page, 1952: 57]. The workers of 
Cuba were already familiar with Gerardo Machado, having achieved infamy among 
them many years before his ascendancy to President of the Republic. During his 
reign as Secretary of State, the anarchist periodical iTierra! dubbed him Machadito 
(Little Machado) as "lo consideramos muy pequeno e impotente" (we consider him to 
be very little and powerless) [ jTierra!, 1911: d]. He expelled a number of "agitators" 
following the 1911 strike by sewer workers in Havana, which infuriated the 
newspaper: 18. 
A la mayoria del pueblo ha sorprendido la acometida brusca e inesperada, en 
plena paz, del Secretario de Gobernaciön contra nosotros. (The brusque and 
161 Referring to President Machado, the phrase was coined in a manifesto by the Central Committee of 
the Cuban Communist Party (PPC), published in the Mexican Communist organ EI Machete, 16/09/1926, in light of the cruelty inflicted by Machado. [IMSRSC, a, 1985: 244]. 162 Annual Report, Cuba, 1926, Mr Morris to Sir Austin Chamberlain, [FO 371/11991: A744/14]. 163 For more information on this strike see Aguirre 1965: 98-100 and this thesis, Chapter 1. 
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unexpected attack against us by the Secretary of State, where peace had 
reigned, took the majority of the people by surprise) [ jTieffa! 1911, d: 1]. 
Machado employed strike-breakers to quash the protest and although strikers' 
demands were not met, iTierra! felt that solidarity had strengthened in the face of 
adversity: 
Estamos de enhorabuena los anarquistas, porque el autocrätico y dictador 
Machado estä resuitando inconscientmente el gran propagandista de nuestro 
ideal de saneamiento universal. (Anarchists are in luck since the autocratic 
dictator, Machado, is unconsciously acting as the great propagator of our 
ideal of a universal clean-up) [! Tierra!, 1911, e: 1]. '64 
If the "autocratic" Machado had helped to promote the anarchist cause in 1911, his 
tyrannical actions in 1925 would have the reverse effect, when Machado's 
administration purged the labour movement of overtly radical elements, the SGOIF 
being one of the largest casualties: 
Machado se declaraba desde el principio adversario del sindicalismo y 
escogia como campo de batalla lo que constitula el arma ünica de defensa 
de los trabajadores (From the beginning Machado declared himself an 
adversary to syndicalism and he chose as his battle ground that which 
constituted the workers' only means of defence) [Cordova, 1997: 150]. 
In September 1925, the SGOIF was suspended and EI Progreso was closed, 
becoming the major focus of Machado's clean-up plan. According to the government- 
sponsored "worker" periodical Acciön Socialista, it was inevitable that the union be 
dissolved as it had proved to be harmful to Cuban society and to workers: 
Mataron en la clase trabajadora el afecto a la familia, a la patria, a la justicia y 
a la orden (Among the working class, they destroyed love for the family, the 
motherland, justice and order) [Acciön Socialista, 1926, f: 1 ]. 
114 The use of "sanaemiento", also meaning sewerage, may be a play on words - the strike demanded a 
rise in wages and an improvement of safety and hygiene for the sewerage workers. 
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The "dangerousness" of the union, echoed by police reports, ' justified an all-out war 
against it. According to Calixto Masö, the poisonings at La Polar acted as Machado's 
pretext "para atacar con ferocidad el movimiento obrero"(to attack ferociously the 
labour movement) [Mash, 1964: 75]. 
On April 24th, 1925, Machado attended a lunch given by the President of the 
American Sugar Refining Co. at the Bankers Club of New York, a banquet that 
attracted more than forty U. S. businessmen, the majority being sugar company 
bosses. In his speech, Machado assured the diners that "there are sufficient forces to 
repress all disorder" [Thomas, 1998: 572]. He was true to his word. The right to 
detain wayward Cubans and to extradite "pernicious foreigners" was exercised as 
more than 500 workers, "principally of the new SGOIF", received such treatment 
[Page, 1952: 63]. Workers who managed to evade deportation or imprisonment 
escaped to Florida or Yucatan, while others faced assassination [Fernfindez, 
2000: 65]. 
Such was the destiny of Catalonian worker Jose Cuxart Faljons. The "destacado 
dirigente obrero" (outstanding worker leader) [Paläez Groba, 1991: 6], a member of 
the SGOIF, was arrested on suspicion of preparing a plot to assassinate General 
Machado. On 1St October 1925, Cuxart was steered towards the prison of Forteleza 
de la Cabana, where he was shot in the back. His assassins were legally permitted 
to murder their prisoner since the "ley de fuga" (law of escape)165 applied, Cuxart 
apparently being shot while trying to escape. 
Margarito Iglesias also perished at the hands of Machado's henchmen, becoming 
one of those Cuban workers to be imprisoned following the closure of the union. 
Iglesias had long been a thorn in the side of the authorities and had been arrested on 
165 The Ley de Fuga stipulated that a detainee could be shot in the back by the authorities while 
attempting to escape. 
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numerous occasions although,. following each release, the Pinareno166 returned to 
Puentes Grandes, where he never failed to secure a leading role in the union. 
Furthermore, he had been accused of conspiracy in the murder of Fernandez y Diaz 
Caneja and of other terrorist acts throughout Havana. This "dangerous and 
rebellious" black Cuban mysteriously disappeared in 1927, an event that, according 
to Cuban anarchist Frank Ferndndez, helped to throw the national workers' union, 
the Confederaciön Nacional Obrera Cubana (CNOC) into crisis [Fernandez, 
2000: 65]. His remains were located in late August 1933, days after the fall of 
Machado. 
Iglesias's corpse was exhumed along with that of fellow Cuban Alfredo Lopez. At a 
conference at the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) commemorating the 48th 
anniversary of his death, the historian Fabio Grobart hailed Lopez "... una de las 
figuras mäs amadas de los trabajadores y mäs destacadas en la historia del 
movimiento obrero cubano" (... one of the figures most loved among workers and 
most prominent in the history of the Cuban labour movement) [Grobart, 1974]. One 
of the founders of the Asociaciön de Tipögrafos en General (General Association of, 
Printers) and subsequent president of the union, Lopez had been among the most 
prominent anarcho-syndicalists in Cuba. "El factor aglutinante" (The cohesive factor) 
[Femändez, 2000: 61] of the FOH from its foundation, he became Secretary General 
in 1925. Lopez also played a key role in the formation of the CNOC and, of the 
August 1925 National Congress, the Instituto de Historia del Movimiento Comunista y 
de la Revoluciön Socialista de Cuba observed: 
EI alma del congreso y de la central sindical en el creada, fue el destacado 
dirigente obrero Alfredo Lopez. (The soul of the congress, and of the central 
union created within it, was the prominent worker leader Alfredo Lopez) 
[IHMCRSC, b, 1985: 407]. 
166 From Pinar del Rio in the west of Cuba. 
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Lopez had supported the SGOIF boycott of La Polar, helping to organise meetings in 
various parts of Havana and in Mines, in an attempt to rally support for the brewery 
workers. In vain, he protested furiously against the fierce repression of the SGOIF 
and very shortly afterwards was arrested himself on suspicion of installing bombs in 
the Capital. On his release in January 1926, Lopez continued to voice his disgust at 
government handling of innocent workers, and in particular of the persecution of 
SGOIF members. He chaired an illegal meeting in support of the union, which he 
fully hoped to reorganise. He was duly rearrested and taken to the Chief of Secret 
Police (la Porra), Desiderio Ferreira, who reportedly advised him "que dejara eso si 
queria conservar la vida (... that he drop it if he wished to live) [Grobart, 1974]. 167 
Unrelenting, L6pez organised yet another "asamblea de los fabriles" (meeting of 
factories), which was suspended on the orders of Ferreira. Having once again 
received threats from government officials, Lopez headed to the Police headquarters 
to report that he had been denied his individual liberties. On 27th July 1926, the 
popular worker leader was snatched from outside his home on his way to a meeting 
at the "Centro Obrero" and -he was escorted to Castillo de Atares, where he was 
tortured and finally murdered. It has been widely accepted that Lbpez met his grisly 
end as a result of his unbending desire to reorganise the manufacturers' union. 
Lopez had arguably been the most outspoken and charismatic anarcho-syndicalist of 
both the FOH and the CNOC. His absence deprived the workers' organisations of an 
orator fired with the determination to fight the state through economic struggle, 
disregarding the ballot box as a tool of the oppressor. His dream to help found a 
national workers' union was finally realised in 1925, although he would not live to 
witness the Confederation's metamorphosis into a communist redoubt. 
167a eso" referred to meetings in support of the SGOIF. 
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While La Porra harassed workers in the city, the Rural ý Guard attended to 
undesirables in the country, where -sugar workers -received the. brunt of rural 
discipline.. Following the 1926 kidnapping-to-ransom of sugar boss,, Enrique Pina 
Jimenez, a friend of Machado, punishment fell on a group of Canary Islanders in -" 
Ciego de Avila. Page reported that some 200 islanders were "lynched and hanged" 
[Page, 1952: 63], while a more conservative estimate has put the figure at 40 
[IHMCRSC, a, 1985: 233]. Worker leaders in the Interior were also targeted: 
Con Lopez y Varona asesinados, los anarchosindicalistas perdian en un 
momento clave de nuestra historia, a dos de sus mfis valiosos orientadores, y 
la clase obrera a dos luchadores serenos y valientes (With Lopez and Varona 
assassinated, the anarcho-syndicalists lost, in a key moment in our history, 
two of its most valuable advisors, and the working class two calm and brave 
fighters) [Fernandez, 2000: 65]. 
In rural Cuba the prestigious anarcho-syndicalist Enrique Varona Gonzalez met his 
bloody end in September 1925. E! Progreso regularly protested at the government's 
treatment of these workers: some were threatened with expulsion while others, 
including Varona, were imprisoned, it recorded. In September 1924, the periodical 
published a manifesto condemning authoritarian attacks on workers at Morön and 
pleaded for solidarity between urban and rural workers. However, the fight did not 
reach truly sanguinary proportions until the summer of 1925. Until then, it seems 
sugar workers had been faced with mainly empty threats. A few foreign workers 
were to be deported, claimed EI Progreso but not because they were the principal 
instigators of the workers' movement against the Cuban government and US 
capitalism. Instead, it insisted that a handful of Spaniards was being falsely labelled 
"pernicious" and threatened with expulsion in an attempt to intimidate other workers 
into returning to the mills [EI Progreso, 1924, s1: 1] . 
From August 1925 repression in rural Cuba was severe. Scores of foreign sugar 
workers were expelled from Cuba while many Cuban-born workers were imprisoned. 
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Varona was just one of those to be assassinated following renewed strikes in three 
sugar mills belonging to the United States-owned Cuban Cane Sugar Corporation. 
General Gerado Machado had been the President of the Republic for less than four 
months. 
Persecution: The Beginning of the End of Anarcho-Syndicalism in Cuba 
Page described the closure of the SGOIF and El Progreso as a "body-blow" to 
anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba [Page, 1952: 62]. Cordova agreed: 
"... la perdida de uno de los reductos del anarquismo .. es probable que 
contribuy(ö) al declive posterior del anarquismo" (... the loss of one of the 
strongholds of anarchism ... is probably that which contributed to the ultimate decline of anarchism) [Cordova, 1997: 140]. 
The general consensus is that the union was closed due to its intransigence in the La 
Polar affair. The fact that the SGOIF refused to end the four-year strike/boycott 
infuriated the authorities, especially after Machado had guaranteed foreign interests 
in Cuba that business need not fear disorder on the Island. 
The SGOIF had been a combative force in Havana and through its use of direct 
action and endless propaganda, it had become a threat to both the authorities and 
capitalist interests. Finally, intolerance of the anarcho-syndicalist union forced 
Machado and his Porra to take decisive action against it. Examples of illegal 
behaviour and non-adherence to the laws of association afforded the authorities a 
justification to purge the country of rebellion. Although the SGOIF had been seen as 
the principal menace to economic and social stability, the Machadato declared an all- 
out-war on other actual or potential insurgents. Those who stood accused usually 
had some link to the union, however tenuous. 
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That workers in rural areas of Cuba had become more vociferous since the autumn 
of 1924 must have unnerved the authorities. Although the-September to December 
strike by sugar workers in Camaguey had not secured total victory through direct 
action, it pointed towards growing discontent in the countryside. 168 Having been . 
closed in 1914, the anarchist periodical jTierra! was revived in August 1924 and the 
plight of the strikers in Camaguey was passionately recorded in both iTierra! and El 
Progreso. The country had to unite in its fight against oppression, observed both 
periodicals. Of the struggle at Central "Pina" in Moron, EI Progreso cried: 
iTrabajadores! iHa Ilegado el momento de que deis prueba de que sois 
hombres! jQue nuestra protesta, nuestra accibn, no se haga esperar! 
(Workers! The moment has come in which you must prove that you are men! 
our protcz, ou action, will not wait! ) [El Progreso, 1924, j 1: 1 ]. I 
This call to arms attempted to fuse real worker action in the city with discontent in the 
Interior, the SGOIF appearing to have detected an authentic possibility of combining 
urban and rural worker forces and, during EI Progreso's last year of print, the 
predicament of the sugar, workers managed to overshadow news of the boycott at La 
Polar. The government saw the SGOIF as the most radical of associations in the 
country and so its support of uprisings outside of its own industrial sphere would not 
have been a welcome interference. Therefore, those individuals who had either a 
direct connection or merely shared an affinity with the union, such as Lopez, were 
targeted. 
The foundation of the CNOC was certainly a watershed in the history of the working- 
class movement, as never before had workers in Cuba been united through a single 
national entity. 189 However, the absence of representatives from sugar regions at the 
'68 According to John Dumoulin, the workers secured at 10% increase in wages rather than the 30% 
originally demanded, and acknowledgement of union delegatcs [Durnoulin, 19°': 5 169 Only twice before had a nations! conference been staged. In August 1914, President Menocal 
organises n Nationai'NorkPr Congress which was condemned by anarchists as a "farsa comedia" 
("comedic farce"), see El Dependiente, 1914: g. A further Congress was held in Havana in April 1920 in 
order to discuss high cost of firing. The main resolu ior. cf t! -.. s Cory: .:.: 'us tne aecs: on, pres. -e-c ty 
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Congress was notable (see chapter 4). At its August gathering, the CNOC arranged 
for a collection to be made that would help financially those workers in Camaguey 
detained by the state as a result of strike action. One of the prisoners was Enrique 
Varona, who, a few weeks after the resolution was made, was murdered on his way 
to the cinema with his family. The loss of one of the most ardent propagators of 
anarcho-syndicalism in rural Cuba handicapped the movement there, as did the 
incarceration, extradition, murder or exile of hundreds of workers. Similarly, the 
campaign in Havana had suffered. The "disappearance" of Alfredo Lopez in 1926 
had only exacerbated the situation. 
Although attended by anarchists, reformists and communists, anarcho-syndicalist 
thought did initially influence the consciousness of CNOC members and the 
agreements reached in Congress undoubtedly displayed a bias towards anarcho- 
syndicalist ideals. The purge of radicalism exercised by Machado, however, left a 
vacuum that, as Fernandez noted, was duly filled by the ever-strengthening 
communists: 
"La situaciön fue häbilmente aprovechada por los marxistas dentro de la 
CNOC, y por 6rdenes del PCC se empezaron a apropiar de los cargo 
sindicales ostentados por los anarquistas muertos, deportados, encarcelados 
o en el destierro" (Marxists within the CNOC easily benefited from the 
situation, and through PCC (Communist Party) orders started to appropriate 
union seats held by dead, deported, imprisoned or exiled anarchists) 
[Fernandez, 2000: 65]. 
Communism did not suffer the same fate as its leftist rival. The nascent party had 
not yet penetrated worker unions. This meant that although the PCC had to struggle 
for recognition and acceptance among workers, it also enjoyed a period of near 
invisibility among officials: 
Secretary Lopez, not to send a Cuban delegate to the "yellow" Pan-American Worker Congress in 
Mexico later that year, see chapter 1. 
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Machado y sus colaboraodres olvidaban que los comunistas normalmente no 
ponian bombas sino que utilizaban otros metodos de lucha que a largo plazo 
eran mäs oeligrosos (Machado and his collaborators forgot that communists 
did not nor;, ally place boy ;s but instead used other methods of struggle that, 
in the long run, were more dangerous) [Cordova, 1997: 51] 
Those "alternative methods" referred to by Cordova included the communist system 
of organising clandestinely and in cells. The absence of experienced orators and the 
removal of sympathisers culminated in a downwards spiral for anarcho-syndicalism in 
Cuba, which was eventually (and rather quickly) replaced by communism. Although 
anarcho-syndicalism did not disappear "overnight", the extermination of the SGOIF 
and individuals linked to it contributed in no small way to its demise. Although 
anarchist-related thought did not entirely evaporate, it never again enjoyed the 
privilege of being at the forefront of radical labour in Cuba. 
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Conclusion 
To assume that the eclipse of anarcho-syndicalism by communism was part of a 
teleological process is too simplistic. True, socio-economic and political conditions in 
Cuba during the early twentieth century necessitated the espousal of an ideology by 
working-class activists that responded to those conditions. Likewise, the earlier 
ideological shift from a more orthodox form of anarchism to the relative pragmatism 
of anarcho-syndicalism was a reaction to a changing reality in the workplace, in 
particular. However, anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba did not disappear, simply because 
it had served its purpose, allowing communism to snugly fill its place in the hearts 
and minds of the populace. Rather, the SGOIF failure to organise on an even larger 
scale than it had by the mid-1920s, repression used by the government, the union's 
slow response to a changing society and emphasis placed on the wrong issues, all 
contributed to its downfall. 
The appeal of anarcho-syndicalism lay partly in its inclusiveness. Initially imported to 
Cuba by some Spanish workers during the late nineteenth century, anarchism was 
embraced by Spanish and Cuban workers alike and collectivism was the most 
popular strain of anarchism in Cuba around this time, as it was in Spain. The need to 
form worker unions that would act as a breeding ground for these ideas was already 
seen as an important step in the education of the workers. 
Although anarchism did enter into worker consciousness in the sugar regions of 
Cuba, in particular in Cruces, the main thrust of anarcho-syndicalism was found in 
239 
the emerging industrial areas of Havana during the early twentieth century and it was 
particularly appealing to workers who not only felt that they. were being treated 
harshly but who often had first-hand experience of the mal-distribution of wealth, 
such as barmen and waiters. Subjected to long hours, poor wages and unhealthy 
living conditions, service industry workers sought a change in the treatment they 
received at work, demanding short-term gains. Through necessity, these workers 
fought for an improved standard of living, bemoaning the squalor in which they were 
forced to live and work, although they also aspired to a brighter future, that is they 
strove for improvements in the long-term. 
These improvements, many believed, could be achieved through education and 
especially through the instruction of naturism as, they maintained, a healthy body 
would be more able to cope with the drudgery of daily life, while the financial savings 
made on vices such as alcohol could be channelled into a healthier lifestyle for all the 
family. The juxtaposition of short and long term gains is one of the characteristics of 
all anarchist-related thought. What was more remarkable about the form of 
anarchism prevalent among service industry workers was the blend of the collectivist 
anarcho-syndicalism with the more individualistic anarcho-naturism. 
However, this crossover should be no surprise, considering that the abuses and 
effects of alcohol and food were probably witnessed everyday in the workpla cc, 
particularly by those who served wealthier Cubans and tourists in the more 
expensive cafes, restaurants and hotels, leading to a desire by some workers to 
reverse this trend (besides it was one they could ill-afford) and to embrace a cleaner 
way of life. In this way, some workers adopted such remedies as sun-worship, 
vegotarisniým, teetotalism and yoga and it was through the long-established unions 
that, it was hoped, such instruction could be received. 
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Unions dedicated to service industry workers had existed before the War of 
Independence, making them some of the oldest unions in urban Cuba, and so it was 
natural that anarcho-naturists aimed to spread the word through these instruments of 
learning and solidarity. The unions' espousal of anarcho-syndicalism over socialism 
or reformism was partly the result of disenfranchisement, which invalidated the 
former, while the perceived abuses of power displayed by politicians and employers 
did not make either a convincing alternative. Direct action was propagated in 
periodicals and social gatherings, such as vigils, conferences, open days and 
meetings. Writers and speakers told of the need to fight employers with boycotts and 
strikes (open-mouth sabotage was a particularly popular tool among waiters). 
While the horrors of the Great War were becoming apparent, there was a definite 
strengthening of moralistic attitudes in urban Cuba but, at the same time, the fear of 
rising war-time prices and a subsequent fall in real wages convinced some to pool 
resources to prevent an even lower standard of living than was already a reality in 
1914. Writers in El Dependiente pleaded that workers join forces and form along 
industrial lines, rather than continue to be separated by the type of work undertaken 
(chef or waiter, for example) or by place of work (cafe or restaurant). And so, 
individualistic moralism and naturism fused with ideas of industrial unionism, as some 
attempted to increase the solidarity and protection offered to all workers by 
dismantling existing unions and replacing them with one big union of the food and 
drink branch (Ramo Gastronömico). 
This was partly a response to the growth of manufacturing industry during the 1910s 
and, with it, a workforce that began to voice discontent early on, as illustrated by two 
spontaneous strikes declared by workers at the Tropical Brewery in 1913, both of 
which attracted the sympathy of other unions all over Cuba. These strikes were the 
first instances of direct action displayed by workers in a nascent but quickly 
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expanding industry. - The Tropical strikes were coupled with boycotts, so 
characteristic of the, as yet, unfounded SGOIF, and were supported by equally 
typical demonstrations and meetings. This spontaneous worker action attracted 
country-wide solidarity for those industrial workers who, like the SGOIF, employed 
violence where it was deemed necessary. The failure of the strikers at Tropical was 
mostly due to a heavy reliance on spontaneous action and the lack of a solid 
organisation, .a setback that, it was hoped, would be rectified with the legal 
foundation of the SGOIF, four years later. 
Tax breaks offered to certain factories in Cuba, such as those producing beer, soap 
and cement, were perhaps an effort by the government to -create an import 
substitution industry in a country where the majority of necessary goods came from 
abroad, at a time when some products were in short supply (and so available at 
inflated prices) as a direct result of the War. In any case, manufacturing industry did 
experience a growth period and employed thousands of new workers who, due to the 
low-skilled nature of many of their jobs, were often mobile and easily replaceable in 
the factories, the majority of which were centred in and around the Havana 
neighbourhood of Puentes Grandes. 
Industrial workers needed to respond, firstly, to companies who employed them on a 
larger-scale than previously and, secondly, to an industry that had no need for highly 
skilled workers and could replace strikers without difficulty. Both necessitated a more 
solid form of organisation among workers, in the shape of a union that would 
represent all workers, regardless of the tasks performed by individuals. Moreover, 
the demographic concentration of urban workers fortified contact among them and so 
solidarity was able to flourish.. The setting up of the SGOIF in the hub of worker. 
activity, Puentes Grandes, in1917, was an appropriate response to those conditions. 
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At the end of the Great War, the pull towards industrial unionism far outweighed 
individualistic trends as the forging of a network of worker solidarity that could match 
the might of more powerful employers was considered more urgent. Bearing witness 
to the growing influence of foreign power in the factories and mills of Cuba's two 
most economically important products, sugar and tobacco, workers in the breweries, 
initially, aimed to get the advantage over big business by organising a union that 
could truly match it. However, the realisation that one big union was needed in Cuba 
was not sufficiently acted upon and it may well be that the failure of the SGOIF to 
embrace more workers in other industries was a contributory factor in its downfall. 
That those employed in other sectors, most notably in the sugar industry, were not 
successfully recruited was not through any lack of awareness or enthusiasm on the 
part of some organisers in the SGOIF. A new entity, it first had to expand its base 
from a union for brewery workers, employed by just two breweries, to one that 
incorporated all workers in manufacturing industry, be they cement, match or pasta 
factory workers. And besides, from 1920, it was hoped that the developing FOH, in 
which the SGOIF played no small part, would take the reins in organising a national 
union, a plan that did not bare fruit until 1925. 
The SGOIF's initial aim was to welcome as many industrial workers as possible, 
whether Spanish, Cuban, black, white, male or female, and this partly dictated the 
ideological route that the union followed. Approximately half of all factory workers in 
Cuba were Spanish and many were probably new arrivals who, due to the low-skilled 
nature of the jobs, accepted such posts until they could get higher-paid or more 
secure employment. Those who had been in the country for less than five years 
could not be naturalised and so, according to the Cuban Constitution, were not 
eligible to vote. Likewise, the factories employed many women, most likely the first 
time that any women had been employed alongside men in urban areas of Cuba and, 
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as analysis of EI Progreso has proven, many children were taken on as even 
cheaper labour in some establishments. Neither women nor workers under 21 years 
of age enjoyed suffrage. A mistrust of politics by those Cuban workers eligible to 
vote, exacerbated by the scale of corruption practised by politicians, and the 
disenfranchisement of others, made the use of the ballot box either unattractive or 
impossible. Another survival strategy often used by those living in hardship was 
emigration, but many of those in Cuba's factories, being Spanish, had already tried 
that avenue and found themselves in jobs that had seen a fall in the value of real 
wages (research has shown, that an increase in pay was one of the continual 
demands of strikers belonging to the SGOIF). Promising immediate gains and 
eventual emancipation, anarcho-syndicalist unions offered a place where these 
workers, in particular, could voice their discontent. 
The SGOIF grew considerably during its existence, attracting more workers as 
industry expanded. By securing a large and solid base, the union aimed to use a 
proletarian army to fight the might of a rapidly expanding industry: if the strength of 
industry lay in its size, so must that of the workers' union, it was reasoned. In this 
respect the SGOIF was successful and a detailed study of E! Progreso has shown 
that it played a large part in helping to attract new members. Reporting on the 
success of strikes, the union hoped to illustrate the tangible benefits that non- 
members could gain from affiliation. Higher wages were within easy reach of all who 
joined union ranks, EI Progreso seemed to guarantee, in articles that sat comfortably 
next to items that aimed to educate readers on the equality of women or the futility of 
government, for example. 
Through analysis of El Progreso, it has become apparent that those writing for and 
editing the periodical were more concerned with what was happening in the present 
than with the promises of some distant future, although the preoccupation with the 
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on-going dispute at La Polar may have damaged the union rather than strengthened 
it. It is possible that too much emphasis was placed on the boycott of La Polar and 
on what SGOIF still envisaged to be a strike by ex-workers at the brewery. Almost 
four years after the initial strike was called for fairer wages for overtime worked, the 
union still maintained that that worker action was valid, even though new hands had 
been drafted in by the company (whom the SGOIF labelled strike-breakers) and, due 
to the transient nature of such employment, had probably been replaced over again. 
Although workers in many other unions supported the strike, especially those 
belonging to the FOH, it is possible that endless articles about the boycott in El 
Progreso became tiresome and, besides, there were other issues that needed to be 
addressed. From 1924, the periodical began to report on events in the sugar 
regions, at a time when sugar workers were beginning to take the initiative in 
declaring their own large strikes. 
The importance of the sugar industry was largely underestimated by the SGOIF until 
that point and only Paulino Diez, the former Secretary-General of the CNT, who had 
recently arrived from Spain, appeared to have truly grasped the significance of 
unionising the thousands of sugar workers in Cuba. The economy relied heavily on 
the sugar crop and an all-out strike would have been detrimental both to the 
government and to US interests on the island. By the time of the strikes, the SGOIF 
had clocked up seven years experience of organising previously non-unionised 
workers and was in a good position to take the initiative in embracing those workers 
who manned the sugar factories in the campo. Diez's dream to incorporate sugar, 
workers into the Ramo De Alimentaciön y sus Anexos de la Habana y su Radio, an 
organisation that aimed to encompass all those employed in the food and drink 
industry, would, in reality, have been an extension of the SGOIF, making it the most 
powerful union ever to have existed in Cuba. Maybe for this . reason, 
Diez 
encountered fierce opposition from some prominent members of the FOH who, after 
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all, were planning an all-inclusive, nation-wide union drive (which later became the 
CNOC) and who, with limited success, attempted to take over the role of organising 
the striking workers at the mills. Later, the CNOC also failed to unionise workers in 
the campo, and not until 1933, eight years after the start of the end of anarcho- 
syndicalism in Cuba and the foundation of the PCC, did the Confederation, then 
headed by communists, successfully do so, and only then after the fall of the 
Machadato. 
Although the SGOIF defended Diez as the FOH mounted personal attacks on him, it 
neglected to support fully his argument or to take the lead in immediately organising 
sugar workers, an act that could have placed the union even beyond the control of 
the authorities and trusts. Although it recognised the need for those in the campo to 
rise up, maybe the SGOIF believed too heavily in the spontaneity of the workers 
themselves and too little in the importance of a central organisational point. In the 
city, it had been far easier for workers to gain access to the ideas of the SGOIF and 
for the union to inform them of what was happening in other workplaces, either 
through direct, inter-worker contact at work or home, or through EI Progreso. The 
word would have spread less rapidly in an industry that covered the whole country, 
and it would have been more difficult for those in the mills to the far east of Cuba to 
receive news of the strikes occurring in Camaguey, for example. The failure of the 
SGOIF to take the organisational lead in 1924, therefore, must been seen as just one 
of the reasons for the collapse of the union and, consequently, of anarcho- 
syndicalism in Cuba. 
The growth of the SGOIF was impressive but not impressive enough for its survival, 
although the unwillingness or inability to recruit more quickly is not,. of course, the 
only explanation for the demise of the SGOIF. The purge on the union by the 
Machadato, while neither the sole destroyer of the union, certainly helped to damage 
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it beyond repair. Although the SGOIF had started out as a pragmatic union that that 
placed the onus on making life so difficult for employers that they would have to give 
in to their demands, the force of government persecution of the union and the refusal 
of management at La Polar to recognise the union or the strike, often forced it to 
defend rather than to attack. 
The hitherto disregarded boycott of La Polar is a vital case study in helping to 
understand the SGOIF and the general mood of the labour movement in urban Cuba 
at that time, as it illustrates the extent of worker solidarity, the use of direct action 
(including, although not proven, murder) and union stubbornness when dealing with 
the employers, whom anarcho-syndicalists saw as one of the main enemies of the 
working class. The Pages of El Progreso display how much emphasis the SGOIF 
placed on propaganda during the conflict. Through the boycott, via the pages of the 
periodical, the union was able to educate readers on the importance of solidarity, on 
the use of direct action in preparation for the General Strike and eventual 
emancipation, on the vileness of employers and on the treachery of fellow workers 
who did not support the boycott (usually labelled strike-breakers or worse, 
amarillistas). 
In a bid to win support and to make the SGOIF a tighter, more closed organisation, 
the union usually tried not to alienate strike-breakers, although it did vilify those who 
had been active anarcho-syndicalists but had abandoned the ideals of the SGOIF 
while remaining involved in the labour movement. The verbal abuse directed at 
Hilario Alonso and Felipe Zapata best illustrates the hostility reserved especially for 
"traitors" to the workers' cause. A study of the treatment of these men can be further 
used to demonstrate a lack of judgement on the part of writers in El Progreso. It was 
seen as important by them that the amarillistas be treated in an exemplary fashion: 
the union hoped that if others feared that they too might be ostracised by fellow 
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workers and peers, they would be dissuaded from abandoning the principles of the 
SGOIF. However, so much internal bickering was at the expense of more pressing 
matters. As was the case with the single-mindedness as regards the boycott of La 
Polar, it would have been more beneficial for the union to have concentrated on 
positive recruitment, as opposed to focussing on the negativity of abandonment; the 
likes of Alonso and Zapata defended their positions, after all, allowing others to read 
about and interpret possible flaws in union organisation. Both men maintained that 
the union was too restrictive and hierarchical. Zapata did not agree with the structure 
of the union and was more inclined towards orthodox anarchism, displayed by his 
part in the foundation of Acciön Consciente, while Alonso had veered towards a more 
reformist attitude, - supporting worker progression through social legislation. El 
Progreso did not publish their comments, although they could be easily sought out in 
other worker periodicals. 
EI Progreso was an important part of the success of the SGOIF. No other worker 
periodical in the 1920s (and none so radical) had published so many issues (some 
250-300 issues in all) to so many readers (at one point around 5,000 copies per 
week were being sold) in such varying occupations all over the country. The 
periodical printed details of worker collections for strikers and their families and the 
financial in-goings and out-goings of the union were there for all to see, including the 
authorities. Such apparent openness did not satisfy the government and the SGOIF 
was condemned by the authorities as a sinister organisation whose members , 
employed violence or committed murder at every opportunity. 
Radical worker organisations in Cuba, as elsewhere, had always been repressed to 
some extent and the governments of Menocal (1913-1921) and Zayas (1921-1925) 
were no exception. The Menocalista regime had deported or imprisoned hundreds of 
workers and, needing to be seen by the USA as dealing with labour problems that 
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had disrupted the movement of sugar, repression was at its most fierce during 1919. 
The presidency of Zayas was less harsh, although he did keep the workers in check 
when strikes seemed to be getting out of employer-state control. As the records in 
the National Archive of Cuba have shown, the authorities jailed SGOIF members, 
often the same ones over and again, but usually had to free them due to a lack of 
substantial evidence against them. The fourteen-month imprisonment and 
subsequent release of Arias, Rivera and Quiros, accused of poisoning La Polar, is an 
excellent example of government capitulation in the face of a weak prosecution. 
However, neither the rule of Zayas or Menocal can compare to the brutality of the 
Machadato. Although relatively tame by Latin American standards at that time, the 
repression unleashed by Machado on the workers and their unions was 
unprecedented in Cuba. Already known to the working class in his former capacity 
as Minister of the Interior, Machado pandered to US interests and, shortly after his 
inauguration, he promised to execute a "clean-up plan'. This plan included the 
murder, deportation and imprisonment, of undesirables in the Cuban labour 
movement and the SGOIF bore the brunt of it. It is probable that Machado was 
aware of the influence that the union enjoyed in the FOH and the emerging CNOC, 
evident from SGOIF members' impressive subscriptions to the former, in particular. 
Machado would also have been extremely concerned at the creation of the CNOC, 
which practically coincided with his rise to power. If Machado had wished to rid the 
important Federation and Confederation of anarcho-syndicalist influence, quashing 
the industrial workers' union was certainly an excellent place to begin. The 
persecution of individuals was coupled with the forced closure of both the SGOIF and 
E! Progreso, extinguishing the union. The FOH was also silenced forever and, 
although the numerically reduced CNOC did not suffer the same fate in 1925, it was 
eventually crushed by, Machado three - years later, after members opposed 
Machado's unconstitutional re-election. Attempts by the much-esteemed Alfredo 
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L6pez to reorganise the SGOIF resulted in his murder and the SGOIF did not reform 
until the fall of Machado in 1933, by which time communism had replaced anarcho- 
syndicalism as the possible saviour of workers in Cuba. 
Communism was not a credible opponent of anarcho-syndicalism in 1925, although 
the rise of the former and the demise of the later did coincide. At its foundation, the 
PCC only claimed 27 members, hardly a force to be reckoned with, and it may well 
be for this reason that its members or the party did not appear on Machado's hit-list. 
Some founding members, such as Barriero and Vilaboa were also prominent 
members in the FOH, suggesting that Communist ideas were discussed among FOH 
members. However, although the Russian Revolution had been debated for years in 
Cuban worker press, neither anarcho-syndicalist dominated unions, such as the FOH 
or SGOIF, nor the authorities considered communism to be a threat in 1925. The 
SGOIF, as most anarcho-syndicalists in Cuba, envisaged reformism to be more of a 
danger to union leadership than communism, illustrated by the countless verbal 
attacks on those unionists veering if not towards reformism, then gradually away from 
anarcho-syndicalism. It is probable that the SGOIF underestimated the potential 
that communism had in taking hold in a country where only negligible splits had 
previously existed among leftist thinkers: a hitherto anarchist-dominated 
cohesiveness had led the majority of union players into a false sense of security. "o 
Events in Russia were not fully supported by the radical worker press, although El , 
Progreso, believing as it did in freedom of speech (to a certain degree) did welcome 
points of view that were both pro- and anti-Bolshevik. Some condemned the brutality 
of the new government there: the whole premise of government, no matter what 
policies or actions it adheres to, is anathema to anarchism. Others insisted that at 
least the workers in Russia had played a part in overthrowing the previous system. 
170 Paulino Diez did, however, expect communist rivalry. 
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The point had, been made in 1921 by one member of the pro-Bolshevik camp that 
someone like Lenin was needed in all regions in order that, a solid form of 
organisation between workers be forged. It was exactly this lack of organisation that 
would hinder the success of the SGOIF. 
Communists placed emphasis on organisation, while the SGOIF never 
wholeheartedly embraced the idea that a central focal point was tantamount to 
success. To do so would have been to deny its anarchist roots. The anarchist 
concentration on spontaneity did not rest well with the need for any worker union to 
forge some central point that could easily oversee the autonomous sections of that 
union. Centralisation necessitated a federal system, a leaning towards leadership, 
while anarchism aimed to respect the autonomy of separate branches of the larger 
union and of the individual. Anarchism and centralisation made limp bedfellows. The 
SGOIF, for its part, organised on a rotational basis, with a central committee that was 
re-elected each year and that invited delegates from every industrial sector. The 
organisational secretary and the financial secretary were paid a living wage so that 
these two men could concentrate their efforts solely on union duties, a luxury for any 
libertarian union. "' Although organisation was an important aspect of union 
philosophy, failure to organise sugar workers has proven that not enough emphasis 
was placed upon it. While the anarchist Zapata had complained that the SGOIF was 
too hierarchical, the anarcho-syndicalist Diez maintained that, unlike the SGOIF, the 
FOH was too centralised, an observation that, considering the creeping influence of 
communism among some prominent members of the FOH, was probably more than 
a mere accusation. The SGOIF, then, was placed squarely in the anarcho-syndicalist 
camp, too centralised for the anarchists and not centralised enough for the emerging 
communists. In this respect, as with the SGOIF's failure to fully acknowledge the 




importance of a growing nationalism in Cuba, the eventual. overshadowing of 
anarcho-syndicalism by communism does admit a certain teleology: centralisation 
was essential and anarcho-syndicalism did not satisfy this necessity. 
Although, through El Progreso, the SGOIF condemned the rise of US influence on 
the island, attacks were directed, . in true anarcho-syndicalist style, towards 
companies as employers and statesmen as tyrants. However, all employers, 
regardless of nationality, and all states, were wholly criticized, as one of the main 
arguments of anarcho-syndicalism was that no hierarchy should exist in any part of 
life. Thus, the union attached no additional venom in attacking US employers over 
Spanish or Cuban ones: the tragedy lay not in the provenance of the bosses as much 
as in the fact that there were bosses at all, it maintained. However, many workers in 
Cuba (regardless of place of birth) had become increasingly disillusioned at the 
growing. economic, and so political, power of the USA in Cuba. Ever since the 
introduction of the " Platt Amendment, the Cuban authorities had quashed labour 
unrest for fear of intervention by the USA whose companies, after all, owned some of 
the largest sugar plantations in Cuba and who reserved the right to protect those 
interests by whatever means necessary. Cubans were aware that their needs were 
being compromised by those of capitalist (and, increasingly US) interests and the 
situation must have taken a more urgent turn with the advent of prohibition in the 
USA and the exploitation of Cuba as a "millionaires' playground*. 
Public anger at the huge US trusts and at their treatment of workers in Cuba was . 
manifested in the setting up of the Anti-imperialist League and " in the well-attended 
rallies they organised. Although El Progreso did help to publicise the League, it most 
probably supported the collapse of imperialism/capitalism as an international entity 
and not as a non-Cuban one. The SGOIF did not react sufficiently to the level of 
popular discontent vis-ä-vis the American question. The communists did. Machado 
S 
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did. The election of Machado was largely due to his promise to lessen the influence 
of the USA in Cuba and it was his rule that would ironically, and suddenly, stamp out 
the union and, with it, anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba. 
The originality of this thesis is multi-fold. It has filled a large void in Cuban 
historiography, analysing the strength and importance of anarcho-syndicalism in 
1920s Cuba. That class-consciousness was weak (or non-existent) prior to the 
formation of the PCC and the subsequent embracing of Marxism-Leninism is a false 
notion: the real rejection of a nationalist politics by anarchists appears to have been 
confused, by many labour historians, with an imagined political immaturity. In fact, 
the working class had fought for economic and social betterment throughout the latter 
part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Neither have the anarcho- 
syndicalist educational crusades, both in and out of the workplace, been credited by 
most historians. Not only did many of the workers possess class-consciousness, but 
they fully aimed to share it with the less enlightened, and education was extended to 
the next generation - the children of the workers. What was absent, however, was 
the belief in a political answer to the problems of overwork, low wages and lack of 
control in the workplace. Instead, the radical elements of the Cuban working class 
strove for a wholly economic solution. That rejection of party politics has led some 
modem-day accounts to demote anarcho-syndicalism as unworthy of comment in a 
society now so convinced of the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. In the 1920s, 
communism quickly offered an alternative leftist ideal to the damaged-beyond-repair 
anarcho-syndicalism and it swiftly gained supporters, who may have felt that a 
centralised party could succeed where anarchism had failed. 
My research has shown that anarchism was not fading in 1920, as has been 
indicated, rather, it was well supported and constantly attracting more adherents. For 
its part, the SGOIF was becoming a force to be reckoned with and the confidence 
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that workers placed with the growing union has been evidenced through analysis of 
El Progreso. The periodical, gathering dust in the Instituto de Historia for 80 years, 
consulted by no-one, was a long-running, informative union mouthpiece that was 
going from strength to strength, in terms of sales, until its forced closure in 1925. A 
study of EI Progreso has shown the constant demands workers made of their bosses 
and their reinforced confidence as regards social and economic rights. It seems 
plausible that the confusion over the weakening of the ideology lies in the gradual 
overshadowing of a `purer" form of anarchism by anarcho-syndicalism during that 
time, a natural evolution in a country that was attracting bigger business and, so, a 
larger, more concentrated workforce: industrialisation necessitated industrial 
unionism. 
This thesis has studied the reality and the importance of that industrial unionism in 
Cuba, which, until now, has been ignored. The SGOIF laid the foundations for the 
huge union drive of the sugar industry by communists in the 1930s, a fact that has 
been entirely overlooked. The SGOIF paved the way for the FOH and the CNOC, 
both of which are widely believed to have played a pivotal role in the wonting-class 
history of the country. A study of the SGOIF is tantamount, therefore, to 
understanding how these unions came about, and the influence that the SGOIF 
enjoyed in the Federation and Confederation it helped to create should not, as it has 
been, disregarded. Here, 1 have aimed to redress the balance, explaining how the 
SGOIF, through industrial unionism, appeared to offer a solution for previously 
unorganised factory workers: the nature of much of the workforce (disenfranchised 
foreigners, women and children and non-skilled workers who experienced job 
insecurity, giving them the air of the itinerant worker) demanded it. 
The kind of leftist unionism embraced in Cuba's urban factories was similar to that 
practised in the USA's IWW, an organisation that drew together workers who, until 
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the foundation of "one big union", had been cast aside by the AFL, which concerned 
itself more with the aristocracy of skilled labour than the unskilled and/or migratory 
worker. Thus, the model the SGOIF used was borrowed more from the USA than 
Spain. Moreover, anarcho-syndicalists were not exclusively Spanish, a view that 
existed among the authorities and bourgeois press of the time and that has been 
perpetuated by contemporary historians. The former group hoped to discredit the 
wide-appeal of anarcho-syndicalism and to cause division among different factions of 
the labour force, namely foreign and native, while the latter have helped to veil the 
real popularity of the ideology among Cubans of the day, further legitimising present 
day communism/revolutionary socialism. Thus anarcho-syndicalism has been 
labelled an import, the only resort of desperate, Spanish troublemakers. While I do 
not maintain that Spanish workers were inconsequential in the union (on the contrary, 
the anarcho-syndicalist ideas brought to Cuba originated in Spain, while many factory 
workers in Havana, and so the union, belonged to the mass of disenfranchised and 
disillusioned Spaniards), I have illustrated that the SGOIF attracted all workers, 
regardless of provenance, gender or, race. Some of the most respected anarcho- 
syndicalists were of Cuban stock, both within (Margarito Iglesias, Felipe Zapata) and 
without (Alfredo Lopez, Antonio Penichet) the union. 
Most importantly, though, this thesis has recognised the thousands of workers who 
made up the SGOIF, who, until now, had not reached the annals of Cuban 
historiography. Those who toiled in the breweries and in the paper, ice, drink, 
cement, pasta, chocolate, jam, match and biscuit factories merit their place in that 
history and their struggle deserves to be documented. Their collective voice has 
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Fl: #34 - 30108/1924 
G1: #35 - 06/09/1924 
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H1: #36 -13/09/1924 
11: #37 - 20109/1924 
J I: #38 - 27/09/1924 
KI: #39 - 04/10/1924 
L1: #40 -11/10/1924 
Ml: #41 -18/10/1924 
NI: #42 -25/10/1924 
01: #43 - 01/11/1924 
P1: #44 - 08/11/1924 
01: #45 -15/11/1924 
RI: #46 - 22/11/1924 
S1: #47 - 29/11/1924 
Ti: #48 - 06/12/1924 
U l: #49 -13/1211924 
V1: #50 - 20/12/1924 
W1: #51 -27/12/1924 
Ario VI -1925 
#1-03/01/1925 
#2 - 10/01/1925 
#3 -17/01/1925 
#4 - 24/01/1925 
#9 - 28/02/1925 
#11-14/03/1925 
#12 - 25/03/1925 
#13 - 28/03/1925 
#14 - 04/04/1925 
#17 - 25/04/1925 
#19 - 09/05/1925 
#21 - 23/05/1925 
#22 - 30/05/1925 
#29 -16/06/1925 
#32 - 06/08/1925 
#33 - 13/08/1925 
#34 - 20/08/1925 
#35 - 27/08/1925 
#36 - 10/09/1925 
#38 - 24/09/1925 
PRO-VIDA, La Habana: 
Aßo II: 
#4 - Enero, 1915 
#5 - Febrero, 1915 
#6 - Marzo, 1915 
#8 - Mayo, 1915 
#9 - Junio, 1915 
#10 y #11, Julio y agosto, 1915 
AlSo I!!: 
#17 - Febereo, 1916 
#18 - Marzo, 1916 
#20 - Mayo, 1916 
#24 - Setiembre. 1916 




#34 - 01/06/1917 
#35 - 06106/1917 
#38 - 16/07/1917 
#40 - Setiembre, 1917 
REBEUON: Semenario Anarquista: 
Afro I, Regla: 
#1-14/10/1908 
#2 - 31/10/1908 
#3 -18/11 /1908 
Aho I1: 
#8-21/01/1909 
#10 - 11/02/1909 
#12 - 04/03/1909 
#13 -18/03/1909 
#14 - 31/03/1909 
#15-0810411909 
#19 - 30/05/1909 
#20 - 12/06/1909 
#23 - 16/07/1909 
#28 - 24/10/1909 
Cruces, Mo 11 
#2 - 16/04/1910 
#3 - 01/05/1910 
SANTIAGO, Santiago de Cuba, 1979: 
SOLIDARIDAD GASTRONÖMICA, La Habana: 
AAo V- #6 -15/06/1954 
Mo VI - #8 -15/08/1955 
MoVll-#12-1511211956 
TEORIA Y PRACTICA, La Habana, 1967. 
jTIERRAI; Peri6dico Semenal: 
Mo II: 
#44 - 09/05/1903 
#45 -16/05/1903 
#51- 27/06/1903 
#52 - 04/07/1903 
#56 - 01/08/1903 
#58 -15/08/1903 
#59 - 22/08/1903 
#60 - 29/08/1903 
#61- 05/09/1903 
#63 -19/09/1903 
#64 - 26/09/1903 
#66 - 10/10/1903 
#70 - 07/11/1903 
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Arlo VI: 
#222 - 23/03/1907 
#226 - 30/04/1907 




#257 - 22/02/1908 






#222 - 23/03/1907 
#226 - 30/04/1907 
#235 - 27/07/1907 
#251- 21/12/1907 
#294 - 27/02/1909 
#298 - 27/03/1909 
#318 -16/10/1909 
Aßo IX: 
#330 -15/01 /1910 
#343 -16/04/1910 
Atio X: 
A: #408 - 01 /07/1911 
B: #410 -19/08/1911 
C: X411- 26/08/1911 
D: #418 -13110/1911 
E: #423 -11/11/1911 
F: #428 - 23/12/1911 
Afio XIII: 
#562 -16/07/1914 
#565 - 06/08/1914 
#568 - 27/08/1914 
#569 - 03/09/1914 
#570 - 10/09/1914 
#573 - 01/10/1914 
#575 - 22/10/1914 
#578 - 26/11/1914 
#579 - 03/12/1914 
Agio l: 
#1-14/0811924 
#2 - 21/08/1924 
#3 - 28/08/1924 
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#4 - 04109/1 924 
#0 -1810911924 
17 - 25/0911024 
#8 - 02/1011924 




# 13 - 0611 111 924 
#14-13/11/1924 






#25 - 30/0111925 
#35 -1ß/O4/1925 
#42 - 05/06/1925 
1TIERRAI: Or©ano do la Fedoracibn Central do Anarquistas do Cuba. La Habana: 
Mo 1: 
#0 - 30/01/1934 
V -10/03/1934 
#0 -10104/1934 
TRADAJADORES, brgano Official do la Central do Trabajadores do Cuba, La Habana. 
VERDE OLIVIO, La Habana, 1972,1992. 






07 - 09/03/1912 
VOZ DEL DEPENDIENTE: LA: Organo defensor de tos dependientes de cafe, fondas, 
restaurontes, hotels y cocineros do is Isla do Cuba 




Archivo Naclonal do Cuba: 
Reiistro de Asociaciones 
SOIF " Sindicato Obrero de la Industria Fabric - Legajo 390, Expedicnte 11964 
FAC - Federaciön Anticlerical Cubana - Legajo 371, Expediente 11251 
FOH - Federacibn Obrera de la Habana - Legajo 383. Expediente 11540 
'La Gloria' - Union de Empleados y Obreros de la Fabnca de Chocolate. Galleticas y 
Confitura'La Gloria' - Legajo 341, Expediente 10153 
UCH - Union de Cocineros de la Habana - Legajo 433, Expedience 15393 
SDRHFH - Sociedad de Dependientes de Restauantes, Hoteles y Fondas de to Haban - Legajo 425, Expediente 13421 
CMA - Congregation Mariana de la Anunciata - Legajo 346, Expediente 16019 
SOIC - Sindicato ObreroIndustrial do Cuba - Legajo 371, Expediente 11256 
SENFH - Sociedad de Empleados de la Nueva Fabrica de Hieb - Legajo 1118. Expediente 
23376 
Secretaria de la Presidencia 
#63, Legajo 76 
Donativos y Remisiones 





Archivo Juan M Portuundo Domench 
#702 
17-33 
Public Records Office, Kew, London: 
(British Government) Foreign Office Reports, FO/371. 
Censuses and Government Publications at the British Library, London; 
Canso do la Republica do Cuba. Bajo la administracion previsional de los Estados Unkios, 
1907, USA Department of War. Census of Cuba, Washington, 1907 
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Censo do la RepOblica do Cuba, Direc ciOn del Censo, Mode 1919. 
Direccidn General del Censo, Movimiento do Poblacian on Is Republica desdo Primer do 
Enero do 1924 a 31 DiciembAre del mismo aflo, La Habana, 1925. 
USA Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Information Bulletin #1-60,1922. 
Secretaria do Hacienda. Seccidn do Estad(sticas. lnmigraci6n y e! Movimionto do Pasajoros. 
La Habana, 1927 
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